Social categorization in connectionist networks: Towards a unified model of person perception by Klapper, A.P.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/175877
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-07 and may be subject to
change.
Social Categorization in 
Connectionist Networks
T Person Perception
André Klapper
your design here
Invitation
For the 
public defense 
of my dissertation
Social Categorization in 
Connectionist Networks
on Monday 11 September 2017 
at 16:30
in the Aula of the 
Radbout University
Com niuslaan 2
Nijmegen
André Klapper
a.klapper@donders.ru.nl
Paranymphs
Gesa Kappen
Lin Jansen
 
 
 
 
 
S
O
C
IA
L
 C
A
T
E
G
O
R
IZ
A
T
IO
N
 IN
 C
O
N
N
E
C
T
IO
N
IS
T
 N
E
T
W
O
R
K
S
 
A
ndre K
lapper
2 0
1 7
Social Categorization in Connectionist Networks
Towards a Unified Model of Person Perception
André Klapper
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   1 17-07-17   13:09
ISBN: 978-94-6299-664-9
Layout: Nikki Vermeulen – Ridderprint BV
Printing: Ridderprint BV – www.ridderprint.nl
The research in this dissertation was supported by a NWO grant 464-11-036 awarded to 
Ron Dotsch and Daniël Wigboldus.
© André Klapper, 2017.
No part of this thesis may be reproduced in any form without prior written permission 
of the author.
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   2 17-07-17   13:09
Social Categorization in Connectionist Networks
Towards a Unified Model of Person Perception
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 11 september  2017 
om 16.30 uur precies
door
André Klapper
geboren op 16 Juni 1986
te Keulen
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   3 17-07-17   13:09
Promotor
Prof. dr. Daniël H.J. Wigboldus
Copromotoren
Dr. Ron Dotsch
Dr. Iris van Rooij
Manuscriptcommissie
Prof. dr. Harold Bekkering 
Dr. Pim Haselager
Prof. dr. Ernestine Gordijn (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   4 17-07-17   13:09
Contents
Chapter 1
Introduction 
7
Chapter 2
Four Meanings of “Categorization” 
27
Chapter 3
Unifying Social Categorization and Connectionist Models 
55
Chapter 4
Testing Novel Predictions 
99
Chapter 5
General Discussion 
125
Appendix
English Summary 143
Dutch Summary 151
Acknowledgements 159
Curriculum Vitae 167
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   5 17-07-17   13:09
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   6 17-07-17   13:09
Chapter
I n t roduc t i on
01
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   7 17-07-17   13:09
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   8 17-07-17   13:09
01I n t r o d u c t i o n  -  C h a p t e r  1
9 
Imagine you are at a party and look for a conversation partner. You look at one 
person and get the impression that this person is relatively shy, and probably not 
interested in a conversation. You look at another person and get the impression 
that this person is arrogant, and probably not a pleasant person to talk to. Then you 
notice another person who appears likeable, and trustworthy. Despite not really 
knowing any of these people, you decide to approach the latter person. 
 People are able to arrive at impressions of other people (e.g. that they are shy, 
arrogant, or likeable) with ease and relatively quickly. While this ability helps us 
to navigate through the social world (e.g. on a party), it can also have detrimental 
consequences. Discrimination by nationality, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, 
age, and discrimination against various kinds of minority groups are common in 
many societies, and these phenomena may in part also be a consequence of our 
tendency to arrive at impressions of other people quickly, and based on relatively 
little information. For example, in 2016 the black rapper Typhoon was stopped by 
the police in his car not because he violated any traffic rules but because his profile 
(a black person) did not match his expensive car. Much like people quickly pick 
out a potential conversation partner at a party, the policeman quickly picked out a 
potential criminal based on superficial cues such as race. 
 In the example above, the policeman was fully aware and admitted that he was 
biased. In addition to such explicit forms of discrimination against social groups, 
person perception research has shown that there are also more implicit forms (Banks 
& Eberhardt, 2006; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; 
Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). For example, if a witness of a crime is presented 
with a line-up of suspects, the witness is more likely to falsely identify an innocent 
suspect if the suspect is from a different race than the witness (Hugenberg, Young, 
Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010). Furthermore, it was shown in a simulated task that people 
are more likely to accidentally shoot innocent African Americans compared to 
innocent White Americans (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2007). Such implicit 
forms of discrimination can sometimes operate outside of people’s awareness, and 
they can occur even if people do not hold negative explicit beliefs about these social 
groups (Dovidio et al., 2002; but see De Houwer, 2006). 
 Without an understanding of the mechanisms that underlie person perception, 
these issues remain relatively intangible. For example, although we may simply 
forbid police officers to engage in racial profiling, this will not change that these 
police officers are more likely to perceive a black person as criminal. Consequently, 
they may still engage in implicit forms of prejudice (e.g. being more likely to shoot an 
innocent African American compared to a White American). Likewise, while quotas 
for employing women may help to reduce gender inequalities in employment rates, 
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the potentially underlying perceptions (e.g. that women are less competent or more 
submissive) remain unchanged and may continue to manifest themselves in other 
situations. In general, addressing the underlying causes of discrimination may be 
relatively intangible without understanding the cognitive mechanisms through 
which they come into existence. For this reason, a general aim of the present 
dissertation is to contribute to our general understanding of person perception.
Conceptual Challenges
The present dissertation aims to advance our general understanding of person 
perception through conceptual contributions. This approach is different from more 
common empirical research approaches. For this reason, I will first provide a simplified 
illustration of the type of contributions intended by the present dissertation. 
 The first goal is to advance the conceptual clarity of existing theories. To illustrate 
why this is important, let us temporarily leave the scientific task of understanding 
the cognitive mechanisms that may underlie person perception, and consider the 
more straightforward everyday task of understanding another person’s character. 
For example, suppose that we want to understand Peter’s characters and have the 
theory that “Peter has a good heart”. In that case, we may wonder: what does it mean 
to “have a good heart”? One researcher may believe that “having a good heart” means 
to generally act relatively kind towards other people (the good person meaning; e.g. 
Mother Theresa). Another researcher may believe that “having a good heart” means 
to have the potential to be kind but this trait may not necessarily manifest itself in 
behavior (the good core meaning; e.g. Darth Vader or Ebeneza Scrooge). 
 Notice that the predictions one can derive from the theory that “Peter has a good 
heart” depend heavily on the chosen meaning. Under the good person meaning, 
the theory that “Peter has a good heart” predicts that Peter tends to act kind. Under 
the good core meaning, the theory that “Peter has a good heart” does not lead to 
this prediction and may even be compatible with a person who behaves relatively 
viciously (e.g. Darth Vader or Ebeneza Scrooge). As a result, our understanding of 
Peter remains limited in the sense that we cannot derive clear predictions about 
Peter. Advancing our understanding of Peter would require to disentangle different 
meanings of the theory that “Peter has a good heart”, and to investigate which one 
fits Peter’s behavior best (e.g. is he generally kind or does he merely have a good 
core?). In other words, we would have to narrow down the meaning of “a good 
heart”.
 The second goal of the present thesis is to advance the integration of existing 
theories. As the number of existing theories grows, an important question is how 
these theories are related to each other and how they may be integrated into a single 
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overarching theory. To illustrate why this is an important point, imagine that we have 
two theories about Peter: “Peter is choleric” (theory 1) and “Peter has a good heart” 
(theory 2). Now we may wonder: should we predict that Peter acts aggressively (given 
that Peter is choleric; theory 1) or should we predict that Peter acts gentle (given 
that Peter has a good heart; theory 2)? This is hard to tell and there are two possible 
reasons why it is hard to tell. The first possibility is that the two theories contradict 
each other: theory 1 declares Peter as aggressive, and theory 2 declares Peter as not 
aggressive. In that case, the theories taken together do not really enlighten us about 
Peter. Instead, they may merely fool us into believing that we understand Peter by 
enabling us to cherry pick explanations from a pool of incompatible theories (“of 
course Peter punched that person, he is generally aggressive towards other people” 
and “of course Peter responded gently to that offensive remark, he has a good heart 
and is thus not aggressive”).
 Another possibility is that the two theories are compatible in principle but not 
yet integrated by an overarching framework. For example, we could say that being 
choleric means to act aggressively when having low control over ourselves (e.g. 
under pressure), while having a good heart means to be kind to other people in 
situations of high control. As a result of this framework, it becomes clear when which 
theory applies: theory 1 (“Peter is choleric”) applies in situations of low self-control 
and theory 2 (“Peter has a good heart”) applies in situations of high self-control. 
Consequently, we can derive clear predictions through which the overarching 
theory that “Peter is a choleric with a good heart” can be tested as a whole. Hence, 
when theories accumulate in the literature, clarifying how those theories are related 
to each other and how they can be integrated becomes an increasingly important 
task.
 Much like conceptual clarity and integration is important for the everyday task 
of understanding a person’s character, it is also important for the scientific task of 
understanding the cognitive mechanisms that may underlie person perception. 
The present dissertation will focus on two classes of person perception models: 
social categorization and connectionist models. Social categorization models have 
provided influential ideas about person perception but their main assumptions have 
remained relatively ambiguous (as will be elaborated upon below). Moreover, the 
relationship between social categorization and connectionist models has remained 
relatively unclear (as will be elaborated upon below). In the following, I will provide a 
brief summary of the history of social categorization and connectionist models. Next, 
I will outline the contribution intended by the present dissertation, and introduce 
tools that will be employed for this purpose.
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Social categorization models
An important origin of social categorization models is the work of Allport (1954). He 
was one of the first to suggest that prejudice and stereotyping may be by-products 
of the natural tendency to categorize stimuli (e.g. people). For example, when sitting 
in a restaurant, we automatically distinguish between people who are “guests” and 
“waiters” and adjust our expectations and behavior towards these people based on 
these categories. Allport suggested that we automatically categorize other people 
(into social roles, nationalities, genders, occupations, etc.) and that these categories 
provide us with expectations and behavioral scripts that help us to navigate through 
the social world. Unfortunately, this adaptive process also has the side-effect that it 
can lead to various types of discrimination. 
 Allport’s ideas brought revolutionary changes in the thinking about prejudice and 
stereotyping. In particular, they opened the door to the currently widely accepted 
view that prejudice and stereotyping are natural everyday phenomena that can be 
observed in virtually every person (Correll et al., 2007; Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 
2002; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 2002; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 
2003, 2004; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). This laid the theoretical foundations for research 
on implicit forms of prejudice, which is now widespread in the literature (Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995). 
 Allport’s work was later complemented by the work of Tajfel (1969). In particular, 
Tajfel found evidence that people do not only categorize other people but also tend 
to exaggerate the perceived differences between social categories. In a famous 
experiment, he presented lines to participants and asked them to judge the length 
of the lines. In the categorization group, short lines were labeled with the letter “A” 
while long lines were labeled with the letter “B” (which was counterbalanced; Tajfel 
& Wilkes, 1963). In the control group, the letters were randomly assigned to the line 
lengths such that there was no relationship between the letters and the length of 
the lines. The results showed that participants perceived a larger between-category 
difference (i.e. lines that were labeled as “A” and lines that were labeled as “B) in the 
categorization relatively to the control group. Similar findings were later obtained 
with social stimuli. Namely, if two social groups that differ on some trait dimension 
(e.g. likability) are given different social labels (e.g. nationalities), their differences on 
the trait dimensions tend to become exaggerated (Razran, 1950; Secord, Bevan, & 
Katz, 1956; Tajfel, Sheikh, & Gardner, 1964; Tajfel, 1959)
 Similar ideas were proposed in theories of social identity and self-categorization 
(Brown, 2000; Hornsey, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). A central idea of these theories 
is that people can construe themselves and others as either unique individuals 
(individuation) or group members (social categorization). This idea also became a 
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central notion in impression formation models. In particular, Brewer (1988) proposed 
an impression formation model in which people employ two processing strategies. 
Initially, a social perceiver automatically categorizes a perceived person (e.g. X is a 
man), which can give rise to stereotyped impressions (e.g. given that X is a man, X 
may be dominant). However, if the perceiver is sufficiently motivated and possess 
sufficient cognitive resources, the perceiver may subsequently individuate the other 
person by looking at the individual characteristics of this person (e.g. X behaves 
submissive). 
 Fiske and Neuberg (1990) further elaborated this idea in their influential 
Continuum Model of impression formation. They proposed that categorization and 
individuation are two extremes of a continuum and that the processing strategies 
people adopt usually fall somewhere on this continuum. This model entailed that 
social perceivers initially assign a social category to a perceived person that best 
organizes the observed attributes about this person. For example, when perceiving 
an athletic and tall person with a deep voice, we may assign the person to the category 
male because this category organizes the observed attributes best (categorization). 
Next, we may search for further attributes and assess to which degree the category 
fits the other person. If the fit of those attributes with the category is low (suppose 
we discover that the other person has long hair, and wears make-up) we next 
attempt to find a sub-category that fits the target person better (e.g. transvestite). 
This process of sub-categorizing repeats until a fitting sub-category is found. If none 
of the available sub-categories fits the attributes of the other person well enough, 
the other person will be processed solely based on the observable attributes 
(individuation).
 Although the abovementioned models all differ in various respects, they share 
the general idea that people can categorize or individuate a perceived person. This 
idea is still widespread in the impression formation literature (Crisp, 2007; Gawronski 
et al., 2003; Krueger & Rothbart, 1988; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993; Kunda & 
Thagard, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001; Macrae, 
Shepherd, & Milne, 1992; Pratto & Bargh, 1991; Quinn & Macrae, 2005). In addition, 
the idea that people can either categorize or individuate other people also inspired 
research on person memory. In particular, it was found that people tend to confuse 
people more frequently within a social category (e.g. a man with other men) than 
between social categories (e.g. a man with women) - especially when the social 
category is made salient (Blanz, 1999; Gawronski et al., 2003; Klauer, Hölzenbein, 
Calanchini, & Sherman, 2014; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). This was later 
complemented by research that employed a process dissociation analysis, which 
provided evidence for the existence of two underlying cognitive components: one 
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component in which every member of a social group is treated as the same entity 
(categorization) and another component in which every perceived person is treated 
as a separate entity (individuation; Klauer & Wegener, 1998). Research showed that 
these two cognitive components can be independently influenced by experimental 
manipulations: for example, cognitive load tends to impair individuation more 
strongly than categorization (Klauer & Wegener, 1998).  
 Recently, the categorization-individuation distinction also led to insights into the 
other-race effect: the effect that same-race faces are better recognized than other-
race faces (Hugenberg et al., 2010). This effect can have dramatic consequences when 
an eye-witness is asked to identify the culprit of a crime in a line-up of suspects. In 
this context, the other-race effect entails that suspects from a different race than the 
witness have a higher risk for being falsely remembered as the culprit than suspects 
from the same race as the witness. Originally, this phenomenon had been attributed 
to lack of experience with recognizing other-race faces, which would mean that it 
may be hard to prevent (Hugenberg et al., 2010). However, recent research showed 
that the other-race effect is reduced when the perceivers are asked to pay close 
attention to the individual features of each perceived person (Hugenberg, Miller, 
& Claypool, 2007; S. G. Young & Hugenberg, 2011). This led to the suggestion that 
the higher recognition performance for own-race faces is not solely a product of 
less experience with other-race people but may also reflect lower motivation to 
individuate other-race people (Hugenberg et al., 2010). This suggested for the first 
time that the other-race effect may be reduced by relatively simple interventions 
aimed at motivating perceivers to individuate.
 In sum, social categorization models converge on the idea that person perception 
is driven by (at least) two cognitive strategies: social categorization and individuation. 
This idea is consistent with various empirical findings (e.g. Hugenberg et al., 2010; 
Klauer & Wegener, 1998) and has inspired several important advances in the person 
perception literature (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hugenberg et al., 2010; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). As such, the idea that social categorization and individuation 
are driving person perception may be seen as a highly influential characterization of 
the potential mechanisms of person perception.
Connectionist models
Another influential account of the potential mechanisms of person perception comes 
from connectionist models (Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; 
Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Smith, 1996). According to connectionist models, person 
perception is driven by a set of processing units (nodes) that are connected with 
each other by weighted links (associations). The basic idea of connectionist models 
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is that external stimuli (person X) can be represented by these nodes (e.g. a node 
may represent African American).1 These nodes can be activated by observation (e.g. 
perceiving Mike Tyson may activate the node African American). Simultaneously, 
associations between the nodes are learned based on observed co-variances. 
After such an association is learned, a node can activate other nodes indirectly by 
spreading activation via associative links.
 According to connectionist models, various types of discrimination may result 
from these associative mechanisms.  For example, after perceiving several African 
Americans who appear criminal (e.g. in biased presentations in the media), we may 
learn an association between the representations African American, and criminal. 
This learned association may subsequently influence our perceptions of people. 
For example, after having learned an association between African American and 
criminal, the representation African American may tend to spread activation to 
the representation criminal, making a perceiver may be more inclined to judge an 
African American as criminal. This may then cause explicit and implicit forms of 
discrimination against African Americans (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
 Connectionist models became initially prominent in research on language 
processing (Rogers & McClelland, 2014). For instance, it was shown that people’s 
ability to recognize words can be explained by a connectionist model where an 
initial layer of nodes responds to low-level features of a letter (e.g. horizontal and 
vertical lines), which then spread activation to nodes that denote letters, which in 
turn spread activation to nodes that denote whole words (Seidenberg & McClelland, 
1989). Furthermore, connectionist models gained prominence because they could 
account for various phenomena (e.g. context sensitivity, the word frequency effect, 
and graceful degradation,) that could not all be explained by previous models 
(Rogers & McClelland, 2014). 
 The general ideas of connectionist models also influenced the theorizing in 
the person perception literature. In particular, the idea emerged in research on 
social attitudes that people may learn implicit attitudes in the form of learned 
associations. These associations may then operate relatively independent of explicit 
beliefs (Dovidio et al., 2002; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald, Mcghee, & 
Schwartz, 1998; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). In addition, connectionist ideas also played 
a pivotal role in explanations of social priming. The idea of social priming is activating 
1 Above, I describe connectionist models that assume localist representations in the sense that each 
person property is represented by one node (e.g. beard, professor, Brad Pitt, etc.). In addition, there are 
models with distributed representations in the sense that each person property is represented by a 
pattern of activation over a whole population of nodes. Often localist models can be seen as simplified 
and compatible abstractions from distributed models (e.g. Schröder & Thagard, 2013). For the sake of 
simplicity, I focus on localist connectionist models. 
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a mental representation (e.g. by presenting a word, picture or other stimulus that is 
conceptually related to the representation) may already be enough to trigger various 
effects on behavior. For example, it was shown that participants behaved more 
hostile after activating the representation of African American (Schröder & Thagard, 
2013). Such findings were explained by the connectionist notions of excitation 
from observation, and spreading activation between representations (Bargh, 1999; 
Schröder & Thagard, 2013; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
 Furthermore, more comprehensive and formal connectionist models of person 
perception emerged. For example, Kunda and Thagard (1996) provided an extensive 
review in which they demonstrated that a multitude of documented phenomena 
in the impression formation literature can be explained by a formal connectionist 
model. This was later complemented by other models that included potential 
learning mechanisms through which associative networks may be generated from 
experience (Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van Rooy, Van 
Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, & French, 2003; Zebrowitz et al., 2003). Recently, 
it was argued that the dynamic processes that operate in connectionist models may 
also fit to the way participants move the mouse cursor towards a response label in a 
categorization task (Freeman, Ambady, Rule, & Johnson, 2008; Freeman & Ambady, 
2009, 2011; Freeman & Nakayama, 2007).
 Taken together, the ideas of connectionist models are ubiquitous in the person 
perception literature. Moreover, proponents of connectionist models pointed out 
that these models have the strength that they have been formalized (Kunda & 
Thagard, 1996). This means that the general assumptions of connectionist models 
have been described in unequivocal mathematical language, and can therefore 
also be simulated on a computer. In addition, it has been argued that connectionist 
models are relatively parsimonious in the sense that they do not ascribe different 
person perception phenomena to different cognitive strategies (e.g. the distinction 
between categorization and individuation) but explain person perception 
phenomena uniformly by the principles of associative learning, and influences 
of learned associations during person perception (Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & 
Thagard, 1996). 
The present contribution
What do these models taken together teach us about person perception? One 
lesson is that discrimination against social groups may be a consequence of people’s 
tendency to “categorize” rather than to individuate (social categorization models). 
However, what does it mean to “categorize”? Earlier, I gave the example that the 
theory that “Peter has a good heart” provides only limited insights about “Peter” if 
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it is unclear what it means to “have a good heart”. Analogous to this example, the 
theory that people may discriminate against social groups because they “categorize” 
provides only insight to the degree that it is clear what it means to “categorize”. As 
we will argue in more detail later, there are several existing meanings of the term 
“categorization” in the literature and as a result the theory that “people categorize 
other people” does not make unequivocal predictions. Advancing our understanding 
of person perception therefore requires to disentangle these different meanings, 
and to investigate to what extent they fit to documented phenomena of person 
perception.
 Another lesson is that various forms of discrimination against social groups may 
be caused by associative processes (connectionist models). However, how does this 
idea relate to the idea of social categorization models? One existing perspective is 
that social categorization and connectionist models are competing with each other 
(Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). A reason for this perspective may 
be that social categorization models have often been seen as dual process models: 
they assume that person perception is driven by (at least) social categorization and 
individuation (Brewer, 1988). In contrast, connectionist models have often been seen 
as single process models: they assume that person perception is generally driven by 
associative processes (Ehret, Monroe, & Read, 2014; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). As a 
result, social categorization and connectionist models appear to be in conflict with 
regard to the number of cognitive processes they assume (Cox & Devine, 2015; 
Kunda & Thagard, 1996). If this is the case, then adopting both social categorization 
models and connectionist models when explaining person perception phenomena 
would be incoherent.
 An alternative existing perspective is that social categorization and connectionist 
models are compatible with each other and could in principle be integrated into 
a single model of person perception (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). However, as yet, 
there is no overarching framework that explains how the distinction between 
categorization and individuation can be integrated into (single process) connectionist 
models. As a result, it is not clear when which model applies. For example, although 
there is a documented cognitive dissociation in person memory that may fit to the 
idea that people can categorize and individuate (Klauer & Wegener, 1998), one is left 
to wonder whether this dissociation constitutes evidence against (single process) 
connectionist models. Hence, if social categorization and connectionist models are 
compatible, a framework is lacking that clarifies when which model is applicable.
 Note that advancing the conceptual clarity and integration of existing models 
are theoretical goals. For example, the question of how social categorization and 
connectionist models are related, and how they may be integrated cannot be 
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answered solely by empirical research. Empirical research can address the question 
to what extent a cognitive model is plausible (in light of evidence) but it cannot – 
by itself – clarify the relationship between existing models or – by itself – integrate 
existing models. Instead, answering such conceptual questions requires theoretical 
research as well. Given that theoretical research is less widespread than empirical 
research in the person perception literature, I will briefly outline the research tools 
employed in the present dissertation. 
Research tools
There are several tools that will be employed in the present dissertation. The first 
tool is Marr’s (1982) conceptual distinction between three levels at which a cognitive 
mechanism can be described: the computational level (the input-output mapping), 
algorithmic level (the process), and implementational level (the physical instantiation 
of the process). It has been pointed out that sometimes different models of social 
cognition have been treated as competing although they may describe the same 
cognitive mechanism at different levels (De Houwer, 2015). Hence, situating models 
at the right level is crucial in order to determine how models are related to each 
other.
 What do the three levels refer to? To illustrate this, consider the example of a 
coffee machine. The computational level model of this machine could be that it takes 
some water, a coffee capsule, and a cup (input), and returns a cup with coffee inside 
(output). This is what the coffee machine does. But how does it do this? An algorithmic 
level model describes by which sequence of steps the input is transformed into the 
output. In the case of the coffee machine, the processing steps involve pressing the 
water through the powder in the coffee capsule, and pouring the result into the 
cup. Of course, there are several ways this algorithm can be physically instantiated 
(as evident from different existing coffee machines) and the physical instantiation is 
what is described at the implementational level.  
 An illustration may help to see why the distinction between computational level 
and algorithmic level is particularly important for comparing social categorization 
and connectionist models. Notice that a coffee-capsule machine returns different 
(that is, dissociable) types of coffees dependent on the capsule one provides as an 
input. Importantly, the reason for this is not that the coffee machine employs several 
processes (in either case, it presses the water through the capsule) but because the 
machine can take different inputs (different types of coffee capsules). However, 
notice that a coffee machine may also take one capsule as an input and then return 
either a coffee or an espresso. In this case, the input is the same but the process 
(i.e. how the water is pressed through the capsule) is different. Thus, a dissociation 
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between different outputs could either reflect a dissociation between different 
processes (algorithmic level) or it may reflect a dissociation between different inputs 
(computational level). As such, a key question is whether the distinction between 
categorization and individuation needs to be a process distinction or whether it can 
be an input distinction in (single process) connectionist models. 
 The second conceptual tool that will be employed in the present dissertation is 
formalization. To formalize a model means to express it in unequivocal mathematical 
language, which is an effective strategy to address conceptual ambiguities in 
theories. Conceptual ambiguities do not only limit the extent to which a theory 
advances our understanding of person perception (what does the theory that 
“people categorize” tell us if it is unclear what “categorization” means?) but also make 
it difficult to integrate theories (what is “categorization” in a connectionist model?). 
For these reasons, a central aim of the present dissertation will be to provide steps 
towards the conceptual sharpening, and formalization of the core notions of social 
categorization models. 
 The third employed tool is computer simulation. In essence, a computer 
simulation entails to let the computer derive a prediction from a formal model rather 
than calculating the prediction by hand. A strength of computer simulations is that 
computers only understand formal language and do not allow for any contradictions 
(otherwise, the computer simulation will not run). Therefore, deriving a prediction 
from a cognitive model via a computer simulation can be seen as a proof that the 
cognitive model leads to this prediction. For example, we may wonder: can an input 
distinction (analogous to: two types of coffee capsules go in) account for evidence of 
a cognitive dissociation (analogous to: two types of coffees come out)? A computer 
simulation can help to answer such questions unequivocally: if a computer 
simulation with an input distinction but no process distinction can reproduce the 
evidence for the cognitive dissociation, then an input distinction can account for the 
documented dissociation. Finally, the last employed tool will be empirical research 
to test predictions of the integrative framework that we will propose later.
Outline of the dissertation
The present dissertation aims to advance (1) the conceptual clarity of social 
categorization models, and (2) the integration of social categorization and 
connectionist models. In Chapter 2, we disentangle four qualitatively different 
meanings with which the term “categorization” has been used in the person 
perception literature. Moreover, we aim to show that the predictions of the 
theory that “people categorize other people” depend on the adopted meaning of 
“categorization”. As we will show, this conceptual contribution by itself can already 
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help to reconcile conflicting viewpoints in the literature, and thus contributes to the 
integration of existing research.
 In Chapter 3, we present a theoretical framework that aims to integrate the core 
notions of social categorization and connectionist models. The basic idea is that the 
distinction between social categorization and individuation may be understood 
as a distinction at the computational level of connectionist models (i.e. they are 
analogous to different coffee capsules) rather than their algorithmic level (i.e. the 
process is always the same). Next, we provide a formal implementation of the 
proposed theoretical framework (while adopting one of the existing meanings of 
“categorization”), and show in computer simulations that the resulting model can 
account for documented phenomena in various person perception areas. In addition, 
we show how our formal model helps to address existing conceptual issues of social 
categorization models. 
 Ideally, a theoretical framework should not only be able to explain existing 
findings (post hoc) but it should also predict novel findings (a priori). In Chapter 
4, we therefore present studies that test predictions of our framework that do not 
follow unequivocally from previous person perception models. Specifically, our 
framework predicts that memory confusions between people can occur based on 
any social representation that can be used to group other people. Consistent with 
this prediction, we find evidence that people tend to confuse trustworthy looking 
faces more readily with other trustworthy looking faces than with untrustworthy 
looking faces (and vice versa). Moreover, we find evidence for a dissociation 
between categorization and individuation if we apply a conventional process 
dissociation analysis to this data. These findings could not have been unequivocally 
predicted from past models, which assumed that memory confusions are caused 
by “categorization” and typically considered trustworthiness a non-categorical 
representation. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the general theoretical contributions as well as 
societal, and scientific implications of the work presented in this dissertation. 
Theoretical contributions concern the sharpening, and integration of existing 
models. Societal implications involve further insights about the potential causes of 
discrimination against social groups. Finally, scientific implications involve lessons 
about the value of theoretical research tools such as formalization and computer 
simulations. 
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Abstrac t
It is widely assumed that people tend to “categorize” other people, and that 
“categorization” is the source of various documented biases in person perception. 
However, these notions have also been criticized as being vague or artificial, and 
some researchers even suggested to reject them. We suggest that such issues may 
reflect that the term “categorization” has been used with qualitatively different 
underlying definitions. We present a conceptual analysis in which we disentangle 
four different definitions that have been employed in the person perception 
literature: (1) categorization as representing, (2) categorization as dichotomizing, 
(3) categorization as organizing, and (4) categorization as grouping. We show 
that seemingly antagonistic viewpoints in the literature may be reconciled by 
disentangling these definitions. Furthermore, we argue that disentangling these 
definitions is vital for theoretical interpretations of (past and future) empirical 
findings. Overall, our work aims to contribute to the clarity of person perception 
theories, provide novel perspectives on existing debates, and serve as a stepping 
stone for more differentiated models of person perception.
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Introduc tion
People spontaneously categorize other people and use the knowledge that is 
associated with those categories to guide their behavior. For example, upon 
encountering another person, we may immediately categorize the person as a 
“policeman”, infer that the person may have a relatively dominant personality, and 
adjust our behavior to be respectful to the other person. This is how the person 
perception process has been characterized by social categorization models. These 
models have been highly influential in the person perception literature (Brewer, 
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Hugenberg, Young, 
Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010), and which have been used to explain various phenomena 
related to stereotyping, prejudice, and biases in judgments and memory (Allport, 
1954; Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007; Hugenberg et al., 2010; Klauer & Wegener, 
1998; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Tajfel, 1969; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978; Young 
& Hugenberg, 2011). 
 Notwithstanding their pivotal role in the literature, social categorization models 
have been criticized due to conceptual issues. For example, Quinn and Macrae 
(2005) noted that researchers have reached seemingly antagonistic conclusions 
from the empirical literature, and speculated that this may be because there is no 
consensus on the question how the term “categorization” should be defined in the 
person perception literature. Furthermore, Kunda and Thagard (1996) noted that 
researchers have distinguished between categorical and non-categorical processes 
in person perception while leaving ambiguous what exactly distinguishes these two 
types of processes. Similar concerns were raised by Cox and Devine (2015). Because 
of such issues, some have argued for models that avoid the typical notions of social 
categorization models (Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). 
 What is the cause of these issues? As Quinn and Macrae (2005) suggested, a 
likely cause is that different researchers have used the term “categorization” with 
different definitions. If that is the case, a possible solution may be to disentangle the 
confounded definitions and investigate whether the issues could reflect different 
usages of the term “categorization”. For example, seemingly antagonistic viewpoints 
may turn out to be compatible if they employ the term “categorization” with 
different definitions. However, as yet, it has remained relatively unclear what those 
confounded definitions are, and whether disentangling them can address existing 
issues.
 In the present article, we present a conceptual analysis in which we disentangle 
four definitions with which the term “categorization” has been used in the person 
perception literature. Next, we demonstrate how confounding these definitions 
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may have contributed to several open questions in the literature. Conversely, we 
argue that disentangling the definitions may help to answer those questions. In 
the following, we briefly describe several existing issues in the person perception 
literature for which this conceptual contribution is relevant.
Open Questions
First, there are seemingly antagonistic viewpoints about the question how 
integral categorization is to person perception. According to the traditional view 
“categorization” is an inevitable part of person perception – there cannot be 
person perception without it (Allport, 1954). However, other researchers argued 
that “categorization” may be only one of several processing strategies that social 
perceivers can employ, and that social perceivers rely on categorization only under 
certain conditions (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). As yet, the question whether “categorization” is an inevitable 
or a conditional part of person perception has been largely treated as an empirical 
question. However, we aim to show that these viewpoints may not be as antagonistic 
as they seem. That is, both the hypothesis that “categorization” is inevitable, and 
that “categorization” is a conditional strategy can be true at the same time, if those 
hypotheses employ different definitions of the term “categorization”.
 Second, if one adopts the viewpoint that “categorization” is a conditional 
processing strategy, it is relatively unclear to what extent social perceivers rely on 
“categorization”. While the more traditional view is that “categorization” is a frequently 
employed default of person perception (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), some 
researchers noted that non-categorical processes seem to be relatively common 
(Krueger & Rothbart, 1988), and some more recent findings suggested that people 
rely more on non-categorical processes than previously assumed (Blair, Judd, Sadler, 
& Jenkins, 2002; Blair, Chapleau, & Judd, 2005; Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004). As a 
result, there is no clear answer to the question of how frequently people “categorize”. 
We suggest that this issue may not reflect solely insufficient empirical data but also 
different employed definitions of “categorization” in the literature. That is, the same 
set of findings may support the conclusion that people “categorize” frequently under 
some definitions but not under others. Consequently, the conclusions that different 
researchers reach can be conflicting even when based on the same set of empirical 
findings. Disentangling these definitions is therefore an important requirement to 
reach a coherent conclusion about the frequency with which people “categorize”.
 Third, there has been debate about the scientific value of the key notions of 
social categorization models. In particular, there appear to be ambiguities in the way 
researchers distinguished “categorization” from other hypothetical processes (Cox & 
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Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Quinn & Macrae, 2005). For example, although 
“categorization” has been defined as grouping individuals (e.g. Mason & Macrae, 
2004), mapping a person onto a personality trait (e.g. this person is “intelligent”) has 
been explicitly distinguished from “categorization”. However, Kunda and Thagard 
(1996) noted that people can be grouped based on virtually every property – 
including personality traits (e.g. the group of intelligent people). As such, there 
seems to be a conceptual reason why mapping a person onto a personality trait does 
not constitute “categorization”. For such reasons, conceptual distinctions between 
“categorization” and alternative processes have been rejected by several researchers 
(Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). 
 We suggest that a source of the issues above may be that terms like “category” 
and “categorization” have been used with different underlying definitions, and that 
these definitions are currently confounded in the literature. If this is the case, then the 
issues above may be addressed (at least, in part) by disentangling the confounded 
definitions of “categorization”. 
Conceptual Analysis
Our conceptual analysis extracts and disentangles four different definitions with 
which the term “categorization” has been used in the person perception literature. 
First, the term “categorization” has been used to refer to the process of mapping 
external stimuli onto internal representations (the representing definition). Second, 
the term “categorization” has been used to refer to the process of mapping stimuli 
that vary on graded dimensions onto binary all-or-none representations (the 
dichotomization definition). Third, the term “categorization” has been used to refer to 
the process of summarizing information about other people in terms of organizing 
representations (the organizing definition). Fourth, the term has been used to refer 
to the process of construing perceived people as interchangeable members of social 
groups rather than separate individuals (the grouping definition). An overview of 
these definitions and related terminology is given in Table 1. Readers who wish 
to see more “evidence” that these definitions have been used in the literature are 
referred to the Appendix in which we provide a selection of relevant quotations.
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TABLE 1 - An overview of the four discussed definitions of “categorization”
Definition Categorical representation
Non-categorical 
representation
Categorical 
processing
Non-categorical 
processing
1. Categorization 
as representing
Any mental 
representation
Not explicitly 
defined
Perceiving a person 
as “something”
Not explicitly 
defined
2. Categorization 
as dichotomizing
An all-or-none 
representation
A graded 
representation
Perceiving a person 
as either X or not X
Perceiving a degree 
to which a person 
is X
3. Categorization 
as organizing
The representation 
that has the most 
associations with 
other observed 
properties of a 
person
All other observed 
properties of a 
person
Reducing a person 
to the property 
(e.g. man) that 
has the most 
associations with 
other observed 
properties (e.g. tall, 
beard, dominant)
Looking at 
all individual 
properties of 
a person (e.g. 
man, tall, beard, 
dominant)
4. Categorization 
as grouping
A representation of 
a group (e.g. man)
A representation of 
an individual (e.g. 
Brad Pitt)
Distinguishing 
between groups 
without necessarily 
distinguishing 
between their 
members
Distinguishing 
between 
individuals
Note: Most definitions distinguish between categorical representations (“categories”) and non-categorical 
representations (“dimensions”/ “attributes”/ “exemplars”) that can be mapped onto a perceived person. Similarly, 
most definitions make a distinction between categorical and non-categorical processing of another person.
 
Definition 1: Categorization as representing
The term “categorization” has often been used to refer to the process of mapping 
external stimuli onto internal representations (Macmillan, Kaplan, & Creelman, 1977; 
Medin & Smith, 1984; Smith & Medin, 1981; see also: Mervis & Rosch, 1981) According 
to this definition, any kind of conception of a stimulus as “something” constitutes 
categorization. This includes perceiving a person as a member of a social group 
(e.g. this person is a “professor”), recognizing a person’s identity (e.g. this person is 
“Mary”), or judging a person’s character (this person is “friendly”). Hence, under the 
representing definition, “categorization” is a very general cognitive function.
 There has been very little debate about the question of whether people 
“categorize” under the representing definition. In fact, it is widely assumed in 
cognitive science that perception (including person perception) involves some form 
of mapping stimuli onto internal representations1. Virtually every existing person 
perception model in the literature assumes that social perceivers mentally represent 
1 Exceptions to this view can be found in non-representationalist camps in cognitive science (e.g. van Rooij, 
Bongers, & Haselager, 2002; van Gelder, 1995; but see: Haselager, de Groot, & van Rappard, 2003). Yet, to 
our knowledge, no non-representational accounts of person perception have been put forth to this date. 
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other people in some way (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Ehret, Monroe, & Read, 2014; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hugenberg 
et al., 2010; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Zebrowitz, Fellous, 
Mignault, & Adreoletti, 2003) and under the representing definition of “categorization”, 
this entails that virtually every person perception model assumes that perceivers 
“categorize”. Nevertheless, there has been debate in the past on the question of 
how exactly the mapping of stimuli onto representations is performed. Awareness 
of two models of this mapping is particularly important in order to disentangle the 
representing definition from other definitions: the classical and the prototype model. 
These models are well known and we therefore summarize them only briefly before 
we proceed with our conceptual analysis.
 According to the classical model, a perceived stimulus is mapped onto an 
internal representation if and only if the stimulus contains a number of necessary 
and jointly sufficient features (e.g. a stimulus may be categorized as a pen if and 
only if it is long, thin, and can write; Medin & Smith, 1984; Smith & Medin, 1981). 
Importantly, this model implies that only two discrete cognitive outcomes are 
possible: either a representation is not mapped onto the stimulus (because it does 
not have all necessary features) or it is mapped onto the stimulus (because it has 
a jointly sufficient set of features). In contrast, according to the prototype model 
“categorization” is seen as a graded similarity judgment between an external 
stimulus and an internal representation (Medin & Smith, 1984; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; 
Smith & Medin, 1981; Smith & Zarate, 1990). Thus, a key difference is that the classical 
model assumes that our brain makes a binary decision during “categorization” (a 
stimulus is seen as ‘X’ or ‘not-X’) while prototype models assume that the mapping of 
stimuli onto internal representation is graded (the stimulus could be categorized as 
a better or worse example of ‘X’). Keeping these two models in mind is important for 
distinguishing the representing definition from the next definition. 
Definition 2: Categorization as dichotomizing
The term “categorization” has also been used to refer to the strategy to dichotomize 
information as opposed to employing graded information. In particular, Tajfel (1969) 
proposed that people can represent perceived people in terms of “attributes which 
vary on continuous dimensions”, and “classifications [i.e. categories] which are 
discontinuous”. He gave the example that “nationalities or racial groups are, on the 
whole, discontinuous [whereas] personal traits or characteristics can be empirically 
treated as dimensions much in the same way as height and weight would be” 
(Tajfel, 1969, p. 178). In more recent research, this has evolved into a conception in 
which categorical representations are binary representations (e.g. a person is either 
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an “African American” or not) while non-categorical representations are graded 
representations ( e.g. a person can be “trustworthy” to different degrees; Blair et al., 
2002, 2005; Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004).
 There are two noteworthy differences between the representing definition and 
the dichotomization definition of “categorization”. First, under the representing 
definition, any mapping (non-graded or graded) of a stimulus onto a mental 
representation constitutes “categorization”. In contrast, under the dichotomization 
definition only some mental representations are conceptualized as “categories” (e.g. 
nationalities) and only mapping stimuli onto these particular type of representations 
is conceptualized as “categorization”. Conversely, mapping stimuli onto other 
mental representations (e.g. personality traits) is not seen as categorization under 
the dichotomization definition. This means that “categorization” can be avoided in 
principle under the dichotomization definition by representing another person in 
terms of non-categorical representations (e.g. extravert) rather than categorical 
representations (e.g. Italian). 
 Second, under the dichotomization definition, the defining property that 
distinguishes categorical from non-categorical representations is that categorical 
representations are binary. This idea is reminiscent of the classical model of 
“categorization” (under the representing definition) in which “categorization” involves 
a binary decision of whether or not to map a stimulus onto an internal representation. 
However, there is an important conceptual difference: under the representing 
definition, “categorization” is the general process of mapping stimuli onto internal 
representations independent of whether that mapping is binary (as in the classical 
model) or graded (as in prototype models). Consequently, under the representing 
definition a binary mapping is merely one possible model of how perceivers may 
“categorize”. In contrast, under the dichotomization definition categorization is a 
binary mapping by definition. Consequently, graded mappings do not constitute 
“categorization” under the dichotomization definition. 
 This conceptual difference has consequences for the interpretation of empirical 
research. For example, consider the finding that the effect of African American 
race and Afrocentric facial features on judgements were differentially affected by 
a cognitive load manipulation. This finding was explained based on the idea that 
“the continuous nature of the features would make their strategic use much more 
difficult” (Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004, p. 768; emphasis added), suggesting that the 
processing of race is more effective under cognitive load. This reasoning seems 
to be based on the idea that African American race is not continuous in the mind 
of the perceivers (i.e. a target either belongs to the race or does not). As such, this 
reasoning appears to be based on the dichotomization definition and would not be 
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consistent with the representation definition under which all representations can be 
continuous.
 In fact, there is an even more general difference between the dichotomization 
and the representation definition. If one takes the dichotomization definition literal 
then there is a substantial amount of findings that sheds doubt on categorization 
models. Specifically, it is a robust finding that people perceive a relatively graded 
fit between external stimuli and internal representations (Mervis & Rosch, 1981). 
This sheds doubt on the idea that people tend to dichotomize in their perception 
of other people: that is, that they “categorize” under the dichotomization definition. 
Likewise, there is evidence that race-based stereotyping gets gradually stronger 
as a function of the amount racial features of a perceived person (Blair et al., 2002, 
2005; Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004). This challenges categorization models under 
the dichotomization definition because under this definition “categorization models 
of stereotyping tend to assume that category members will be stereotyped to the 
same degree.” (Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004, p. 763, emphasis added). In contrast, none 
of these findings would challenge the notion that people tend to “categorize” under 
the representing definition because the representing definition allows for continuous 
representations (and stereotyping).
 To be clear, researchers have not explicitly declared the substantial body 
of evidence for continuous perception and stereotyping as evidence against 
“categorization”. Instead, the effect of the dichotomization definition on empirical 
conclusions tended to be somewhat milder such as the example of the assumed 
higher efficiency of the perception of race compared to the perception of racial 
features. Nevertheless, our reasoning above helps to make the principled differences 
between the dichotomization and representing definition more visible and 
simultaneously reveals their potential impact on empirical conclusions: if one takes 
the dichotomization definition literal then there is a substantial body of findings that 
sheds doubt on categorization models. In contrast, if one adopts the representing 
definition then the same findings are compatible with the idea that people tend to 
categorize, because the representing definition allows for graded mappings. As such, 
the definition one adopts can have a major impact on a researcher’s conclusion 
about the question whether people tend to “categorize”. This illustrates that (1) the 
representing and dichotomization definitions are conceptually distinct and (2) that 
these definitions can lead to spuriously antagonistic conclusions from the same set 
of empirical findings if they are not disentangled. 
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Definition 3: Categorization as organizing
Other researchers used the term “categorization” to refer to the strategy to represent 
other people in terms of organizing representations rather than individual features. 
For example, rather than mapping a perceived person onto the features “tall”, “beard”, 
and “dominant” a social perceiver may map the person onto the representation “man”, 
which organizes the other features. In particular, this definition of “categorization” 
has been adopted by Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, and Milberg (1987) as well as by 
Fiske and Neuberg (1990) in their influential and widely cited Continuum Model. 
They distinguished between two types of internal representations: “categories” 
and “attributes” (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
Importantly, “the feature [/attribute] that a perceiver uses to organize and understand 
the remaining features  defines  the category […]” (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 9, 
emphasis added). Thus, a “category” (e.g. man) is the observed feature of a person, 
which best organizes the other features of the person (e.g. tall, beard, dominant) 
while the remaining features are referred to as “attributes”. 
 Based on this assumption, they proposed that a perceiver can process another 
person in (at least) two distinct ways (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).2 First, the perceiver 
may engage in categorical processing of another person (traditionally referred to as 
“category-based” processing). This involves processing the other person in terms of 
the best organizing representation (e.g. the representation “man” and its associated 
stereotypes). Alternatively, the perceiver may engage in non-categorical processing 
of the other person (traditionally referred to as “attribute-based” or “individuating” 
processing). This involves processing the other person in terms of all observed 
properties (e.g. man, tall, beard, and dominant). 
 Importantly, the premise of this theorizing is that a person can be represented 
either in terms of the best organizing representation (“category”) or individual 
properties (“attributes”). However, when is a property a good organizer of the other 
properties of a person? Fiske and Neuberg (1990) elaborated that “the category label 
has more and stronger links to the attributes than any single attribute has to the other 
attributes; hence the category label can be said to organize the attributes” (Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990, p. 9, emphasis added). For example, if the set of observed properties 
is man, tall, beard, and dominant, the property man is the “category” if it has the most 
associations with other properties in this set (for direct quotations, see Appendix). 
2 In their Continuum Model, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) proposed also that there may be processing 
strategies that fall in-between a purely category-based and attribute-based strategy (e.g. sub-
categorizing). Although this idea is of theoretical importance, it is not directly relevant for the question 
of how “categorization” is defined in their model. For the sake of simplicity, we illustrate their definition of 
“categorization” by focusing on the main distinction between purely category-based and attribute-based 
processing.
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Hence, under the organizing definition, categorical representations (“categories”) 
differ from non-categorical representations (“attributes”) in terms of their structural 
position in an associative network. 
 The organization definition differs conceptually from the representing definition. 
Under the representing definition, every mental representation constitutes a 
“category”. In contrast, under the organization definition only a subset of all mental 
representations constitute “categories” (i.e. those that organize observed properties), 
and only a mapping of a stimulus onto those mental representations constitutes 
“categorization”. Consequently, while “categorization” is a seemingly inevitable 
part of person perception under the representing definition, “categorization” can in 
principle be avoided under the organization definition by processing the individual 
properties (e.g. man, tall, beard, and dominant) of the other person rather than 
reducing the other person to one organizing property (e.g. man). 
 The organization definition also differs conceptually from the dichotomization 
definition. Although both the dichotomization and the organization definition 
make a distinction between categorical and non-categorical representations, 
the dichotomization definition makes this distinction based on whether graded 
information is employed (“categories” are defined as all-or-none representations and 
non-categorical representations as graded) while the organization definition makes 
this distinction based on structural positions in an associative network (“categories” 
are defined by having the most and strongest associative links with other properties 
of the person). Consequently, evidence of graded processing (e.g. Blair et al., 2004) 
constitutes evidence of non-categorical processing under the dichotomization 
definition but not under the organization definition.
 That the organization definition is distinct from other definitions is also evident in 
other existing interpretations of empirical findings. For example, what finding would 
lead to the conclusion that a personality trait is a “category” under the organizing 
definition? It has been reasoned as follows. Representations with an organizing 
positions have – by definition – relatively many associations, which may make 
them relatively effective sources of inferences about another person. Hence, if a 
representation does not seem to be effective sources of inferences about another 
person, it probably has few associative links. Importantly, a representation with few 
associative links is unlikely to act as an organizer of observed person properties. 
Thus, it was argued that “the category labels are most likely to be those features that 
generate relatively rich but distinct inferences” (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 
1987, p. 401-402).
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 There are a number of findings, which suggest that personality traits are relatively 
ineffective sources of inferences (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Andersen, Klatzky, & 
Murray, 1990; Bond & Brocket, 1987; Bond & Sedikides, 1988). For example, Andersen 
and Klatzky (1987) provided participants with a person label (e.g. politician or 
extravert) and instructed to list as many properties a person with that label is likely 
to have. They found that participants listed relatively few novel properties based on 
personality traits (e.g. extravert) compared to other person labels (e.g. politician). 
This and other findings (Andersen et al., 1990; Bond & Brocket, 1987; Bond & 
Sedikides, 1988) have led to the conclusion that personality traits are unlikely to act 
as organizers of observed person properties (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This means 
that they are unlikely to act as “categories” under the organization definition. Notice 
that this reasoning uniquely applies under the organization definition where a 
category is defined in terms of its structural position in an associative network. 
Hence, the theoretical conclusions from empirical findings depend again on the 
employed definition of “categories” and “categorization”. This further illustrates that 
the organization definition is conceptually distinct from other definitions.
Definition 4: Categorization as grouping 
Another definition is that categorization means to “characterize others on the basis 
of the social groups to which they belong [rather than to] view other people […] 
as unique entities” (Mason & Macrae, 2004, p. 1785; see also: Hugenberg et al., 
2010; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001). Put differently, 
“categorization” entails to map several people onto the same internal representation 
(e.g. when looking at three people we may see: “man”, “man”, and “man”), while 
non-categorical processing entails mapping each individual onto a separate 
representation (e.g. when looking at three people we may see: “Peter”, “Dave”, 
and “John”). This distinction is relatively common in the recent person perception 
literature (Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2001, 2000; Mason & Macrae, 2004), and also has connections to the extensive 
literature on self-categorization and social identity (Brown, 2000; Hornsey, 2008; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
 The grouping definition is conceptually different from Definitions 1-3. Under 
the representing definition (Def 1), any mapping of a person onto an internal 
representation constitutes “categorization”. In contrast, under the grouping 
definition, only a mapping onto some (group) representations constitutes 
“categorization” (e.g. “man” but not “Peter”). The grouping definition is also different 
from the dichotomization definition (Def 2). Under the dichotomization definition 
(Def 2), binary mappings constitute “categorization” but graded mappings do not. 
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In contrast, under the grouping definition mapping several people onto the same 
representation (e.g. man) constitutes “categorization” irrespective of whether 
this mapping is binary or graded (e.g. even if these people differ in the degree to 
which each is perceived as a “man”). Finally, the grouping definition is also different 
from the organization definition (Def 3). Under the organization definition (Def 
3), “categorization” entails organizing the properties of another person by one 
representation, which is different from grouping. For example, suppose that the 
observable properties of a person (e.g. blue eyes, blond, actor) are better organized 
by an exemplar representation (e.g. Brad Pitt) than a group representation (e.g. man). 
In that case, representing the person in terms of the exemplar representation (this is 
“Brad Pitt”) would constitute “categorization” under the organization definition but 
not under the grouping definition.
 These conceptual differences are also reflected in theoretical conclusions from 
empirical findings. Most importantly, evidence that social perceivers fail to (correctly) 
distinguish between members of social groups has been taken as evidence of 
“categorization” under the grouping definition. For example, when asked to retrieve 
the speaker of a statement, people tend to confuse speakers more frequently within 
currently salient social groups (e.g. a man with another man) than between these 
social groups (e.g. a man with a woman; Gawronski, Ehrenberg, Banse, Zukova, & 
Klauer, 2003; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978; for an overview see: Klauer & 
Wegener, 1998). This is a robust finding (Klauer & Wegener, 1998), which is consistent 
with the idea that we tend to treat people as interchangeable group members (i.e., 
“categorization” under the grouping definition). 
 Importantly, the interpretation of such findings depends again on the employed 
definition. Under the representing definition, any kind of representing another 
person constitutes “categorization”, including storing an exemplar representation of 
the speaker of a statement. Consequently, correctly remembering the speaker of a 
statement alone could be seen as evidence of “categorization” under the representing 
definition. In contrast, remembering the speaker of a statement is usually not seen 
as evidence of “categorization” under the grouping definition (Klauer & Wegener, 
1998). Hence, the theoretical conclusions from these findings differ dependent on 
whether one adopts the grouping or the representing definition.
 The interpretation of these findings also differs between the grouping and 
the dichotomization definition. Under the dichotomization definition, one speaks 
of “categorization” if and only if there is an all-or-none mapping of the perceived 
person onto an internal representation. The finding of higher within-group than 
between-group confusions between speakers suggest that group members may 
have been mapped onto the same internal representation (e.g. “man”) but does 
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not necessarily imply that this is an all-or-none mapping (people may still perceive 
some speakers as better exemplars of “men” than others). In fact, when interpreted 
together with existing evidence of graded mappings in the literature (e.g. Blair, 2002; 
Freeman, Ambady, Rule, & Johnson, 2008; Mervis & Rosch, 1981), it seems more 
plausible that groupings were based on graded mappings (e.g. several speakers 
fit to the representation “men” but to varying degrees). Under the dichotomization 
definition, this would mean that speakers were not “categorized”. In contrast, under 
the grouping definition, the same interpretation would mean that speakers were 
“categorized”.
 Finally, the interpretation of the findings above is also different depending on 
whether one adopts the grouping or the organization definition. To illustrate this, 
consider the findings that speakers with similar colors of clothing (Brewer, Weber, 
& Carini, 1995) and speakers who are assigned to the same arbitrary groups (Judd 
& Park, 1988) are more often confused with each other. These findings support the 
idea that these speakers were represented as interchangeable group members. 
Hence, under the grouping definition, these findings support the conclusion that 
the speakers were “categorized”. In contrast, it seems implausible that color of 
clothing and arbitrary groupings organize the observed properties of a person 
best (“categorization” under the organization definition). Almost by definition an 
arbitrary grouping should be uncorrelated to the properties of a person, which 
means that distinguishing between people based on an arbitrary grouping would 
not constitute “categorization” under the organization definition. Hence, whether or 
not the findings above can be seen as evidence of “categorization” again depends on 
the employed definition of “categorization”. 
Applying the conceptual analysis to open questions
Earlier, we introduced three existing open questions in the person perception 
literature that are relevant to our conceptual analysis. First, there are seemingly 
antagonistic viewpoints regarding the question of whether or not “categorization” 
is an inevitable part of person perception (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Second, 
there is ambiguity regarding the question of how frequently social perceivers rely 
on “categorization” during person perception (assuming that “categorization” can 
be avoided in principle). Third, it has been argued that the distinction between 
categorical and non-categorical processes is artificial and may be better avoided 
(Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). In the following, we will discuss how 
disentangling the four discussed definitions (see Table 1) may help to address these 
issues.
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1. Is categorization inevitable? 
In Allport’s seminal writings on the role of categorization in person perception, 
he argued that “the human mind must think with the aid of categories […]. We 
cannot possibly avoid this process” (Allport, 1954, p. 21; see also: Bargh, 1999). 
However, the view that “categorization” is an inevitable part of person perception 
has been questioned based on findings that “category” activation is moderated 
by processing goals and resources (Macrae et al., 1997; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2000). As a result, there are seemingly antagonistic viewpoints about the question 
whether “categorization” is an inevitable part of person perception (Allport, 1954; 
Bargh, 1999) or a processing strategy that is endorsed only under specific conditions 
(Macrae et al., 1997; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000).
 Our conceptual analysis suggests that these viewpoints could reflect different 
usages of the term “categorization” rather than truly antagonistic positions. Under 
the representing definition, “categorization” constitutes the general process of 
mapping external stimuli onto internal representations. Virtually every person 
perception model assumes that people represent other people in some sense 
(e.g. Brewer, 1988; Ehret, Monroe, & Read, 2014; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Freeman & 
Ambady, 2011; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hugenberg et al., 2010; Kunda & Thagard, 
1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Zebrowitz, Fellous, Mignault, & Adreoletti, 2003). 
As such, “categorization” does appear inevitable under the representing definition. 
Allport’s strong claim that thinking in general requires categories (i.e. that there does 
not exist any non-categorical thinking) suggests that he adopted the representing 
definition.
 By contrast, under Definitions 2-4, “categorization” constitutes a mapping 
of external stimuli onto a specific set of internal representations (all-or-none 
representations, organizing representations, or group representations) that are 
distinguished from non-categorical representations. Consequently, “categorization” 
can in principle be avoided under Definitions 2-4 by construing other people in terms 
of non-categorical representations (graded dimensions/ attributes/ exemplars). It 
seems likely that researchers who argued that “categorization” is a conditional rather 
than inevitable adopted one of these (or similar) definitions. This is evident in the 
interpretation of findings as evidence for the conditional nature of “categorization”. 
These findings usually show that certain social representations (e.g. gender) have 
not become more activated in a certain situation. This indicates that those particular 
mental representations have not been mapped onto the perceived person in this 
particular situation (Macrae et al., 1997; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). By contrast, 
these findings do not rule out that the other person has been mapped onto some 
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internal representation and thus that perceivers “categorized” under the representing 
definition. 
 Taken together, the two viewpoints above may not be truly antagonistic. 
Researchers who adopted the viewpoint that “categorization” is an inevitable part 
of person perception may have intended to suggest that mapping external stimuli 
onto internal representations (Def 1) is an inevitable part of person perception. In 
contrast, researchers who adopted the viewpoint that “categorization” is a conditional 
processing strategy may have intended to suggest that dichotomizing, organizing, 
or grouping (Def 2-4) or other more specific cognitive strategies are conditional. 
2. How frequently do people rely on “categorization”? 
If “categorization” is one of several possible processing strategies, an important 
question is how frequently social perceivers employ this strategy. Unfortunately, 
the existing literature does not give an unequivocal answer to this question. While 
the more traditional view is that “categorization” is a frequently employed default 
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), some researchers 
have noted that “categorization” may be relatively rare (Krueger & Rothbart, 1988), 
and findings emerged which could suggest that non-categorical processes may 
be more common than originally assumed (Blair et al., 2002). As a result, it remains 
relatively ambiguous what the conclusion is regarding the frequency with which 
people “categorize”.
 Again, we suggest that part of the ambiguity may be due to different usages 
of the term “categorization”. As we already noted, “categorization” seems to be an 
inevitable aspect of person perception under the representing definition (Def 1) 
while Definitions 2-4 leave room for the possibility that social perceivers do not 
always “categorize”. However, even among Definitions 2-4, different answers arise for 
the question of how frequently people rely on categorization. This is most apparent 
when comparing the dichotomization to the grouping definition. As we mentioned 
above, there is considerable evidence that social perceivers employ graded (rather 
than binary) representations in various settings and tasks (Blair et al., 2005; Blair, Judd, 
& Fallman, 2004; Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Mervis & Rosch, 1981). These findings 
suggest that people rarely “categorize” under the dichotomization definition. At the 
same time, there is also considerable evidence that people often do not distinguish 
between members of social groups (Gawronski, Ehrenberg, Banse, Zukova, & Klauer, 
2003; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978; for an overview see: Klauer & Wegener, 
1998). Moreover, there is robust evidence that social perceivers judge other people 
not only in terms of individualized knowledge but also in terms of stereotypes about 
social groups (Jussim, 1991; Smith & DeCoster, 1998). These findings suggest that 
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   42 17-07-17   13:09
02F o u r  M e a n i n g s  o f  “ C a t e g o r i z a t i o n ”  -  C h a p t e r  2
43 
people tend to represent other people as interchangeable group members. This 
means that they may frequently “categorize” under the grouping definition.3 
 In sum, while there is considerable evidence that social perceivers “categorize” 
rarely under the dichotomization definition, there is also considerable evidence that 
social perceivers “categorize” frequently under the grouping definition. Consequently, 
ambiguity about the frequency with which people “categorize” may not necessarily 
be due to conflicting empirical findings but could also be due to different usages 
of the term “categorization”. Hence, what may appear to be conflicting conclusions 
(e.g. people frequently “categorize” vs people rarely “categorize”) may be compatible 
conclusions (e.g. people rarely dichotomize information but frequently group other 
people).
3. Is the distinction between categorical and non-categorical processes useful? 
Several researchers have noticed that there are seeming contradictions in the way 
researchers have distinguished “categorization” from other hypothetical cognitive 
strategies (Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Quinn & Macrae, 2005). As 
a result, such distinctions have been declared artificial (Cox & Devine, 2015), and it 
has been proposed that models that do not make the distinction are to be favored 
(Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Despite this criticism the distinction between categorical 
and non-categorical processes has remained widespread in the person perception 
literature (Hugenberg et al., 2010; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). As such, there 
appear to be different viewpoints about the scientific value of the distinction 
between categorical and non-categorical processes. 
 Again, these viewpoints may partially be the result of different usages of the term 
“categorization”. For example, Kunda and Thagard (1996) noticed that “categories” are 
defined as group representations (i.e. the grouping definition) and that personality 
traits are not seen as “categories” by many researchers (for an overview see: Kunda 
& Thagard, 1996). They argued that this appears to be untenable given that people 
can be grouped based on virtually any property – including personality traits (e.g. 
the group of intelligent, trustworthy, or extravert people). As such, there appears 
to be no reason why personality traits should not be seen as “categories” (here, 
understood as “groupings”) and thus why mapping a person onto personality trait 
3 To our knowledge, there has not been much systematic research that addressed the question to what 
extent people tend to “categorize” under the organization definition (but see: Fiske et al., 1987). Moreover, 
answering this question is relatively complicated given that it is relatively ambiguous what can be 
counted as “categorization” under Definition 3. For example, whether representing another person as 
an actor counts as “categorization” depends on whether the representation “actor” organizes the other 
features of the person and it is not always clear in empirical studies whether that is the case. As such, it is 
relatively ambiguous to what extent people “categorize” under Definition 3.
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should not be seen as “categorization”. In line with this point, we recently found 
evidence that people spontaneously group other people based on personality traits 
(Klapper, Dotsch, van Rooij, & Wigboldus, 2016).
 Nevertheless, notice that Kunda and Thagard assessed the practice of treating 
personality traits as non-categorical representation under the grouping definition. 
Indeed, under this definition there seems to be no clear reason why a personality trait 
should not be seen as a “category”. However, under the dichotomization definition 
any graded representation is not a category and the treatment of personality traits 
as non-categorical representation therefore seems appropriate. A similar point 
applies to the organizing definition under which a representation that has many 
associations with other observed properties of a person is a “category”. Under 
this definition, the findings that personality traits are relatively ineffective sources 
of person inferences is consistent with the treatment of personality traits as non-
categorical representations (Andersen et al., 1990; Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Bond & 
Brocket, 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
 Taken together, it seems that researchers who treated personality traits 
as non-categorical representations did not necessarily intend to suggest that 
personality traits are not group representations (Def 4). Instead, they may have 
intended to suggest that personality traits are graded representations (Def 2) or 
representations that do not organize observed person properties (Def 3). As such, 
the seeming contradiction between explicit definition (e.g. “categories” are group 
representations), and usage of the term “categories” (e.g. personality traits are not 
“categories”) may not be a real contradiction. Instead, it may reflect that the term 
“categories” has been used with different underlying meanings. 
 A similar point can be made for criticism that was raised by Cox and Devine 
(2015). They discussed the view that categorical representations are more effective 
sources of person inferences than non-categorical representations (which fits best to 
the organizing definition). They collected a pool of person properties that had been 
labeled as “categories” and a pool of person properties that had been treated as non-
categorical representations by researchers in the person perception literature. Next, 
they tested how effectively people can infer person characteristics from these labels.4 
They found that the presumed “categories” were not consistently more effective 
sources of person inferences than the presumed non-categorical representations 
and that this challenges traditional categorization models (Cox & Devine, 2015). They 
4 The argument above is somewhat simplified. The way Cox and Devine interpreted the distinction between 
“categories” and non-categories was similar to the organization definition but not entirely equivalent. 
Namely, they adopted the interpretation that “categories” differ from “non-categories” in the sense that 
associative links are stronger in the direction from “categories” to “non-categories” than from “non-
categories” to “categories”. Above, we treat this interpretation as a variant of the organization definition.
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argued that the presumed “categories” do not appear different from the presumed 
non-categorical representations and that the distinction between categorical and 
non-categorical representations may be better avoided.  However, it seems likely 
that many researchers who distinguished between categorical and non-categorical 
representations did not intend to suggest that the former is a more effective source 
of person inferences than the latter (which belongs to the organizing definition). 
Instead, they may have intended to suggest that one is presumably dichotomous 
and the other presumably graded (the dichotomization definition) or that one is 
a group representation and the other an individual representation (the grouping 
definition). 
 What can we conclude from this? In our view, the problem is not necessarily that 
the distinction between categorical and non-categorical representations is devoid 
of any coherent (Kunda & Thagard, 1996) and empirically supported meaning (Cox 
& Devine, 2015). Instead, the problem may be that several different meanings are 
attached to it, and that these meanings are usually confounded in the literature. 
This is a qualitatively different problem than suggested in past criticism, which 
requires a different solution. Namely, rather than rejecting the distinction between 
categorical and non-categorical representations, a more constructive approach may 
be to disentangle the different meanings that are attached to these distinctions and 
discuss them separately in future research. For example, rather than asking “should 
we label personality traits as categories?” we may adopt the grouping definition, and 
ask “do people group other people based on personality traits?”. While there is no 
clear approach to answer the former question, the latter question could be answered 
by investigating whether people tend to confuse other people who possess similar 
personality traits (and we recently found evidence that they do; Klapper et al., 2016). 
In general, by adopting specific definitions of “categorization”, relatively intangible 
conceptual questions could be turned into more tangible empirical questions. We 
hope that our conceptual analysis provides the conceptual foundation for this. 
Sharpening the relationship between theory and data
A general problem that we hope to alleviate with our conceptual analysis is that 
the relationship between theory and empirical findings gets blurred if different 
definitions are confounded. This blurring can have important consequences. First, 
if different definitions are confounded under the same label empirical evidence 
may be allocated to the wrong theoretical hypothesis. For example, recall from our 
discussion of the dichotomization definition that sometimes the assumption has 
been adopted in the literature that representing a person by race entails an all-or-
none mapping. This assumption has been adopted although there is considerable 
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evidence that mappings of people onto internal representations tend to be graded. 
This may be due to a misallocation of evidence. For example, based on the literature 
it appears that there is widespread agreement that “people tend to categorize” and 
without disentangling the confounded definition this can appear as agreement that 
“people tend to dichotomize”. As a result, a hypothesis that is not well supported 
by empirical findings (“people dichotomize”) can spuriously appear well supported. 
Hence, confounding definitions of theoretical constructs creates the danger of 
confounding evidence for theories.
 Second, a blurred relationship between theory and empirical findings also 
makes it hard to falsify theories. Counter-evidence usually applies only under one 
specific definition of “categorization”, and can therefore be discredited by adopting 
another definition. For example, most researchers may not think that evidence for 
graded mappings is evidence against “categorization” because it is evidence against 
“categorization” only under the dichotomization definition. A similar point can be 
made about the finding that person properties that researchers have labeled as 
“categories” are not generally more effective sources of inferences than person 
properties that researchers have treated as non-categorical representations (Cox & 
Devine, 2015). This finding is problematic if the main idea behind the distinction is 
that the presumed “categories” are more effective sources of inferences. However, 
most researchers may not make the distinction between categorical and non-
categorical representation with the idea in mind that categorical representations are 
more effective sources of inferences (which belongs to the organization definition). 
As a result, the findings by Cox and Devine may be perceived as irrelevant by many 
researchers. In general, most conceivable findings that would challenge that there 
is a distinction between categorical and non-categorical representations under one 
definition are likely to be irrelevant under other definitions and therefore prone to 
be discredited. This makes the theoretical assumptions that are underlying such 
distinctions relatively immune to falsification as long as the definitions remain 
confounded.
 To conclude, confounding different definitions of “categorization” can distort 
conclusions from the empirical literature in multiple ways and thereby makes 
an empirical discussion about the theory (e.g. in an empirical review) relatively 
intangible. In all cases, the key to preventing the problem is to properly disentangle 
existing definitions. We hope that our conceptual analysis has contributed to this 
aim.
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Conclusion
The notion of “categorization” has been widespread in the person perception 
literature for decades. However, the term “categorization” has been used with 
qualitatively different meanings, which can give rise to spurious disagreement. 
A main cause of such problems is that confounding these definitions blurs the 
relationship between theory and empirical findings. Consequently, it is vital for 
scientific debates to explicate and disentangle the different definitions that are 
employed in the literature. We hope that our conceptual analysis has contributed to 
this aim, and helps to further advance the clarity, and general quality of the field’s 
pivotal theories.
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Appendix
Below, we provide for each definition a list of quotations from the literature where the 
respective definition has been implicitly or explicitly adopted. However, we advise 
some caution with interpreting the authors of these statements as “proponents” 
of the respective definitions. Definitions serve mainly communicative purposes 
and therefore an author who uses it does not necessarily adopt it personally. The 
purpose of the list the quotations below is exclusively to show that the definitions 
exist (for one reason or another) in the writing in the literature. For this purpose, we 
list quotations from selected sources that have been influential and widely cited in 
the literature. 
Representation definition (Def 1)
- “Categorization. This function involves determining that a specific instance is a 
member of a concept” (Smith & Medin, 1981, p. 6).
- “the human mind must think with the aid of categories […].We cannot possibly 
avoid this process.” (Allport, 1954, p. 21). Note: the claim here is that the human 
mind generally requires categories. This claim fits exclusively to the representing 
definition given that other definitions assume that there exist non-categorical 
processing styles.
Dichotomization definition (Def 2)
- “In a rather formal way, the problem of stereotypes is that of the relation between 
a set of attributes which vary on continuous dimensions and classifications [here, 
used interchangeably with “categories”] which are discontinuous.” (Tajfel, 1969, p. 
177-178, emphasis added). 
- “As noted previously, it is much more difficult to adjust one’s judgments in 
response to  continuous  cues rather than a  dichotomous  cue, such as racial 
category” (Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004, p. 774, emphasis added). Note: in the 
discussed experiment participants saw faces that gradually varied in how African 
American they looked while true race was not disclosed – as such, it seems to be 
assumed here that the racial “category” is a dichotomous representation in the 
mind of the participants.
- “categorization models of stereotyping tend to assume that category members 
will be stereotyped to the same degree, regardless of their features.” (Blair, Judd, & 
Fallman, 2004, p. 763, emphasis added). Note: this is a description of categorical 
processing (under Def 2).
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- “With feature-based stereotyping, individuals who are categorized as members 
of the same group may be stereotyped and discriminated against  to different 
degrees”. (Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004, p. 763, emphasis added). Note: this is a 
description of non-categorical processing (under Def 2).
- “the continuous nature of the features would make their strategic use much 
more difficult” (Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004, p. 768; emphasis added). Note: here, 
the dichotomization definition motivated the prediction that categorization is 
cognitively more efficient than feature-based stereotyping based on the idea 
that categorization is not continuous. 
Organization definition (Def 3)
- “a category label is any feature that best organizes the other features. More 
specifically, the label is that feature with the strongest and most frequent 
associations to each of the other features” (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 
1987, p. 401; emphasis added)
- “the feature [/attribute] that a perceiver uses to  organize  and understand 
the remaining features  defines  the category […]” (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 9, 
emphasis added).
- “the category label has more and stronger links to the attributes than any single 
attribute has to the other attributes; hence the category label can be said to 
organize the attributes” (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 9, emphasis added).
- “In general, the category labels are most likely to be those features that generate 
relatively rich but distinct inferences” (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987, 
p. 401-402). Note: here, the organization definition motivates the reasoning that 
the inferential productiveness of a representation is evidence of its status as a 
“category”.
- “the category label is more likely to be a social grouping (demographic category, 
role, job) than a single personality trait. Recent research demonstrates the greater 
distinctiveness, richness, and vividness of social stereotype groupings compared 
to traits (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987), as well as their superior efficiency in cuing 
memory for acquaintances (Bond & Brocket, 1987). Accordingly, they are likely 
candidates for organizing a targets other features.” (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 10). 
Note: another example how the organization definition motivated the reasoning 
that the inferential productiveness of a representation is evidence of its status as 
a “category”.
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   52 17-07-17   13:09
02F o u r  M e a n i n g s  o f  “ C a t e g o r i z a t i o n ”  -  C h a p t e r  2
53 
Grouping definition (Def 4)
- “categorization refers to people’s propensity to characterize others on the 
basis of the social groups to which they belong (e.g. men, senior citicizens). 
[…]  Individuation, in contrast, reflects the tendency to view other people not 
as members of distinct social groups, but rather as unique entities.” (Mason & 
Macrae, 2004, p. 1785).
- “In brief, individuation is the act of discriminating among exemplars of a category 
(e.g., discriminating among letters in an alphabet; Wong, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 
2009). Categorization, however, is the act of classifying exemplars into a group 
along shared dimensions (e.g., classifying symbols as letters)” (Hugenberg, 
Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010, p. 1170). 
- “The term category is commonly used to describe the totality of information that 
perceivers have in mind about particular classes of individuals (e.g. Germans, 
plumbers, pastry chefs)” (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000, p. 96). Note: this is 
a variant of the grouping definition. Nevertheless, the defining property of a 
category is still that it is in some way about social groups.
- “In person perception research, the term category is used to describe the totality 
of information that perceivers have in mind about various groups of individuals 
(e.g. Italians, doctors, blondes)” (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001, p. 243). Note: this 
is the same variant of the grouping definition as above. 
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Prelude
In Chapter 2, four definitions of “categorization” were disentangled. This makes 
it possible to narrow past theorizing down by asking: in what sense (i.e. under 
what definition) is it true that “people categorize” and that “categorization” is a 
source of various important person perception phenomena (e.g. various forms of 
discrimination). For example, past studies showed evidence for a cognitive dissociation 
in person memory, which was attributed to the independent contributions of 
categorization (e.g. I may remember that I saw a man) and individuation (e.g. I may 
remember that I saw Brad Pitt) to person memory. Based on the conceptual analysis 
in Chapter 2, we can now ask: which of the confounded meanings of “categorization” 
could be underlying this and other relevant phenomena?
 In Chapter 3, we will investigate to what extent the grouping definition of 
categorization can be seen as a plausible cause of such phenomena. In addition, 
we aim to contribute to the conceptual clarity of this notion of “categorization” by 
providing steps towards formalizing it. Moreover, we also aim to show a possible 
way to synthesize the idea that social perceiver may treat other people either as 
group members (categorization; grouping definition) or individuals (individuation; 
grouping definition) with connectionist models. 
Abstrac t
We present a theoretical framework that integrates two classes of influential models 
in the person perception literature. First, according to social categorization models 
social perceivers can employ two processing strategies: they can either treat 
other people as individuals (individuation) or as members of social groups (social 
categorization). Second, according to connectionist models person perception is 
driven by a process of spreading activation between mental representations in a 
learned associative network. Our framework synthesizes these ideas by situating the 
distinction between social categorization and individuation based in the input of 
the connectionist mechanism. We demonstrate in computer simulations that this 
framework can account for relevant phenomena in various person perception areas 
including social learning, memory, judgement, and impression formation. Overall, 
the framework may help to bridge different person perception (and other cognitive) 
literatures, explain various social phenomena, and help to answer conceptual 
questions in the literature. 
Keywords: Person perception, social categorization, individuation, connectionism
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   56 17-07-17   13:09
03U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s  -  C h a p t e r  3
57 
Introdc ution
 When people perceive other people, they do not always treat them as unique 
individuals but frequently treat them as interchangeable members of social groups 
(Allport, 1954; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2001, 2000; Tajfel, 1969). Treating a person as a member of a social group makes it 
possible to know something about an unknown person. For example, although we 
may not know anything about the individual Peter, we may know something about 
the group of men to which Peter belongs, which enables us to make predictions 
about Peter’s behavior despite never having seen him before. Alternatively, we 
may treat Peter as a unique individual and base our predictions about him solely 
on our observations of Peter. The idea that social perceivers can employ these 
two processing strategies – referred to as social categorization and individuation, 
respectively - is a core notion of social categorization models (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990; Hugenberg et al., 2010).
 Another influential idea is that people learn associations between social 
representations, which subsequently influence their perceptions of other people. 
For example, after learning an association between African American and criminality 
(e.g. from biased presentations in the media), one may be more inclined to judge a 
perceived African American as criminal. These ideas are most explicitly expressed in 
connectionist models, which have been influential in the person perception literature 
(Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, & Conner, 2015; Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Kunda 
& Thagard, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van 
Rooy, Van Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, & French, 2003; Zebrowitz, Fellous, 
Mignault, & Adreoletti, 2003), and the cognitive science literature more broadly (e.g. 
Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; Mcclelland, 1987; Rogers & McClelland, 2014; Seidenberg 
& McClelland, 1989).
 In the present article, we introduce a theoretical framework that aims to integrate 
the key notions of social categorization and connectionist models. In addition, we 
present a formal implementation of this framework and show that documented 
phenomena in various person perception areas can be reproduced in computer 
simulations. This work aims to (1) contribute to the conceptual integration of existing 
models, (2) contribute to explaining relevant person perception phenomena, and 
(3) contribute to addressing conceptual issues in the person perception literature 
through a formalized theorizing approach. In the following, we will outline the key 
notions of social categorization and connectionist models and introduce general 
challenges that we aim to address in the present article.
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Social categorization models
As mentioned above, the core notion of social categorization models is that social 
perceivers employ two main cognitive strategies: social categorization (treating a 
person as an interchangeable group member) and individuation (treating a person 
as a unique individual; Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Hugenberg et 
al., 2010; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). There are various empirical findings that are 
consistent with this idea (Klauer & Wegener, 1998; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Taylor, 
Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). For example, it is a robust finding that people 
more often confuse individuals within social groups than between social groups 
– especially when group membership is made salient (Taylor et al., 1978; for an 
overview see: Klauer & Wegener, 1998). Recent work has shown that this finding fits 
well to a cognitive model in which social perceivers can represent a person either 
as an individual or as an interchangeable member of a social group (Gawronski, 
Ehrenberg, Banse, Zukova, & Klauer, 2003; Klauer & Wegener, 1998). In addition, 
various findings suggest that people employ both knowledge about individuals and 
knowledge about groups (stereotypes) during person perception (Smith & DeCoster, 
1998). All of these findings support the notion that social perceivers engage in both 
individuation and social categorization during person perception.
 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the distinction is conceptually problematic 
(Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). For example, Kunda and Thagard 
pointed out that people can be grouped based on virtually any property such 
as occupation (e.g., ‘professors’), personality traits (e.g., ‘intelligent people’), and 
behaviors (e.g., ‘smiling people’). As a result, cases that have been labeled as 
individuation by researchers can often be interpreted as social categorization, 
which makes the distinction questionable (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). For example, 
inferring a trait (e.g. aggressive) from behavior (e.g. punching) is usually treated as 
individuation in the sense that it is based on a behavior that is performed by this 
particular individual. However, one can also think of it as applying a stereotype about 
a social group (people who punch are aggressive) to the perceived person. Based on 
such conceptual issues, some researchers have argued in favor of models that avoid 
the distinction between social categorization and individuation altogether (Cox & 
Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996).
 Related to the discussion above is the common assumption in the social 
categorization literature that some social representations (often referred to as 
“social categories”) are a main source of stereotyping while others are more 
passive descriptions of other people (often referred to as “attributes”; Fiske, Lin, & 
Neuberg, 1999; Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). For example, races, nationalities, occupations, and 
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similar groupings (“social categories”) are seen as a source of stereotyping, whereas 
adjectives like personality traits (“attributes”) are seen as more passively descriptive 
representations of another person. This idea was (in part) inspired by findings, which 
showed that people can infer novel person attributes more effectively based on the 
former (e.g., politicians are extravert, intelligent, and old) compared to the latter 
(e.g. extravert people are outgoing; Andersen, Klatzky, & Murray, 1990; Andersen & 
Klatzky, 1987; Bond & Brocket, 1987). 
 However, the category-attribute distinction has been criticized. Related to the 
points above, Kunda and Thagard (1996) argued that people can be grouped based 
on virtually any property and therefore there appears to be no conceptual reason 
why “attributes” like personality traits should not be labelled as “social categories”. 
In addition, Cox and Devine (2015) presented evidence that there are cases where 
person labels that had been treated as “attributes” in the literature are more effective 
bases of inferences than person labels that had been referred to as “social categories” 
(Cox & Devine, 2015). As yet, there is no theoretical account that addresses these 
conceptual issues and explains those seemingly conflicting findings.
 In sum, social categorization models assume that social perceivers can construe 
others as either individuals (individuation) or group members (social categorization) 
and various empirical findings seem to be consistent with this idea. Nevertheless, 
there are conceptual and empirical challenges that led to criticism. Overall, there is 
need for a framework that addresses the conceptual issues, and provides an account 
of relevant empirical findings.
Connectionist models
Connectionist person perception models assume that person perception is driven 
by interactions between nodes in an associative network (Freeman & Ambady, 2011; 
Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Smith, 1996). In the simplest case, 
each of these nodes denotes a certain social representation (e.g. beard, professor, 
Brad Pitt, etc.). Nodes can be activated by observations and simultaneously spread 
their activation to other nodes via associative links. This continues iteratively until 
the activations of all nodes stabilize in an equilibrium between activation springing 
from observation, activation spread among associative links, and activation decay 
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1989). Various models assume that person perception is 
driven by this type of dynamic process (Dalege et al., 2015; Freeman & Ambady, 2011; 
Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; 
Van Rooy et al., 2003; Zebrowitz et al., 2003). Moreover, the general ideas of these 
models that people constantly learn and are influenced by associations between 
internal representations are ubiquitous in literature on social cognition (e.g. Bargh, 
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1999; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Gawronski et al., 2003; Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Strack & Deutsch, 2004)
 Connectionist models of person perception and social categorization models 
have sometimes been treated as competing models (Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda 
& Thagard, 1996). One reason for this is that social categorization models have 
sometimes been conceptualized as dual process models because they distinguish 
between social categorization and individuation (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Quinn & Macrae, 
2005). In contrast, connectionist models of person perception have often been 
conceptualized as single process models (e.g. Ehret, Monroe, & Read, 2014; Kunda & 
Thagard, 1996). A related reason is that social categorization models tend to assign 
a special status to some social representations (i.e. the “social categories”) in the 
person perception process (Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). In contrast, 
connectionist models assume that all nodes are subject to the same processing rules 
and have in that sense the same status (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). 
 Nevertheless, there are also researchers who adopted the viewpoint that social 
categorization and connectionist models may be compatible and who provided 
precursors for a unified model (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). However, as yet, the 
conceptual obstacles above have not been fully addressed. In particular, there is 
no connectionist account of the distinction between social categorization and 
individuation. Consequently, it remains unclear how social categorization and 
connectionist models are related to each other on the whole.
The present article
In the present article we aim to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we aim 
to contribute to the conceptual integration of existing person perception models. For 
this purpose, we introduce a theoretical framework that synthesizes the key notions of 
social categorization and connectionist models of person perception. This is essential 
to derive clear predictions from the more general literature on person perception. For 
example, is the finding of a cognitive dissociation (see Phenomenon 2 later) consistent 
with current theorizing (it may reflect social categorization and individuation) or 
inconsistent (does it fit to the view that connectionist processes generally underlie 
person perception?). Second, we aim to show in computer simulations how this 
framework can account for relevant phenomena in various person perception areas. 
Thereby, we provide (post hoc) empirical tests of the proposed framework, and at the 
same time provide insights into the causes of key person perception phenomena. 
Third, we aim to contribute to the conceptual clarity of social categorization 
models by grounding their informal key notions in a formal connectionist model. 
This will later help us to address (part of ) the conceptual issues discussed above. 
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Theoretical framework
Marr (1982) proposed an influential distinction between three levels at which a 
cognitive mechanism can be explained. At the computational level, one describes 
what the mechanism does by specifying the input-output mapping that it performs. 
At the algorithmic (or process) level, one describes the processing steps by which 
the input is transformed into the output. Finally, at the implementational level one 
describes the physical implementation of the mechanism. The history of (social) 
cognition research has shown that distinguishing between these levels is crucial 
when comparing cognitive models, because sometimes seemingly antagonistic 
models can turn out to be descriptions of the same theoretical mechanism at 
different levels (De Houwer & Moors, 2015).
 How do these levels relate to connectionist models? In connectionist models 
of person perception, one can distinguish between two mechanisms: a learning 
and a person perception mechanism. In the learning mechanism, the cognitive 
system generates associative links between internal representations based on 
external inputs from observed stimuli. For example, a possible learning mechanism 
(described at the computational level) is that we observe correlations between 
observed representations (learning input), and form associative links that reflect 
those correlations (learning output; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998). For example, if 
we perceive that professors tend to be intelligent (learning input) we may form 
an excitatory link between the representations professor and intelligent (learning 
output). A possible process (algorithmic level) by which this may be achieved is to 
increase associations at moments where two representations are both observed 
as present and decrease associations at moments where one property is observed 
as present and the other as absent (also known as Hebbian learning; McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1989). 
 In the connectionist person perception mechanism, the perceiver generates a 
perception of another person based on both external observations and internal 
knowledge (i.e. associative links). The input (first part of the computational level) 
of this mechanism refers to the starting state of the network, which consists of a 
set of nodes with starting activations (usually zero), the degree to which each node 
is directly excited by an observed stimulus, and a set of weighted associative links 
(derived from a learning mechanism; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998). The connectionist 
process (algorithmic level) refers to the set of rules that are used to update the 
activations of the nodes (Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998). Simply put, these rules entail to 
increase the activations of nodes to the extent that they are excited by an observed 
stimulus (i.e. influences of observation), spread activation between nodes via 
excitatory and inhibitory links (i.e. influences of knowledge/ prior experiences), and 
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gradual activation decay (also known as Parallel Distributed Processing; McClelland 
& Rumelhart, 1989). This continues iteratively until all activation levels stabilize in an 
equilibrium. Finally, the output (second part of the computational level) refers to the 
final activations after all activations have stabilized or until the process is interrupted 
(see Figure 1 for an illustration; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998).
increase activations
based on external
inputs, spread 
activation, decay
Input Process Output
FIGURE 1 -  An illustration of the distinction between input, process, and output in the connectionist 
person perception mechanism. The input  refers to the starting state of the network, which consists of 
a set of nodes with initial activation levels (usually zero), the degree to which each node is excited by 
an observed stimulus (in the figure above, only nodes with bold circles are excited by the currently 
observed stimulus), and a set of associative excitatory (solid lines) and inhibitory (dashed lines) links. 
The process  is the set of rules that are applied to update the activation levels of all nodes over time (e.g. 
spread of activation via associative links). The output  consists of the final activation levels (denoted by 
the shade of the nodes) after the activations have settled in an equilibrium or the process is interrupted.
The question is whether the distinction between social categorization, and 
individuation can be integrated into this general outline of connectionist models 
without adding anything (e.g. a second set of processing rules). If this is possible, then 
connectionist models and social categorization models can be seen as compatible 
(in principle). We propose that social categorization and individuation can be seen 
as different outputs of connectionist models that result from two different inputs. 
To give an analogy: a coffee machine may always apply the same processes (e.g. 
pressing water through a coffee capsule and pouring it into a cup), and nevertheless 
return dissociable types of coffee (outputs) based on different coffee capsules 
(inputs). Analogously, connectionist models may always apply the same associative 
(learning and person perception) processes, and nevertheless return dissociable 
outputs based on different inputs. 
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 More specifically, recall that social categorization means to treat a perceived 
person as an interchangeable group member while individuation means to treat a 
perceived person as a unique individual. We can conceptualize these two cognitive 
strategies by distinguishing between two types of nodes. First, there are nodes that 
are excited by any member of a social group (“social categories”). Second, there are 
nodes that are excited exclusively by specific individuals (“exemplars”). For example, 
we may call the node man a “social category”, and activation of this node “social 
categorization”, because the node man has been excited by several observed people 
in the past. Conversely, we may call the node Brad an “exemplar”, and activating 
this node “individuation”, because the node Brad has been excited exclusively by 
the perception of a specific individual in the past. 1 Under this interpretation, “social 
categorization” and “individuation” are two different person perception outputs 
(activation of a “social category” node or an “exemplar” node, respectively) that can be 
distinguished based on the inputs of connectionist models (“social category” nodes 
are excited by the observation of any member of a social group while “exemplar” 
nodes are excited exclusively by the observation of a specific individual). 
 What are consequences of this theoretical distinction? If social category nodes 
and exemplar nodes are excited differently by observed people during learning, 
there will be systematic differences in their structural positions in the learned 
associative network. As a result, there may be dissociable differences in the way these 
two types of nodes influence person perception at a particular moment. Importantly, 
this idea would be consistent with the core notions of both connectionist and social 
categorization models. Consistent with existing connectionist models (e.g. Freeman 
& Ambady, 2011; Kunda & Thagard, 1996), there is only one person perception 
process (i.e. one set of processing rules that is uniformly applied to all nodes). 
Consistent with social categorization models, there is a distinction between “social 
categorization” and “individuation” (namely, social category and exemplar activation 
respectively). This is possible, because our framework places the distinction between 
“social categorization” and “individuation” at the computational rather than the 
algorithmic level. More specifically, it bases the distinction on how different nodes 
are excited by observed people (social categories are excited by any member of a 
social group, while exemplars are excited exclusively by specific individuals), and 
resulting associative links (social category nodes have different associative links than 
exemplar nodes) while assuming that the processes that operate on these two types 
1 The distinction is somewhat simplified because it omits generalization gradients. For example, the node 
Brad is likely to become excited not only by observing Brad but also by people who resemble Brad 
(to some degree). In the computer simulations we present later, one can think of the effects of such 
generalization gradients as being reflected in the noise components of our simulations.  
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of nodes (e.g. learning, spreading activation via associative links, activation decay, 
etc.) are the same.2
 Would this theoretical framework also be consistent with relevant empirical 
phenomena in the person perception literature? To shed light on this question, 
we will describe a formal computational implementation of this framework. 
Subsequently, we show in computer simulations that the resulting formal model can 
account for documented phenomena in various person perception areas.
Formal implementation of computer simulations
Each simulation consists of two parts: a simulation of the learning mechanism, and 
a simulation of the person perception mechanism. In the learning mechanism, 
associative links are formed based on observed stimuli. These links are then passed 
as input to the person perception mechanism in which activation spreads via the 
learned associative links. A key assumption in both mechanisms is that some nodes 
are directly excited by the observation of any person that belongs to a certain group 
(e.g. any man) while other nodes are excited exclusively by the observation of a 
particular person (e.g. Peter). Importantly, activating the former type of node would 
constitute “social categorization” while activating the latter type of node would 
constitute “individuation”. In the following, we will describe the formal details of 
these two mechanisms.
Learning mechanism
Learning starts with a set of nodes with weighted links between the nodes. The 
strength of a link between two nodes i and j is represented by a numerical weight 
w
ij
. At the onset of learning all weights are set to zero. Next, weights are updated 
iteratively based on a set of stimuli to which we refer as the learning input. Each 
stimulus in this learning input is formally represented by a vector of external inputs 
ext
i
 for each node i in the network. In our simulations, an external input was usually 
equal to either 1 or -0.1 (with additional noise added to these values). Specifically, a 
value of 1 means that the perceiver detected the presence of the respective property 
(e.g. the perceived person is male) while a value of -0.1 means that the perceiver 
detected the absence of the respective property (e.g. the perceived person is not 
2 This idea is not necessarily opposed to the theoretical position that social categorization and individuation 
are two different processes. A compatible theoretical position would be that the process distinction is 
further upstream in the whole person perception process than the processes that are typically described 
by connectionist models of person perception: first there are two processes (categorization and 
individuation) and then their outputs (group and individual representations) become inputs and produce 
dissociable outputs in a single (connectionist) process.
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female). The values 1 and -0.1 are based on the idea that presence can be detected 
with more certainty than absence, given that the latter could simply reflect a failure 
to observe the property rather than true absence. 
 The learning input of each simulation will be illustrated in a matrix in which each 
column lists exclusively the nodes that are coded as present for a certain observed 
stimulus (see Figure 2). For example, the first column of the matrix in Figure 2 depicts 
a learning input in which A and B were coded as present and C as absent. Notice 
that the learning matrix defines A as a group representation because A receives 
positive external input from several observed persons and are in that sense group 
representations. In contrast, C and B are excited only by specific persons and are in 
that sense exemplar representations. Consequently, activating A would constitute 
“social categorization” while activating C or B would constitute “individuation”. 
 We used an adjusted version of the standard Hebbian learning algorithm for 
auto-associators by Rumelhart and McClelland (1989). This learning algorithm 
adjusts the weights based on correlations between external inputs. More specifically, 
the employed learning algorithm (1) increases association weights if two properties 
are both present in an observed stimulus, (2) decreases association weights if one 
property is present and the other absent, and (3) no weight adjustment is made 
if both properties are absent. 3 More formally, weights are updated iteratively by 
applying the following learning rule to each column of the learning matrix:
  
if (ext
i
 < 0) ^ (extj < 0):
∆w
ij
 = 0
else :
∆w
ij
 =  η * ext
i 
* ext
j
where η is the learning rate, ext
i
 is the external input of node i and ext
j
 is the external 
input of node j. In all simulations, the learning rate was η=0.01, which is a standard 
value (Freeman & Ambady, 2011; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1989). Moreover, after 
each application of the learning rule to an observed stimulus, weights were 
normalized by dividing through the norm of the weight matrix. This prevents that 
weights increase or decrease indefinitely but preserves relative differences between 
3 The qualitative pattern of the results is the same if the unadjusted algorithm is used. The adjustments we 
made were based entirely on conceptual considerations. If the Hebbian rule by McClelland and Rumelhart 
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1989) would have been used in its original form then absence-absence 
observations would generate excitatory links in the context of our model (because two negative external 
inputs multiply to positive weight changes). This has unrealistic consequences: given that virtually every 
property is absent at any given moment, properties will generally be connected by excitatory links. 
To prevent this, we made the adjustment that absence-absence observations do not change existing 
weights.
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weights. It is worth noting that the learning mechanism above leads to symmetric 
weights (w
ij
=w
ji
), which refl ects the fact that correlations between external inputs 
have no direction. Weights of self-connections were permanently set to zero (w
ii
=0).
Learning
Learning Input Connectionist Network
Excitatory link
Inhibitory link
FIGURE 2 - An illustration of the key ideas of our framework. The matrix on the left side presents a 
learning input in which one node (A) is excited by several observed people (hence, a “social category”) 
whereas other nodes (B and C) are excited exclusively by specific individuals (hence, “exemplars”). This 
learning input is passed through a (Hebbian) learning mechanism to create an associative network 
(right side). This network is then used as an input to the person perception mechanism,  (see Figure 1).
Person perception mechanism
Our formal implementation of the person perception mechanism adopts standard 
connectionist assumptions (Freeman & Ambady, 2011; McClelland & Rumelhart, 
1989; McClelland, 1991; Rumelhart, Hinton, & McClelland, 1986). Each node in the 
network had a numerical activation, which was initially set to zero. The activation 
of each node i was then updated iteratively based on its net input. The net input of 
node i is
net
i
 = Σ
j      
w
ij 
* o
j
  + ext
i
 + ε0.01
 
where  w
ij 
is the association weight between node i and j, o
j
 is the output of node j, 
ext
i
 is the external input of node i, and ε0.01 is normally distributed noise with a mean 
of 0 and standard deviation of 0.01. The latter refl ects the noisy conditions under 
which the brain processes information (see also: Freeman & Ambady, 2011). The 
output o
j 
 of node j is the amount of positive activation of node j or more formally:
o
j = max(aj,0)
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where a
j
 is the activation of node j. In other words, if the activation of a node becomes 
negative, it does not spread activation to other nodes. This is a common assumption 
in connectionist models of this type (Freeman & Ambady, 2011; McClelland, 1991; 
Rumelhart et al., 1986). Once the net input for all nodes had been computed, the 
activations of all nodes were updated in parallel as follows:
if net
i 
> 0 :
∆ a
i
 = I (M − a
i 
)net
i 
− D * a
i
if net
i 
≤ 0 :
∆ a
i
 = I (a
i
 − m)net
i 
− D * a
i
where M and m are the maximum and minimum activations respectively, I is a 
constant that scales the effect of the net input on the activation of the node, and 
D is a constant that scales the tendency of activations to decay to zero (parameter 
values are given in Table 1). Activations of nodes were updated iteratively according 
to the formulas above until one of two standard stopping conditions was met: 
(1) the maximum change in activations is smaller than 0.01 or (2) the number of 
iterations exceeds 200. At this point, the updating stopped and the activations were 
interpreted as the output of the person perception process (e.g. a memory retrieval 
result, a judgement, or a formed impression). 
TABLE 1 - Parameter values employed in our simulations of the person perception mechanism
Parameter Value
M 1
m -0.2
D 0.1
I 0.4
Max change 0.01
Max iterations 200
Note: The values above are standard values (Freeman & Ambady, 2011; McClelland, 1991; Rumelhart et al., 
1986).
Simulations of person perception phenomena
In the following, we aim to show that our model can account for relevant phenomena 
in social learning, memory, judgement, and impression formation. Specifically, in 
Simulation 1, we account for the phenomenon that perceivers gradually abstract 
away from individual representations towards group representations during social 
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learning (Sherman, 1996). In Simulation 2, we account for the phenomenon that 
social perceivers tend to confuse people more frequently within than between social 
groups during memory retrieval (Klauer & Wegener, 1998; Taylor et al., 1978; see also: 
Hugenberg et al., 2010). Using the same simulation, we also reproduce a dissociation 
between social categorization and individuation based on a multinomial processing 
tree analysis (Gawronski et al., 2003; Klauer & Wegener, 1998). In Simulation 3, we 
account for the phenomenon that social categorization polarizes continuous 
judgements (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Tajfel, 1969). Finally, in Simulation 4 we account 
for the impression formation phenomenon that people can generate more social 
inferences from what is commonly called “social categories” than from personality 
traits (“attributes”). All simulations were implemented in R 3.1.0 (R Core Team, 2014). 
The code of all simulations is freely available on Open Science Framework (https://
osf.io/sjnhm/?view_only=88c6361cf16f4032840b20fce5f7ff17).
Phenomenon 1: Abstraction in social learning
As we get to know more and more people, people may increasingly transition from 
representing people as individuals towards representing them as group members. 
A key finding that contributed to this idea came from a series of experiments by 
Sherman (1996). These experiments showed that category priming is more effective 
in activating exemplar knowledge if the number of known members of the category 
is small rather than large. In one experiment, participants were presented with 
short descriptions of different exemplars that allegedly belong to the same social 
group (a club at a university). For half of the participants, descriptions of only a few 
exemplars were shown (‘small group’ condition). For the other half descriptions of 
many exemplars were shown (‘large group’ condition). Next, participants were asked 
whether a certain personality trait is descriptive of the group in general. This was 
thought to prime the representation of the group. Finally, participants were asked to 
recall a description about one of the exemplars. The results showed that participants 
were slower in recalling a description of an exemplar in the ‘large group’ compared 
to the ‘small group’ condition. Thus, category priming seemed to be more effective 
in activating exemplar knowledge if the number of known exemplars was relatively 
small. This is a classic finding that is discussed in several social cognition textbooks 
(e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Moskowitz, 2005; Operario & Fiske, 2001). 
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Simulation 1. How can our framework account for the finding by Sherman (1996)? 
The starting network in our simulation entailed a category label (C) and a number 
of exemplar nodes (E
1
-E
N
) to denote exemplar knowledge. All weights of associative 
links were initially set to zero. Participants in the experiment by Sherman were 
sequentially shown information about exemplars with the category label depicted 
along. This was mimicked in our learning simulation by coding the category label 
and one exemplar as present and all other nodes as absent for each update of the 
association weights (see Figure 3). Before updating, random noise was added to 
the learning inputs (μ=0, σ=0.1) to model random variations in attention, viewing 
conditions, and prototypicality of stimuli (among others). We simulated the ‘small 
group’ condition by using N=5 exemplars and the ‘large group’ condition by using 
N=10 exemplars. In both conditions, networks tended to emerge in which exemplar-
exemplar links were inhibitory and category-exemplar links were excitatory (see 
Figure 3).
Learning
Excitatory link
Inhibitory link
Fully connected by
inhibitory links
c c c c
E2 ENE1E2 ENE1
FIGURE 3 - The learning input and resulting network in Simulation 1. In the learning input, exemplars 
(E1-EN) were observed sequentially with a shared category label (C). This led (on average) to a network 
in which the category label had excitatory links with all observed exemplars while exemplars had 
inhibitory links with each other. N=5 exemplars were used to simulate learning in the ‘small group’ 
condition while N=10 exemplars were used to simulate learning in the ‘large group’ condition.
How does category priming affect the accessibility of exemplar knowledge in the learned 
network? 
If the category node is activated by category priming, it will spread activation to all 
stored exemplar nodes via the excitatory category-exemplar links. Simultaneously, 
the exemplar nodes inhibit each other via their inhibitory exemplar-exemplar links. 
The fi nal activations of exemplar nodes are therefore a compromise between the 
excitatory eff ect from the category node and the inhibitory eff ects from other 
exemplar nodes. Importantly, as the number of exemplar nodes increases the 
number of exemplars that inhibit each particular exemplar become larger. Therefore, 
the inhibitory eff ects from competing exemplars grows with increasing category 
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   69 17-07-17   13:09
C h a p t e r  3  -  U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s
70 
size while the excitatory effect from the category label remains relatively constant. 
Consequently, priming the category will cause lower exemplar activation the higher 
the number of exemplars that fall into the category.4
 This idea was tested by applying the person perception mechanism while setting 
the external input of the category label to present external inputs of all remaining 
nodes to zero (simulating category priming). Recall that the task of participants was 
to retrieve information of one exemplar in the group. We assumed that participants 
will retrieve information about the exemplar that has the highest activation and that 
this retrieval will be faster the higher the activation of this exemplar. Therefore, we 
used the maximum final exemplar activation as a measure of exemplar accessibility. 
The whole procedure was repeated 20 times (which is an arbitrary number) to 
simulate several participants. 
 The results showed that the average maximum exemplar activation after category 
priming was higher in the ‘small group’ condition (M = 0.58; SD = 0.01) compared to 
the ‘large group’ condition (M = 0.56; SD = 0.02). A t test showed that this difference 
was significant, t(49)=4.80, p < 0.001. Hence, category priming facilitated retrieval of 
exemplar information more when the learned category contained few rather than 
many members. This conceptually replicates the results by Sherman (1996). Hence, 
our simulation reproduced the phenomenon that individual knowledge decreases 
in accessibility as more members of a certain group are learned.
Phenomenon 2: Systematic confusions and a cognitive dissociation in person 
memory
The notion that social perceivers can construe other people as either individuals or 
group members has been extensively supported by research in the person memory 
literature. One of the best replicated findings comes from the ‘Who said what’ 
paradigm (Gawronski et al., 2003; Klauer, Hölzenbein, Calanchini, & Sherman, 2014; 
Taylor et al., 1978; for an overview see Klauer & Wegener, 1998; see also Chapter 4). In 
the learning phase of this paradigm, participants read statements made by several 
4 There is a second aspect of our simulation that contributes to Phenomenon 1. In each iteration of our 
learning simulation the category label and one exemplar are coded as present while all other exemplars 
are coded as absent. The observation that most exemplars are absent means that weights between the 
category label and those exemplars slightly decrease. For example, perceiving Brad Pitt and actor decreases 
the strength of the link between Matt Damon and actor given that Matt Damon is absent while actor is 
present. However, as soon as the category label is observed together with these exemplars (e.g. Matt Damon 
and actor), the respective category-exemplar weights increase substantially, which overrules the decrease 
of the weight. This happens because our simulations weight absence less strongly (0.1) than presence 
(1). However, the more exemplars fall into a certain category, the more often it happens that a certain 
exemplar is perceived as absent while the category label is present. As a result, the weights of category-
exemplar links decrease with increasing category size. This aspect of our simulations further contributes 
to the phenomenon that category priming activates exemplars less the larger the number of exemplars.
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speakers who fall into two different social categories (e.g. male and female). In the 
test phase, the statements are presented again and participants need to answer two 
questions for each statement: (1) was the statement made during the learning phase 
and if yes: (2) which speaker has said the statement? The answers participants give to 
the second question are most critical for the present discussion. Results showed that 
participants tend to confuse members within categories (e.g. male speakers with 
other male speakers) more often than they confuse members between categories 
(e.g. male speakers with female speakers) – especially if this group membership is 
made salient (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). 
 Furthermore, Multinomial Processing Tree (MPT) analyses have been applied 
to the data above (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). The results of these analyses showed 
a dissociation between two cognitive “processes”: a “process” that distinguishes 
between individual speakers (individuation) and a “process” that distinguishes 
the speakers at a group level (social categorization). This result seems to directly 
supports the assumption made by social categorization models that people employ 
two distinct “processes” during person perception. 
Can our single-process connectionist model account for these findings?
The key aspect of our connectionist account lies in the idea that the perceiver can 
learn an associative link between the statement and a specific exemplar (e.g. Peter) 
and an associative link between the statement and a social category (e.g. male). If 
the perceiver learned exclusively a link between the statement and a social category 
then the statement will activate the category, which then activates all speakers that 
are associated with that category. This prevents between-category errors but does 
not prevent within-category errors. In contrast, if the statement is directly associated 
with a specific exemplar (e.g. Peter) then the statement will activate primarily the 
correct exemplar, causing correct recognition of the speaker of the statement. Taken 
together, this leads to more within- than between-category confusions and (as we 
will show) a dissociation when a MPT analysis is applied to the same data. This was 
tested in Simulations 2a-2d.
Simulation 2a: Learning
Our simulation of the ‘Who said what’ paradigm required to simulate two types of 
learning. First, we needed to simulate lifetime learning, which leads to a network 
that is already present before the participant begins with the ‘Who said what’ task. 
Second, we needed to simulate the learning that takes place during the learning 
phase of the ‘Who said what’ task. In the following, we describe the simulation of 
lifetime learning. Learning that takes place during the ‘Who said what’ task was 
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embedded in the simulation of specifi c test trials and is therefore described in the 
procedure of Simulations 2b-2d below.
 To simulate life time learning, we initialized a network of eight nodes that denote 
the identities of the speakers (E
1
-E
8
) and two category nodes (C1 and C2). Initially, 
all weights were set to zero. We then simulated the learning history of a particular 
perceiver by updating the weights based on the learning input displayed in Figure 
4 1000 times (with added normally distributed noise; μ=0, σ=0.1). An illustration 
of the average network structure that resulted from this simulation is depicted 
in Figure 4. An example of a more specifi c interpretation of this simulation is that 
perceivers learn during their life that (1) the names Peter, Carl, Jon, and Marc (E
1
-
E
4
) are consistently paired with male people (C
1
), (2) the names Jane, Maria, Lara, 
and Anne (E
5
-E
8
) are consistently paired with female people (C
2
), and that (3) names 
(E
1
-E
8
) are mutually exclusive in the sense that people tend to have only one. In the 
following three simulations, we will explain how we used the learned network to 
simulate the process of learning and selecting the speaker of a statement during the 
‘Who said what’ paradigm. 
C1
I1
C1
I2
C1
I3
C1
I4
C2
I5
C2
I6
C2
I7
C2
I8
Excitatory link
Inhibitory link
Fully connected by
inhibitory links
C1 C2
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8
Learning
FIGURE 4 - The learning input and resulting network in Simulation 2a. In the learning input there are 
two social categories (C1 and C2) which each generalize over four out of eight identities (E1-E8). This 
led (on average) to an network in which each social category had excitatory links with four exemplars 
while category-category and exemplar-exemplar links were inhibitory.
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General procedure of Simulations 2b-2d
Our simulations followed an iterative procedure where each iteration consisted of 
a simulation of associative learning in a particular learning trial and the retrieval of 
the speaker of the statement in the corresponding test trial. In recent applications 
of the ‘Who said what’ paradigm (Gawronski et al., 2003; Klauer et al., 2014; Klauer & 
Wegener, 1998) participants were asked two questions in each test trial of the ‘Who 
said what’ paradigm: (1) was the displayed statement shown during the learning 
phase, and if yes: (2) who said the statement? The results that we aim to replicate 
are based on the responses to test question 2 and are relatively independent of 
the responses to test question 1 (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). Therefore, we simulated 
exclusively the cognitive mechanisms that may underlie answering test question 2 
(who said the statement?). Nevertheless, creating responses to test question 1 was 
necessary because the MPT analysis requires estimating additional parameters (e.g. 
memory for statements) that were not of interest to us, but which must be estimated 
in order to apply the same analytical approach as in past research (Klauer & Wegener, 
1998). For this reason, answers to test question 1 were set directly without simulating 
any cognitive process. 
 More specifically, each iteration of our simulation started by randomly setting 
whether the statement considered in the iteration would be treated as a target 
statement (that was shown during the learning phase) or a distractor (that was 
exclusively shown during the test phase) with equal probability. Next, we directly set 
the response to test question 1 (was the statement shown during the learning phase?) 
with a constant probability to give a correct response (.8). If the response was “no”, the 
iteration was terminated (consistent with the design of past studies). If the response 
was “yes”, we simulated a learning trial and then used the resulting connectionist 
network to simulate the retrieval of the speaker in the corresponding test trial. 
 To simulate a learning trial, we took the network that resulted from Simulation 
2a (Figure 4) and added a statement node. Learning was then simulated by applying 
our learning mechanism a single time with the external input of the statement node 
set to one (present) while drawing the external inputs of the corresponding identity 
node (e.g. E
3
) and social category node (e.g. C
1
) from normal distributions (for details 
see the descriptions of Simulations 2b-d). All other external inputs were set to -0.1 
(absent). Taken together, this simulates that participants read every statement on 
learning trials (in line with instructions) but pay varying amounts of incidental 
attention to the properties of the speaker. Consequently, in some trials participants 
will associate the statement with the specific identity of the speaker (a node from E
1
-
E
8
; e.g. the name Peter) and in other trials participants may associate the statement to 
the general social category of the speaker (a node from C
1
-C
2
; e.g. the gender male). 
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 Next, we simulated the retrieval process in the corresponding test trial. The 
general idea was that the statement acts as a retrieval cue that participants use to 
retrieve the speaker of the statement. Speaker selection therefore depends on the 
associative links between the statement with the properties (i.e., E and C nodes) of 
the speaker. We simulated perception of the statement node by applying the person 
perception mechanism with the external input of the statement node set to 1 
(present) and all other external inputs set to zero. The exemplar node with the highest 
final activation was taken as the response in the test trial (i.e. the selected speaker).
 Response frequencies of 50 simulated participants with 100 trials each were 
generated iteratively by repeating the procedure above 5000 times. To simulate 
several participants, we used the weights that resulted from Simulation 2a for 100 
iterations (which can therefore be seen as trials performed by the same participant) 
before we applied Simulation 2a again to generate weights that were used for the 
next 100 iterations (i.e. to simulate a new participant with a different lifetime learning 
history). The response frequencies that resulted from this iterative simulation 
procedure were analyzed with regard to the difference between within-category and 
between-category confusions and also using the standard Multinomial Processing 
Tree analysis for the “Who said what”. Through the latter analysis strategy, we aimed 
to reproduce the documented dissociation between two cognitive components 
(social categorization and individuation). 
How can our simulations account for the dissociation?
To understand this, one needs to know that the MPT analysis dissociates between 
social categorization and individuation based on four independent parameters: two 
parameters for social categorization and two for individuation. These parameters 
denote the probability with which a certain property of the speaker was encoded. For 
example, if the speakers fall into the social categories male and female, the probability 
of remembering that a speaker was male is the first social categorization parameter, 
and the probability of remembering that a speaker was female is the second social 
categorization parameter. Conversely, the probability of remembering the identity 
of a specific male speaker (e.g. Peter, Carl, Jon, or Marc) is the first individuation 
parameter, and the probability of remembering the identity of a specific female 
speaker (e.g. Jane, Maria, Lara, or Anne) is the second individuation parameter. Past 
studies have shown that social categorization and individuation parameters can 
vary independently, indicating that they reflect dissociable cognitive components 
(Klauer & Wegener, 1998). 
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What properties of the cognitive mechanism could these parameters reflect in our simulation? 
Suppose that a participant paid attention to the individual characteristics of the 
speaker (e.g. Peter). In that case, there will be a learned excitatory link between the 
statement and the corresponding exemplar node. Consequently, activation will 
spread from the statement node to that exemplar node and cause the selection of 
the correct speaker (speaker selection based on individuation). In contrast, if the 
participant paid attention only to the social category of the speaker, there will be a 
learned excitatory link only between the statement and one of the social categories 
(C
1
 or C
2
). This social category then spreads activation to all connected exemplar 
nodes. This spread of activation combined with random noise in the activation 
levels will lead to random speaker selection that is biased towards speakers that are 
linked to the social category (i.e. speaker selection based on social categorization). 
Given that whether a statement becomes associated with a specific speaker or a 
social category are two independent states in our simulation, the resulting MPT 
parameters can vary independent of each other, which constitutes a dissociation.
 These ideas were tested in three consecutive simulations in which we simulated 
the situations that, during learning, attention is paid to both individual and category 
properties (Simulation 2b), attention is paid only to individual properties (Simulation 
2c), and attention is paid only to the social category of the speaker (Simulation 2d). 
The purpose of these simulations was to reproduce the finding that people make 
more within-category than between-category confusions (Simulation 2b) and 
also to show that the social categorization and individuation MPT parameters vary 
independent of each other dependent on the extent to which simulated participants 
encode statement-exemplar links and statement-category links (Simulations 2c and 
2d compared to 2b).
Simulation 2b: Baseline
To simulate a situation in which both social categorization and individuation 
occur during learning trials, we sampled the external inputs of the identity of the 
speaker (μ=-0.6, σ=1) and the social category of the speaker (μ=2, σ=1) from normal 
distributions with -0.1 (absent) as lower limit. 5 This simulated varying amounts of 
attention to the identity and social category of speakers during learning trials. In 
5 The means were chosen with the goal to produce rates of correct speaker selection and within-category 
speaker confusions that resemble those obtained in past research (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). Rates 
of correct speaker retrieval tend to be relatively low and we therefore chose for a negative mean for 
the external input of the identity node. Conversely, rates of systematic speaker confusions tend to be 
relatively frequent and we therefore chose for a positive mean for the external input of the category node. 
However, this choice was based on “cosmetic” reasons and is relatively irrelevant for the general point that 
the simulation is consistent with the documented dissociation.
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order to analyze the confusions between speakers, we first corrected between 
category errors for their overall higher chance of occurrence by multiplying their 
frequency with 3/4 (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). In line with past findings, the results 
of a paired samples t test showed that within-category errors (M=18.60; SD=4.29) 
occurred significantly more often than (corrected) between-category errors (M=7.28; 
SD=2.62), t(49)=14.35, p<.001.
 Next, the standard MPT analysis was applied to the simulated data (Klauer & 
Wegener, 1998). The fit of the MPT model with the data was satisfactory, G2=0.54, 
df=1, p=.463. The critical MPT parameter estimates and confidence intervals are 
depicted in Table 2. Most importantly, social categorization and individuation 
parameter estimates were well above zero, as expected. Moreover, constraining 
the social categorization parameters to be equal to zero significantly reduced 
the model fit, ∆G2=299.75, df=2, p<.001. The same was true if the individuation 
parameters were constrained to be equal to zero, ∆G2=114.65, df=2, p<.001. Thus, 
according to these results both social categorization and individuation occurred in 
our simulation. However, do the social categorization and individuation parameters 
capture two dissociable cognitive components? This was addressed in the next two 
simulations in which we tested whether social categorization and individuation can 
be eliminated independently.  
TABLE 2 -  Critical parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for Simulation 2b
Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
c
1
0.181 0.133 0.228
c
2
0.158 0.111 0.206
d
1
0.597 0.480 0.713
d
2
0.640 0.531 0.749
Note: The parameters c
1
 and c
2
 are the probabilities of remembering members of category C
1
 and C
2
 respectively 
(individuation) and the parameters d
1
 and d
2
 are the probabilities of remembering the social category of members 
of C
1
 and C
2
 respectively (social categorization).
Simulation 2c: Social categorization manipulation
Simulation 2c was equivalent to Simulation 2b except that the external inputs of 
social category nodes were always set to -0.1. This simulated a situation in which 
participants never paid attention to the social categories (C
1
 and C
2
) of the speakers 
and therefore never encoded a statement-category link. As expected, the results 
of a paired samples t test showed no significant evidence that within-category 
errors (M=13.72; SD=3.23) occurred often than (corrected) between-category errors 
(M=13.70; SD=2.73), t(49)=0.06, p = .971. 
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 Next, the standard MPT analysis was applied to the simulated data. The fit of 
the MPT model with the data was satisfactory, G2=1.64, df=1, p=.207. The critical 
MPT parameter estimates and confidence intervals are depicted in Table 3. Most 
importantly, social categorization parameter estimates were virtually zero while 
individuation parameter estimates were above zero, as expected. Moreover, 
constraining the social categorization parameters to be equal to zero did not 
significantly reduce the model fit, ∆G2=0.27, df=2, p=.875, whereas constraining 
individuation parameters to be equal to zero significantly reduced the model fit, 
∆G2=66.40, df=2, p<.001. Thus, according to these results only individuation occurred 
in our simulation, as expected.
TABLE 3 - Critical parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for Simulation 2c
Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
c
1
0.118 0.079 0.157
c
2
0.091 0.051 0.130
d
1
0.030 -0.110 0.170
d
2
0.000 -0.158 0.158
Note: The parameters c
1
 and c
2
 are the probabilities of remembering members of category C
1
 and C
2
 respectively 
(individuation) and the parameters d
1
 and d
2
 are the probabilities of remembering the social category of members 
of C
1
 and C
2
 respectively (social categorization).
Simulation 2d: Individuation manipulation
Simulation 2d was equivalent to Simulation 2b except that external inputs of exemplar 
nodes were always set to -0.1. This simulated a situation in which participants never 
paid attention to the identity of a speaker and therefore never encoded a statement-
exemplar link. As expected, the results of a paired samples t test showed that there 
were significantly more within-category errors (M=21.22; SD=4.21) than (corrected) 
between-category errors (M=8.61; SD=2.86), t(49)=15.34, p < .001. Hence, simulating 
zero individuation did not eliminate the phenomenon that people systematically 
confuse speakers within categories, as expected. 
 Next, the standard MPT analysis was applied to the simulated data (Klauer & 
Wegener, 1998). The fit of the MPT model with the data was satisfactory, G2=0.82, 
df=1, p=.366. The critical MPT parameter estimates and confidence intervals are 
depicted in Table 4. Most importantly, social categorization parameter estimates 
were well above zero while individuation parameter estimates were virtually zero, 
as expected. Moreover, constraining the social categorization parameters to be 
equal to zero significantly reduced the model fit, ∆G2=321.51, df=2, p<.001, whereas 
constraining the individuation parameters to be equal to zero did not significantly 
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reduce the model fit, ∆G2=0.49, df=2, p=.778. Thus, according to these results only 
social categorization occurred in our simulation, as expected.
TABLE 4 - Critical parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for Simulation 2d
Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
c
1 0.015 -0.027 0.056
c
2 0.000 -0.040 0.040
d
1 0.581 0.475 0.686
d
2 0.545 0.442 0.647
Note: The parameters c
1
 and c
2
 are the probabilities of remembering members of category C
1
 and C
2
 respectively 
(individuation) and the parameters d
1
 and d
2
 are the probabilities of remembering the social category of members 
of C
1
 and C
2
 respectively (social categorization).
Taken together, the results of Simulations 2a-2d suggest that our connectionist model 
can account for (1) the finding of more within- than between-category confusions 
and (2) the dissociation between social categorization and individuation based on 
a MPT analysis. The latter means that our interpretation of social categorization 
and individuation as a distinction based on the input of our connectionist model 
(Marr’s computational level), and not as a distinction between different processes 
(Marr’s algorithmic level) is consistent with the evidence for a cognitive dissociation 
in person memory (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). Specifically, the dissociation between 
social categorization and individuation may reflect that information about perceived 
targets can be associated with both exemplar (Peter) and group representations 
(man). These associations may then have dissociable effects on the retrieval of the 
speaker of the statement despite being subject to the same processing rules. 
 Although Simulations 2a-2d were designed to explain findings in the ‘Who said 
what’ paradigm in particular, they can also be used to explain related findings in the 
literature. In particular, it is a robust finding that people tend to confuse people from 
other races in memory more often than people from the own race - a phenomenon 
that is known as the cross race effect (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007; 
Hugenberg et al., 2010; Young & Hugenberg, 2011; Young, Bernstein, & Hugenberg, 
2010). This effect has been extensively discussed because it can cause other-race 
suspects to be more often falsely identified as the culprit of a crime (Hugenberg et 
al., 2010).
 It has recently been argued that the cross race effect may be driven by lack 
of motivation to discriminate between individuals of other races (Hugenberg et 
al., 2010). Simulations 2a-2d also apply to these memory confusions. The general 
idea behind Simulations 2a-2d is that a certain cue (e.g. a statement, an observed 
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crime, etc.) becomes associated with both exemplar and group representations of a 
observed person. Later the cue may be provided as a basis for selecting from a pool 
of persons (e.g. to select the speaker of a statement or the person who committed 
the crime). Given that the cue can become associated not only with exemplars 
but also group representations, systematic confusions may arise. Importantly, the 
stronger the perceiver’s tendency to construe other people as group members, the 
stronger the tendency to confuse observed people. This converges with the idea 
that the cross race effect may (in part) be due to lack of motivation to “individuate” 
people from other races: namely, the tendency to construe people in terms of race 
may be stronger for other-race people than for own-race people, and consequently 
perceivers may confuse other-race people may occur more often with each other. 
As such, Simulations 2a-2d apply not only to research with the “Who said what” 
paradigm but can also be seen as a more general explanation for documented 
within-category confusions in (person) memory.
Phenomenon 3: Social categorization polarizes judgements
Among the earliest work on social categorization is research that investigated how 
social categorization influences continuous judgements. In a classic experiment, 
Tajfel (1963) asked participants to estimate the lengths of lines with linearly increasing 
length. In the categorization group, lines that were shorter than the average line 
were labeled with A while lines that were longer than the average line were labeled 
with B (or vice versa). In the control group, the two labels were combined randomly 
with lines such that there was no relationship between the labels and the length 
of the lines. The results showed that the difference between the perceived length 
of the longest line that was labeled with A and the shortest line that was labeled 
with B was larger in the categorization group relative to the control group. Thus, the 
correlation between the category labels and line length seemed to have caused an 
increase in between-category differences. 
 Similar results were demonstrated in social domains where judgements on trait 
dimensions (e.g. intelligence, likability, trustworthiness) are often polarized if those 
traits are correlated with social groups (e.g. ethic groups or sexes; Razran, 1950; 
Secord, Bevan, & Katz, 1956; Tajfel, Sheikh, & Gardner, 1964; Tajfel, 1959). Despite its 
non-social nature, the experiment by Tajfel (1963) is one of the most widely cited 
demonstrations of the influence of social categorization on judgements and we 
therefore addressed the findings of this experiment in Simulation 3.
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Simulation 3
To simulate the experiment by Tajfel (1963) we initialized a network with the category 
label nodes A and B, as well as the length nodes L- and L+. The perception of length 
was modelled as distributed activation over L- and L+. Specifically, perceived length 
in our model is the difference in activation between these two nodes. This means 
that perceiving a stimulus as long entails high activation of L+ and low activation of 
L-, perceiving medium length entails equal activation of L+ and L-, and perceiving a 
stimulus as short entails low activation of L+ and high activation of L-.6 We modeled 
the length of the eight lines that were employed in the experiment by Tajfel by 
creating eight pairs of external inputs (L
1
-L
8
) for the nodes L+ and L- where the 
external input of L+ linearly increased from -0.1 and 1 while the external input of L- 
linearly decreased from 1 to -0.1. This means that L
1
-L
8
 denote connectionist inputs 
to the nodes L+ and L- for lines of linearly increasing length.
 In the original experiment, the eight lines were presented in random order, which 
was repeated over six rounds. We theorized that associative learning may update 
the links between the nodes A, B, L+, and L- during these trials, which increasingly 
influences judgments on later trials. For example, if A is consistently paired with high 
activation in L+ and low activation in L- (i.e. long lines), an excitatory link is learned 
between A and L+ while an inhibitory link is learned between A and L-. These links 
subsequently influence the perception of length on later trials: if a line has been 
displayed together with A, A will excite L+ and inhibit L-, which leads to higher 
perceived length. Thus, according to our explanation the effect of the labels A and B 
on length judgements will occur mainly in later trials while earlier trials mainly serve 
as the learning input that is necessary to produce the effect on length judgments on 
later trials.
 We simulated this by implementing the first five rounds of trials as our learning 
simulation. Figure 5 illustrates the general structure of this simulation for the 
different experimental conditions. In the simulation of the categorization condition, 
A was consistently paired with short lines while B was consistently paired with long 
lines. In the simulation of the control condition, A and B were randomly paired with 
different lengths. To simulate the first five rounds of trials in the experiment by Tajfel 
(1963), we applied the learning input depicted in Figure 5 five times with normally 
6 The distributed coding was chosen based on conceptual reasons. If length is represented by one node 
such as the node long then the default perception (zero activation) is that a stimulus is perceived as 
maximally short unless external input changes this. Using the distributed representation above, the 
default is intermediate length, which seems more plausible. It may be worth noting that this distributed 
representation of length does not (necessarily) imply that a stimulus can be perceived as simultaneously 
both short and long, because length perception is seen as the difference between the activations of the 
two nodes, while the activations of the individual nodes L+ and L- have no phenomenological meaning 
by themselves.
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distributed noise added (μ=0, σ=0.1). Next, we simulated the judgement of line 
length in the last round of trials. For this purpose, the input depicted in Figure 5 was 
applied one more time but this time as input to our person perception mechanism. 
In each simulated trial (corresponding to the columns in the box in Figure 5), the 
diff erence in fi nal activations of L- and L+ was taken as the judged length of the 
line. This whole procedure was repeated 20 times for each group to simulate several 
participants.
C1
L1
C1
L2
C1
L3
C1
L4
C2
L5
C2
L6
C2
L7
C2
L8
C1
L1
C2
L2
C2
L3
C1
L4
C2
L5
C1
L6
C1
L7
C2
L8
C1
L-
C2
L+
C1
L-
C2
L+
Categorization Condition
Control Condition (example)
Excitatory link
Inhibitory link
Learning
Learning
FIGURE 5 - The learning input and resulting network in Simulation 3. Importantly, in the categorization 
condition line length (L1-L8) was correlated with the category labels A  and B. In contrast, the relationship 
between category labels and line length was random in the control condition.
We visualized the results in Figure 6 by plotting the simulated length judgements 
averaged over simulated participants against the objective line lengths (coded as L
1
-
L
8
). This was done for both the categorization and the control condition. In line with 
the original results by Tajfel, there was a higher diff erence between perceived line 
lengths at the category boundary (i.e. L
4
 vs L
5
) in the categorization condition (M=0.31, 
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SD=0.07) compared to the control condition (M=0.07, SD=0.02). A t test showed that 
this diff erence was signifi cant, t(19)=14.73, p>.001. Hence, our simulation results 
replicated the fi nding that length judgments can become polarized by (social) 
categorization. 
	FIGURE 6. The plot above shows the difference between final activations of L+  and L- (i.e. perceived 
length) against the objective lengths of the lines (L1-L8) for both the categorization and control group. 
In line with the results by Tajfel, there is a steeper slope of perceived length from L4 to L5 (i.e. the 
category boundary) in the categorization group compared to the control group.
Polarization of continuous judgements have also been documented in social 
domains (Razran, 1950; Secord, Bevan, & Katz, 1956; Tajfel, Sheikh, & Gardner, 
1964; Tajfel, 1959). Similar to the non-social polarization phenomenon above, it 
was found that trait judgements become polarized if the target persons belong to 
categories (e.g. diff erent ethnicities) that covary with a trait (e.g. likable). Because 
the main diff erence between these studies and the experiment by Tajfel is the 
employed stimuli, Simulation 3 can explain such fi ndings as well by conceiving 
of the L+ and L- nodes as opposites of a certain trait dimension (e.g. intelligent, 
trustworthy, aggressive, etc.) and A and B as social groups (e.g. diff erent ethnicities 
or occupations). In other words, our simulation may be seen as an explanation for 
the general phenomenon that social categorization polarizes (social and non-social) 
judgements.
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Phenomenon 4: “Social Categories” are more predictive than traits
If you learn that a perceived person is a “politician”, you may be able to list a number 
of stereotypic properties that this person is likely to have (e.g. that the person is 
extravert, intelligent, and old). In contrast, if you learn that a perceived person is 
“extravert”, you may not be able to list the same amount of novel properties. In line 
with this idea, several fi ndings suggest that some person labels (e.g. occupations, 
nationalities, and social roles) are more eff ective sources of inferences about another 
person than others (e.g. personality traits; Andersen et al., 1990; Andersen & Klatzky, 
1987; Bond & Brocket, 1987; Bond & Sedikides, 1988; but see: Cox & Devine, 2015). 
For example, Andersen and Klatzky (1987) provided participants with a person label 
that could either be a personality trait (e.g. extravert) or a a social role, occupation, 
or nationality. The task of participants was to list as many person properties as 
possible that can be inferred from the label (e.g. properties that a politician is likely 
to have). The results showed that participants could list a lower number of diff erent 
person properties based on personality traits. Such fi ndings have led to a distinction 
in the social categorization literature between two types of social representations: 
“social categories” (e.g. politician), which enable us to make stereotypic inferences 
about another person, and “attributes” (e.g. extravert), which provide more passive 
descriptions of another person (Fiske et al., 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae 
& Bodenhausen, 2000). This has contributed to the common idea that “social 
categorization” is a major source of stereotyping (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
 However, as mentioned before, the social category-attribute distinction has 
been criticized (Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). In particular, it has 
been noted that people can be grouped based on both what is commonly labelled 
as “social categories” (e.g. politicians) and also based on what is commonly labelled 
as “attributes” (e.g. extraverts). Consequently, the distinction seems artifi cial: if “social 
categories” are defi ned as group representations, then all of these labels are “social 
categories” (Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Our theoretical framework 
converges with this argument. In our framework, every node that is excited by 
several observed people is by defi nition a “social category”, including personality 
traits (e.g. extravert). Nevertheless, the fi ndings above suggest that there is an 
important diff erence between diff erent social representations. 
 We suggest that the fi ndings above may be explained by an extension of our 
category-exemplar distinction. Essentially, the distinction between exemplars and 
social categories is a distinction based on inclusiveness: exemplars are lowly inclusive 
(they refer to one person) whereas social categories are medium to highly inclusive 
(they refer to groups of varying size). We suggest that one can further distinguish 
between two types of social categories. First, there are social categories that refer to 
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relatively small and homogeneous groups and about which inferences are therefore 
possible (e.g. politicians; medium inclusiveness). Second, there are social categories 
that refer to large heterogeneous groups and about which inferences are therefore 
difficult (e.g. extraverts; high inclusiveness).
 The question is how high inclusiveness makes a person label an ineffective 
source of inferences in a connectionist model. Somehow inclusiveness (a learning 
input assumption) would have to lead to an associative network (a learning output 
and person perception input) in which highly inclusive representations are relatively 
ineffective sources of inferences. To illustrate this idea, imagine a politician and a 
comedian who are both extravert. In the corresponding learning input, extravert is 
more inclusive than politician or extravert in the sense that extravert is excited by 
more perceived people than politician or comedian. Moreover, given that extravert 
co-occurs with both politician and extravert, excitatory extravert-politician, and 
extravert-comedian links may be learned. Furthermore, given that politician and 
comedian never co-occur, an inhibitory politician-comedian link may be learned. In 
this network, being told that a person is a politician would activate the node politician, 
which then spreads activation to the node extravert (one inference). In contrast, 
if one learns that a person is extravert, the node extravert would be activated and 
spread activation to both politician and comedian, which then inhibit each other. As 
a result, the activation of politician and comedian may remain subliminal, causing 
the perceiver to be unable to report any inferences (zero inferences). In other words, 
the reason why personality traits (extravert) may be less predictive than some other 
social representations (e.g. politician) may be that personality traits tend to be more 
inclusive and therefore often activate conflicting predictions that cancel each other 
out. This explanation was tested in more extensive form in Simulation 4.
Simulation 4
We initialized a network that consisted of four highly inclusive (trait) nodes (T
1
-T
4
), 
and four nodes (C
1
-C
4
) that were less inclusive. Figure 7 depicts the learning input 
that was used to update the weights of associative links. Notice that there is a one-
to-many mapping from C to T nodes. For example, this may denote that extravert 
people (T) can be politicians (C
1
), or comedians (C
2
), or something else. As another 
example, this may denote that intelligent people (T) can be professors (C
1
), or lawyers 
(C
2
), or something else. At the same time, C nodes tend not to occur together, which 
reflects that people tend to have only one occupation or one nationality, for instance. 
Lifetime learning was simulated by applying the learning inputs in Figure 7 with 
added normally distributed noise (μ=0, σ=0.1) for 1000 times. The average network 
structure that resulted from this learning simulation is illustrated in Figure 7.
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T1    T2         T3            T4
C1   C2        C3           C4
Learning
T1      T1      T2     T2
T3      T4     T3     T4
C1      C2    C3     C4
Excitatory link
Inhibitory link
Fully connected by
inhibitory links
FIGURE 7. The learning input and resulting (average) network of Simulation 4. 
Next, we used the learned network as an input to the person perception mechanism 
and simulated the task by Andersen and Klatzky (1987). In the original experiment, 
participants were presented with one person label and had to generate as many 
inferences from this label as possible. We simulated this by setting the external 
input of one node to one (i.e. the provided person label) while setting the external 
inputs of all other nodes to zero. Using these external inputs, we applied the person 
perception mechanism and assessed to what extent other nodes than the provided 
person label were activated in the output. We assumed that participants would 
list those labels whose activation surpasses a certain threshold from subliminal to 
supraliminal activation, which we set to 0.3. Hence, the number of reported person 
labels was the number of nodes whose fi nal activation was higher than 0.3. This 
was repeated iteratively over all nodes in the network and for each we recorded the 
number of inferred person characteristics. This whole procedure was repeated 20 
times to simulate several participants. The results showed that the average number 
of listed person properties was higher when a medium inclusive label (C
1
-C
4
) was 
provided as person label (M=1.98, SD=0.08) compared to when a highly inclusive 
(trait) label (T
1
-T
4
)  was provided (M=1.01, SD=0.39). A t test showed that this diff erence 
was signifi cant, t(19)=10.77, p>0.001. This replicates previous fi ndings (Andersen & 
Klatzky, 1987), and suggest that the phenomenon that some person labels are more 
predictive than others may (at least in part) be explained by inclusiveness.
 This connectionist explanation is consistent with both the idea of social 
categorization models that diff erent social representations play diff erent functional 
roles during person perception and the common assumption of connectionist 
models that all representations are processed in the same way. In Simulation 4, 
the distinction between person labels that function as sources of inferences (e.g. 
politician) and labels that are more passive description (e.g. extravert) are based 
on their inclusiveness (learning input assumption), and how they are consequently 
positioned in the learned associative network (person perception input 
assumption). At the same time, the same processing rules are applied to both types 
of representations (e.g. spreading activation via associative links), which means that 
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   85 17-07-17   13:09
C h a p t e r  3  -  U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s
86 
they are not distinguished by the way they are processed. Thus, our explanation 
synthesizes the idea that a single (connectionist) process is operating with the 
theoretical distinction between predictive and passively descriptive representations. 
D isc ussion
We aimed to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we aimed to contribute 
to the conceptual integration of person perception models by introducing a 
theoretical framework that synthesizes key assumptions of social categorization 
and connectionist models. Second, we aimed to provide explanations of relevant 
phenomena in various person perception areas using our theoretical framework. 
Third, we aimed to contribute to addressing conceptual criticism of social 
categorization models by grounding their informal key assumptions in a formal 
connectionist model. In the following sections, we will discuss how our work 
contributes to each of these three aims and discuss possible directions for future 
research.
Aim 1: Conceptual integration of social categorization and connectionist models
Our framework was based on Marr’s distinction between the computational level 
(i.e. input-output mapping) and algorithmic level (i.e. process) of a cognitive 
mechanism. We proposed that the distinction between social categorization and 
individuation can be understood as a distinction in the input-output mapping 
of existing connectionist models (computational level) rather than their process 
(algorithmic level). To give an analogy: a coffee machine may always apply the same 
processes (e.g. pressing water through a coffee capsule and pouring it into a cup), 
and nevertheless return dissociable types of coffee (outputs) based on different 
coffee capsules (inputs). Analogously, social perceivers may always apply the same 
associative (learning and person perception) processes, and nevertheless return 
dissociable outputs because they apply these processes to two different inputs 
(group and exemplar representations). This was formally implemented by assuming 
connectionist nodes that become excited by specific individuals (exemplar nodes) 
and other nodes that become excited any member of social group (social category 
nodes). These two types of nodes are then processed according to the same 
updating rules, which makes our model consistent with the common connectionist 
assumption that person perception is driven by a single process. 
 Our theoretical framework makes it possible to explain phenomena from the 
social categorization and connectionist literature on person perception taken 
together. For example, is the finding of a cognitive dissociation in person memory 
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consistent with existing models (e.g. given the distinction between categorization 
and individuation in social categorization models) or inconsistent (given single 
process connectionist models)? Our framework provides some clarification: a 
cognitive dissociation may have been found because the associative processes 
proposed by connectionist processes may be applied to two different inputs (group 
and exemplar representations). 
 Furthermore, our framework may also provide a conceptual bridge that may help 
the social categorization and connectionist literatures to inform each other more 
effectively in the future. First, social categorization research can inform connectionist 
models about input assumptions. Our simulations can be seen as illustrations of 
this idea. For example, based on the distinction between social categorization and 
individuation of social categorization models, we assumed that some nodes are 
excited by the observation of several people while other nodes are excited by the 
observation of only specific people. This enabled us to reproduce a dissociation 
between two cognitive components in person memory (Phenomenon 2). Hence, 
our explanation of this dissociation was adjusting the input of our connectionist 
models based on the theorizing in the social categorization literature. 
 Conversely, connectionist models may contribute to the social categorization 
literature by specifying the processes (i.e. algorithmic level) by which social 
categorization assumptions (i.e. inputs) translate into measurable phenomena (i.e. 
outputs). This idea converges with recent arguments that social categorization 
appears to be driven by a dynamic (e.g. connectionist) process (Freeman, & 
Ambady, 2011). An implication of this idea is that connectionist research on 
learning mechanisms in human cognition may shape the predictions of social 
categorization models. That is, dependent on the learning mechanisms proposed 
by the connectionist literature, construing perceivers as either group members or 
individuals (i.e. learning inputs) may result in different associative networks, which 
lead to different predicted person perception outputs in turn. In this view, social 
categorization and connectionist models are natural extensions of each other that 
shed light onto different aspects of the same cognitive mechanisms.
Aim 2: Explaining relevant person perception phenomena
We also presented a formal implementation of our framework. This enabled 
us to replicate relevant phenomena in computer simulations. The simulations 
encompassed both (1) a learning mechanism in which associative links are formed 
based on observational inputs and (2) a person perception mechanism in which 
observational inputs and learned associative links (derived from the learning 
mechanism) jointly produce person perception outputs. The simulation results 
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   87 17-07-17   13:09
C h a p t e r  3  -  U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s
88 
conceptually replicated documented phenomena in various person perception 
areas including social learning (Phenomenon 1), memory (Phenomenon 2), 
judgement (Phenomenon 3), and impression formation (Phenomenon 4). These 
computer simulations may shed light on the potential mechanisms that underlie 
these phenomena.
 Specifically, Phenomenon 1 entailed that category labels become less effective in 
cueing exemplar knowledge as the number of known category members becomes 
larger. Our connectionist model explained this by the increasing competition 
between exemplars as the number of stored exemplars increases. This provides an 
account of the potential processes that may underlie people’s tendency to abstract 
away from individuals as they encounter more and more members of a social group. 
Moreover, this idea converges with recent proposals that selecting between multiple 
alternatives in social perception (e.g. between sexes) may be driven by a dynamic 
connectionist process (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). 
 Phenomenon 2 entailed that memory for statements made by people is more 
subject to within-category (e.g. a statement made by a women is assigned to 
another woman) than between-category confusions (e.g. a statement made by a 
woman is assigned to another woman). Our connectionist model explained this 
by assuming that an observed statement can become associated with both an 
exemplar representation (e.g. Brad) and a group representation (e.g. man) of the 
speaker. In addition, when we applied a conventional Multinomial Processing Tree 
analysis to the resulting data, a documented dissociation between two underlying 
cognitive components (social categorization and individuation) was replicated. An 
implication of this explanation is that these memory confusions can arise from any 
representation that is excited by several people. Previously, it was assumed that 
memory confusions are caused by “social categorization” and personality traits 
were often not seen as “social categories” (see also the section on Phenomenon 
4). However, our simulation results suggest that memory confusions may also 
arise from any property that is shared by people including personality traits. For 
example, when a witness needs to identify the culprit of a crime, recognition errors 
may be more likely if all suspects look untrustworthy and people pay attention to 
trustworthiness. In line with novel implication, we recently found evidence that such 
memory confusions occur between (un)trustworthy looking faces– especially when 
trustworthiness is made salient by instructions (see also Chapter 4). Moreover, in 
the same studies we obtained evidence for the same process dissociation shown 
in previous studies (see Phenomenon 2; Gawronski et al., 2003; Klauer et al., 2014; 
Klauer & Wegener, 1998). 
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 Phenomenon 3 entailed that assigning stimuli to different categories (e.g. A and 
B) polarizes judgments on continuous dimensions (e.g. line length) if a correlation 
between the categories and the relevant dimension was previously observed (e.g. 
lines labelled with A tended to be longer than lines labelled with B). Our connectionist 
model explained this by learned associations through which the category labels 
facilitate the perception of each extreme (e.g. A may facilitate perceiving something 
as long, while B may facilitate perceiving something as short). This may also explain 
why people often over-estimate trait differences between social groups (e.g. 
ethnicities) on personality dimensions (e.g. likability).
 Finally, Phenomenon 4 entailed that people can infer more person properties 
from “social categories” (e.g. occupations and nationalities) than from personality 
traits. We explained this by assuming that traits may often refer to larger and 
more heterogeneous groups (e.g. extraverts) than what has been labelled as 
“social categories” (e.g. politicians). Heterogeneous groups may not allow for clear 
inferences because they may often activate conflicting representations (e.g. an 
extravert may be a politician or a comedian). This explained the finding that traits 
appear to be relatively ineffective sources of person inferences relative to the person 
properties that have been referred to as “social categories”. An implication of this idea 
is that stereotyping may not necessarily result from any kind of grouping another 
person (e.g. as extravert) but more strongly from assigning a person to a relatively 
homogeneous group (e.g. politician). 
 Importantly, all of these explanation utilized the same core mechanisms. That is, 
although all the inputs of the simulations had to be tailored to the specific aspects 
of experimental tasks (e.g. presented stimuli, randomization, allocation of attention 
based on instructions), all simulation assumed nodes with varying sensitivity 
for properties of observed stimuli (i.e., individuals, small groups, large groups), 
one learning process, and one person perception process. We hope that this 
demonstrates the potential of our model to explain phenomena in various person 
perception areas through the same core mechanisms.
Aim 3: Addressing conceptual issues in the social categorization literature
Our third goal was to ground the informal assumptions of social categorization 
models in a formal connectionist model. Thereby, we hope to address (part of ) 
existing conceptual issues in the person perception literature. In particular, it has 
been criticized that the distinction between social categorization and individuation 
is conceptually vague (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). We presented a connectionist 
interpretation of this distinction, which we implemented in computer simulations. 
In these simulations, the activation of connectionist nodes that receive positive 
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external input from only a particular observed individual constituted individuation 
while the activation of connectionist nodes that receive positive external input 
from any observed member of a social group constitutes social categorization. To 
our knowledge, this constitutes the first formal interpretation of the distinction 
between social categorization and individuation, and our computer simulations 
demonstrate that this interpretation is compatible with various relevant phenomena. 
The strength of a formal (rather than informal) interpretation is that it reduces 
conceptual ambiguities and forces to spell out necessary details of the theory. As 
such, our formal interpretation can be seen as a constructive answer to the criticism 
that the distinction between social categorization and individuation has remained 
conceptually vague (Cox & Devine, 2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996).
 In fact, our theoretical framework would not have been possible without 
this formal interpretation. A conceptual obstacle to the integration of social 
categorization and connectionist models was that social categorization models have 
been labelled as dual process models (Brewer, 1988; Quinn & Macrae, 2005) while 
connectionist models have been labelled as single process models (Ehret et al., 2014; 
Kunda & Thagard, 1996). This can make it appear as if these two types of models are 
incompatible. However, our formal approach helped to demonstrate that the two 
“processes” in the social categorization models can in principle be conceptualized 
as a distinction based on the inputs of connectionist models. This conceptual 
contribution made it possible to integrate the core notions of both models. 
 Our formal interpretation may also help to address more specific conceptual 
issues in the literature. One issue concerns the common distinction in the social 
categorization literature between two types of social representations: “social 
categories” (e.g. occupations and nationalities) and “attributes” (e.g. personality traits; 
Fiske et al., 1999; Fiske et al., 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2000). This distinction grew in part out of evidence, which suggested that personality 
traits (“attributes”) tend to be less effective sources of inferences compared to 
various other social representations such as occupations and social roles (“social 
categories”; Andersen et al., 1990; Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Bond & Brocket, 
1987). However, the category-attribute distinction has been criticized because one 
can group people based on virtually any property – including personality traits 
– which means that both should be labelled as “social categories” (Cox & Devine, 
2015; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). We suggested that the distinction may be seen as a 
distinction between medium inclusive social categories (small groups) and highly 
inclusive social categories (large groups). Hence, personality traits may be relatively 
ineffective sources of inferences, because they tend to refer to relatively large and 
heterogeneous groups that do not provide clear predictions about their members 
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(see Simulation 4). This theoretical proposal addresses the criticism that both types 
of representations should be labelled as “social categories” and at the same time 
provides an explanation of relevant findings.
 The same idea may also help to explain seemingly conflicting findings in the 
literature. In particular, Cox and Devine (2015) provided evidence that many of the 
person labels that researchers have referred to as “attributes” are not consistently 
less effective sources of inferences than person labels that researchers have referred 
to as “social categories”. The idea that inclusiveness may be related to how predictive 
social representations are may help to address this problem. For example, although 
the representation human is traditionally seen as a “social category” and the 
representation aggressive as an “attribute”, human may be less predictive because it 
is more inclusive. 
Limitations and future research
Although our framework synthesizes core notions of social categorization and 
connectionist models, it ignores more specific aspects of existing models. For 
example, the Continuum Model assumes that there are cognitive mechanisms 
that fall in-between social categorization and individuation (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990). Furthermore, the categorization-individuation model by Hugenberg et al. 
(2010) proposes that social categorization and individuation are related to featural 
and configural processing respectively (Hugenberg et al., 2010). Our work does 
not address such more specific ideas. Instead, our work provides a more general 
framework (i.e. situating social categorization at the computational level of 
connectionist models) that can serve as a starting point for the integration of such 
specific ideas. 
 A similar point can be made about existing connectionist models. Although 
connectionist models share the same general assumptions (e.g. spread of activation 
via associative links), the formal implementation of this idea differs between existing 
models (e.g. with regard to the employed lower and upper bounds of activations and 
activation functions; Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Rogers & 
McClelland, 2014; Smith & DeCoster, 1998). Moreover, existing connectionist models 
also differ with regard to the assumed learning mechanisms (Rogers & McClelland, 
2014; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004). Our theoretical framework abstracts away 
from such specific aspects and thus remains silent about the question which of these 
specific ideas is most plausible in a person perception model. Furthermore, although 
we provided a formal implementation of our conceptual framework that included 
more specific assumptions (e.g. a Hebbian type of learning mechanism), there may 
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be other possible formal implementations of the general ideas of our framework. 
As such, the formal implementation may be seen primarily as a proof of concept 
for the general ideas of our theoretical framework. Future research may extend this 
work by exploring other possible formal implementations with different parameter 
assumptions and learning mechanisms. 
Conclusion
The idea that social perceivers can construe other people as individuals (individuation) 
or group members (social categorization) is central to various person perception 
models and has been related to various documented phenomena. At the same time, 
it is widely assumed that person perception (and other cognitive processes) is driven 
by a process in which activation spreads via learned associations between mental 
representations. Our framework demonstrates how these theoretical ideas can be 
synthesized in a way that is consistent with various relevant phenomena. As such, 
we hope that it provides steps towards a unified and formalized model of person 
perception.
Acknowledgements
We thank Eliot Smith for his support with the conceptual groundwork that led to the 
present article. 
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   92 17-07-17   13:09
03U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s  -  C h a p t e r  3
93 
References
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Andersen, S. M., & Klatzky, R. L. (1987). Traits and 
social stereotypes: Levels of categorization in 
person perception. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 53(2), 235–246. http://doi.
org/10.1037//0022-3514.53.2.235
Andersen, S. M., Klatzky, R. L., & Murray, J. (1990). 
Traits and social stereotypes: Efficiency 
differences in social information processing. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
59(2), 192–201. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.59.2.192
Banks, R. R., & Eberhardt, J. L. (2006). Discrimination 
and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society. 
California Law Review, 94(4), 1169–1190. 
http://doi.org/10.15779/Z38TQ5B
Bargh, J. A. (1999). The cognitive monster: The 
case against the controllability of Aufomatic 
Stereotype Effects. In S. Chaiken & Y.Trope (Eds.) 
Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 
361-382). New York: Guilford Press.
Bernstein, M. J., Young, S. G., & Hugenberg, 
K. (2007). The Cross-Category Effect. 
Psychological Science, 18(8), 706–713.
Blair, I. V. (2002). The Malleability of Automatic 
Stereotypes and Prejudice. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 6(3), 242–261. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0603
Blair, I. V., Judd, C. M., Sadler, M. S., & Jenkins, C. 
(2002). The role of Afrocentric features in 
person perception: Judging by features 
and categories. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 83(1), 5–25. http://doi.
org/10.1037//0022-3514.83.1.5
Blair, I. V, Chapleau, K. M., & Judd, C. M. (2005). 
The use of Afrocentric features as cues for 
judgment in the presence of diagnostic 
information. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 35, 59–68.
Blair, I. V, Judd, C. M., & Chapleau, K. M. (2004). 
The influence of Afrocentric facial features 
in criminal sentencing. Psychological Science, 
15(10), 674–679. http://doi.org/10.1111/
j.0956-7976.2004.00739.x
Blair, I. V, Judd, C. M., & Fallman, J. L. (2004). 
The automaticity of race and Afrocentric 
facial features in social judgments. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(6), 
763–78. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.87.6.763
Blanz, M. (1999). Accessibility and fit as 
determinants of the salience of social 
categorizations. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 29(February 1998), 43–74.
Bond, C. F., & Brocket, D. R. (1987). A Social 
Context-Personality Index Theory of Memory 
for Acquaintances. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 52(6), 1110–1121.
Bond, C. F., & Sedikides, C. (1988). The 
recapitulation hypothesis in person retrieval. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
24(3), 195–221. http://doi.org/10.1016/0022-
1031(88)90036-4
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of 
impression formation. In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer 
Jr. (Eds.), Advances in social cognition, Vol. 1. A 
dual model of impression formation (pp. 1-36). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brown, R. (2000). Social Identity Theory : past 
achievements , current problems and future 
challenges. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 30, 745–778.
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, 
B. (2007). The influence of stereotypes on 
decisions to shoot. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 37(6), 1102–1117. http://doi.
org/10.1002/ejsp.450
Cox, W. T. L., & Devine, P. G. (2015). Stereotypes 
Possess Heterogeneous Directionality: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Exploration of 
Stereotype Structure and Content. Plos One, 
10(3), e0122292. http://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0122292
Crisp, R. J. (2007). Multiple Social Categorizations. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 
39, 163–254. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-
2601(06)39004-1
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   93 17-07-17   13:09
C h a p t e r  3  -  U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s
94 
Dalege, J., Borsboom, D., Harreveld, F. Van, & 
Conner, M. (n.d.). Toward a Formalized 
Account of Attitudes : The Causal Attitude 
Network ( CAN ) Model.
De Houwer, J. (2006). What are implicit measures 
and why are we using them? In R.W. Wiers 
& A.W. Stacy (Eds.), The handbook of implicit 
cognition and addiction (pp. 11–28). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.
De Houwer, J., & Moors, A. (2015). Levels of analysis 
in social psychology. In B. Gawronski & G. 
Bodenhausen (Eds.), Theory and explanation in 
social psychology, New YorkGuilford (pp. 24–40) 
(pp. 24–40).
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: 
Their automatic and controlled components. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
56(1), 5–18. http://doi.org/10.1037//0022-
3514.56.1.5
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. 
(2002). Implicit and explicit prejudice and 
interracial interaction. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 82(1), 62–68. http://doi.
org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.1.62
Ehret, P. J., Monroe, B. M., & Read, S. J. (2014). 
Modeling the Dynamics of Evaluation: A 
Multilevel Neural Network Implementation of 
the Iterative Reprocessing Model. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review. http://doi.
org/10.1177/1088868314544221
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). 
A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: 
competence and warmth respectively follow 
from perceived status and competition. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
82(6), 878–902. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.82.6.878
Fiske, S. T., Lin, M., & Neuberg, S. (1999). The 
continuum model: Ten years later. In S. 
Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories 
in social psychology (pp. 231–254). New York, 
NY: Guilford Press.
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of 
impression formation, from category-based 
to individuating processes: influences of 
Information and motivation on attention and 
interpretation. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances 
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 
1–74). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Fiske, S. T., Neuberg, S. L., Beattie, A., & Milberg, S. J. 
(1987). Category-Based and Attribute-Based 
Reactions to Others : Some Informational 
Conditions of Stereotyping and lndividuating 
Processes. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 23, 399–427.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Social Cognition: 
From Brains to Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Freeman, J. B., & Ambady, N. (2009). Motions of the 
hand expose the partial and parallel activation 
of stereotypes. Psychological Science, 20(10), 
1183–8. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02422.x
Freeman, J. B., & Ambady, N. (2011). A dynamic 
interactive theory of person construal. 
Psychological Review, 118(2), 247–79. http://
doi.org/10.1037/a0022327
Freeman, J. B., Ambady, N., Rule, N. O., & 
Johnson, K. L. (2008). Will a category cue 
attract you? Motor output reveals dynamic 
competition across person construal. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 137(4), 673–90. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0013875
Freeman, J. B., & Nakayama, K. (2007). Finger in 
flight reveals parallel categorization across 
multiple social dimensions, 1–11.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). 
Associative and Propositional Processes in 
Evaluation : An Integrative Review of Implicit 
and Explicit Attitude Change, 132(5), 692–731. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692
Gawronski, B., Ehrenberg, K., Banse, R., Zukova, 
J., & Klauer, K. C. (2003). It’s in the mind of 
the beholder: The impact of stereotypic 
associations on category-based and 
individuating impression formation. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(1), 
16–30. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-
1031(02)00517-6
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   94 17-07-17   13:09
03U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s  -  C h a p t e r  3
95 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit 
Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, 
and Stereotypes. Psychological Review, 
102(1), 4–27. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.102.1.4
Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. a, 
Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. a, & Mellott, D. S. 
(2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, 
stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept. 
Psychological Review, 109(1), 3–25. http://doi.
org/10.1037/0033-295X.109.1.3
Greenwald, A. G., Mcghee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. 
K. (1998). Measuring Individual Differences in 
Implicit Cognition : The Implicit Association 
Test, 74(6), 1464–1480.
Haselager, P., de Groot, A., & van Rappard, 
H. (2003). Representationalism vs . 
anti-representationalism : a debate for 
the sake of appearance. Philosophical 
Psychology, 16(1), 5–24. http://doi.
org/10.1080/0951508032000067761
Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social Identity Theory 
and Self-categorization Theory: A Historical 
Review. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 2(1), 204–222. http://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00066.x
Hugenberg, K., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2003). 
Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the 
Perception of Facial Threat. Psychological 
Science, 14(6), 640–643. http://doi.
org/10.1046/j.0956-7976.2003.psci_1478.x
Hugenberg, K., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2004). 
Ambiguity in Social Categorization. 
Psychological Science, 15(5), 342–345. http://
doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00680.x
Hugenberg, K., Miller, J., & Claypool, H. M. (2007). 
Categorization and individuation in the cross-
race recognition deficit: Toward a solution to 
an insidious problem. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 43(2), 334–340. http://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jesp.2006.02.010
Hugenberg, K., Young, S. G., Bernstein, M. J., 
& Sacco, D. F. (2010). The categorization-
individuation model: an integrative account 
of the other-race recognition deficit. 
Psychological Review, 117(4), 1168–87. http://
doi.org/10.1037/a0020463
Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2003). A Symbolic-
Connectionist Theory of Relational Inference 
and Generalization, 110(2), 220–264. http://
doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.220
Klauer, K. C., Hölzenbein, F., Calanchini, J., & 
Sherman, J. W. (2014). How malleable 
is categorization by race? Evidence 
for competitive category use in social 
categorization. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 107(1), 21–40. http://doi.
org/10.1037/a0036609
Klauer, K., & Wegener, I. (1998). Unraveling social 
categorization in the “who said what?” 
paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 75(5), 1155–78.
Krueger, J., & Rothbart, M. (1988). Use of 
categorical and individuating information 
in making inferences about personality. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
55(2), 187–195. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.55.2.187
Kunda, Z., & Sherman-Williams, B. (1993). 
Stereotypes and the Construal of 
Individuating Information. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 1(10), 90–99. http://
doi.org/0803973233
Kunda, Z., & Thagard, P. (1996). Forming 
Impressions From Stereotypes, Traits, and 
Behaviors: A Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction 
Theory. Psychological Review, 103(2), 284–308.
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2001). Social 
cognition: Categorical person perception. 
British Journal of Psychology, 92(1), 239–255. 
http://doi.org/10.1348/000712601162059
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). 
Social cognition: thinking categorically 
about others. Annual Review of Psychology, 
51, 93–120. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.
psych.51.1.93
Macrae, C. N., & Quadflieg, S. (2010). Perceiving 
people. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey 
(Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (5th 
ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Macrae, N., Shepherd, J., & Milne, A. (1992). The 
Effects of Source Credibility on The Dilution 
of Stereotype-Based Judgments. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(6), 765–775. 
http://doi.org/0803973233
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   95 17-07-17   13:09
C h a p t e r  3  -  U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s
96 
Marr. (1982a). Vision. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
Marr, D. (1982b). Vision. San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman.
Mason, M. F., & Macrae, C. N. (2004). Categorizing 
and individuating others: the neural 
substrates of person perception. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(10), 1785–1795. 
http://doi.org/10.1162/0898929042947801
Mcclelland, J. L. (1987). The case for interactionism 
in language processing. In M. Coltheart (Ed.), 
Attention and performance XII: The psychology 
of reading (pp. 3-36). Hillsdale, N J: Erlbaum.
McClelland, J. L. (1991). Stochastic Interactive 
Activation and The Effects of Context on 
Perception. Cognitive Psychology, 23(1), 1–44.
McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1989). 
Explorations in parallel distributed processing: 
A handbook of models, programs, and exercises. 
MIT press.
Mervis, C. B., & Rosch, E. (1981). Categorization of 
natural objects +341, 89–115.
Moskowitz, G. (2005). Social cognition: 
Understanding self and others. Guilford Press.
Operario, D., & Fiske, S. (2001). Stereotypes: 
Content, structures, processes, and context. In 
Brown R, Gaertner SL (eds) Blackwell handbook 
of social psychology: intergroup processes. 
Blackwell, Oxford, UK (pp. 22–44).
Pratto, F., & Bargh, J. a. (1991). Stereotyping 
based on apparently individuating 
information: Trait and global components 
of sex stereotypes under attention overload. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
27(1), 26–47. http://doi.org/10.1016/0022-
1031(91)90009-U
Quinn, K., & Macrae, C. N. (2005). Categorizing 
others: the dynamics of person construal. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
88(3), 467–79. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.88.3.467
Razran, G. (1950). Ethnic dislikes and stereotypes; 
a laboratory study. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 45(1), 7–27. http://doi.
org/10.1037/h0061247
Rogers, T. T., & McClelland, J. L. (2014). Parallel 
Distributed Processing at 25: Further 
Explorations in the Microstructure of 
Cognition. Cognitive Science, 38, 1024–1077. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12148
Rooij, I. Van, Bongers, R. M., & Haselager, W. P. F. 
G. (2002). A non-representational approach to 
imagined action, 26, 345–375.
Rumelhart, D. E., Hinton, G. E., & McClelland, J. 
L. (1986). A general framework for parallel 
distributed processing.
Schröder, T., & Thagard, P. (2013). The affective 
meanings of automatic social behaviors: 
three mechanisms that explain priming. 
Psychological Review, 120(1), 255–80. http://
doi.org/10.1037/a0030972
Secord, P. F., Bevan, W., & Katz, B. (1956). The Negro 
stereotype and perceptual accentuation. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 53(1), 78–83. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0048765
Seidenberg, M. S., & McClelland, J. L. (1989). A 
distributed, developmental model of word 
recognition and naming. Psychological Review, 
96(4), 523–568. http://doi.org/10.1037//0033-
295X.96.4.523
Sherman, J. W. (1996). Development and mental 
representation of stereotypes. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 1126–
41. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/8667161
Smith, E. R. (1996). What do connectionism and 
social psychology offer each other? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 893–
912. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/8656338
Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (1998). Knowledge 
acquisition, accessibility, and use in person 
perception and stereotyping: simulation with 
a recurrent connectionist network. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74(1), 21–
35. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/9457773
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and 
Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior, 
8(3), 220–247.
Tajfel, H. (1959). Quantitative Judgement in Social 
Perception. British Journal of Psychology, 50(1), 
16–29.
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   96 17-07-17   13:09
03U n i f y i n g  S o c i a l  C a t e g o r i z a t i o n  a n d  C o n n e c t i o n i s t  M o d e l s  -  C h a p t e r  3
97 
Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. 
Journal of Biosocial Science, 1, 173–191. http://
doi.org/10.1017/S0021932000023336
Tajfel, H., Sheikh, A., & Gardner, R. (1964). Content 
of Stereotypes and the Inference of Similarity 
Between Members of Stereotyped Groups. 
Acta Psychologica, 22, 191–201.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1986). The Social Identity 
Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In Psychology 
of Intergroup Relations, Worchel S., Austin W. 
(eds) Nelson Hall: Chicago (pp. 7–24).
Tajfel, H., & Wilkes, A. L. (1963). Classification and 
quantitative judgement. British Journal of 
Psychology (London, England : 1953), 54, 101–
14. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/13980241
Taylor, S. E., Fiske, S. T., Etcoff, N. L., & Ruderman, 
A. J. (1978). Categorical and contextual bases 
of person memory and stereotyping. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(7), 
778–793. http://doi.org/10.1037//0022-
3514.36.7.778
Thagard, P., & Verbeurgt, K. (1998). Coherence 
as Constraint Satisfaction. Cognitive 
Science, 22(1), 1–24. http://doi.org/10.1207/
s15516709cog2201_1
van Gelder, T. (1995). What Might Cognition Be, If 
Not Computation? The Journal of Philosophy, 
92(7), 345–381.
Van Overwalle, F., & Labiouse, C. (2004). A 
recurrent connectionist model of person 
impression formation. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 8(1), 28–61. http://doi.
org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0801_2
Van Rooy, D., Van Overwalle, F., Vanhoomissen, T., 
Labiouse, C., & French, R. (2003). A recurrent 
connectionist model of group biases. 
Psychological Review, 110(3), 536–563. http://
doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.536
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1997). 
Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit 
level and its relationship with questionnaire 
measures. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 72(2), 262–274. http://doi.
org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.2.262
Young, S. G., Bernstein, M. J., & Hugenberg, K. 
(2010). When Do Own-Group Biases in Face 
Recognition Occur? Encoding versus Post-
Encoding. Social Cognition, 28(2), 240–250. 
http://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2010.28.2.240
Young, S. G., & Hugenberg, K. (2011). 
Individuation Motivation and Face 
Experience Can Operate Jointly to Produce 
the Own-Race Bias. Social Psychological and 
Personality Science, 3(1), 80–87. http://doi.
org/10.1177/1948550611409759
Zebrowitz, L. A., Fellous, J.-M., Mignault, A., & 
Adreoletti, C. (2003). Trait Impressions as 
Overgeneralized Responses to Adaptively 
Significant Facial Qualities: Evidence from 
Connectionist Modeling. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 7(3), 194–215. http://
doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0101_1
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   97 17-07-17   13:09
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   98 17-07-17   13:09
Chapter
Te s t i n g  N o v e l  P r e d i c t i o n s
04
T h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  b a s e d  o n
K l a p p e r,  A . ,  D o t s c h ,  R . ,  v a n  R o o i j ,  I . ,  &  Wi g b o l d u s ,  D.  H .  J .  ( 2 0 1 6 ) .  D o 
We  F o r m  S t a b l e  Tr u s t w o r t h i n e s s  I m p r e s s i o n s  F r o m  Fa c i a l  A p p e a r a n c e ? 
J o u r n a l  o f  P e r s o n a l i t y  a n d  S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y,  5 ,  6 5 5 - 6 6 4 .
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   99 17-07-17   13:09
C h a p t e r  4  -  Te s t i n g  N o v e l  P r e d i c t i o n s
100 
Prelude
In Chapter 3, a theoretical framework and formal model was presented that aimed 
to provide steps towards the integration and formalization of the core notions of 
social categorization and connectionist models. Furthermore, computer simulations 
showed that various empirically documented phenomena could be explained by the 
model. Ideally, a cognitive model should not only explain existing finding (post doc) 
but also make novel predictions (a priori). Therefore, Chapter 4 will report empirical 
tests of predictions of the model. 
 Originally, it was assumed that memory confusions such as the ones between 
speakers in the “Who said what” paradigm (see Chapter 3; Phenomenon 2) occur 
because people “categorize” other people. At the same time, past theorizing assumed 
that personality traits may not be “categories” (Fiske et al., 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990; Henri Tajfel, 1969). If one takes these points together, past theorizing would 
therefore not (unequivocally) predict that memory confusions happen based on 
perceived trustworthiness. In contrast, our model suggests that memory confusions 
can happen based on any social representations that we map onto several people, 
including personality traits. For example, if several people appear trustworthy 
(or untrustworthy) and the perceiver pays attention to trustworthiness, then the 
perceiver may tend to confuse these people with each other. 
 In Chapter 4, we will present a series of studies that tested predictions that follow 
from this insight. The studies that we will report were originally intended to test the 
spontaneity with which trustworthiness inferences are made from faces and the main 
text therefore focusses on this question in particular. Importantly, trustworthiness 
inferences were measured indirectly by assessing the extent to which people 
confuse trustworthy faces with other trustworthy and untrustworthy with other 
untrustworthy faces. As such, these studies simultaneously tested the prediction 
of our model that confusions between people occur based on trustworthiness. 
Moreover, these studies employed the conventional Multinomial Processing Tree 
analysis to reveal such confusions (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). Consequently, these 
studies also tested whether the related prediction of our model that a process 
dissociation can be found in a context where faces differ in trustworthiness (rather 
than what is traditionally seen as a “social category). In addition, these studies 
manipulated the salience of trustworthiness and thereby investigated the idea that 
these confusions are based on the way perceivers construe other people (i.e. as 
trustworthy). 
 Specifically, three predictions were tested by these studies. First, our model 
predicts that confusions should arise based on trustworthiness. This is tested by 
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assessing whether the (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters of the Multinomial 
Processing Tree model discussed in this chapter was significantly different from zero. 
Second, our model predicts that making trustworthiness salient increases memory 
confusions (see Simulations 2b and 2c). This was tested by assessing whether 
the (un)trustworthiness encoding parameter were significantly increased by a 
trustworthiness salience manipulation. Finally, our model predicts that the tendency 
to confuse other people based on trustworthiness (social categorization) should 
be relatively independent of person memory (individuation). This was indirectly 
investigated by our studies, which will show that these two cognitive components 
vary relatively independently over studies.
Abstrac t
It is widely assumed among psychologists that people spontaneously form 
trustworthiness impressions of newly encountered people from their facial 
appearance. However, most existing studies directly or indirectly induced an 
impression formation goal, which means that the existing empirical support for 
spontaneous facial trustworthiness inferences remains insufficient. In particular, 
it remains an open question whether trustworthiness from facial appearance is 
encoded in memory. Using the ‘Who said what’ paradigm, we indirectly measured 
to what extent people encoded the trustworthiness of observed faces. The results of 
four studies demonstrated a reliable tendency towards trustworthiness encoding. 
This was shown under conditions of varying context-relevance, and salience of 
trustworthiness. Moreover, evidence for this tendency was obtained using both 
(experimentally controlled) artificial and (naturalistic varying) real faces. Taken 
together, these results suggest that there is a spontaneous tendency to form 
relatively stable trustworthiness impressions from facial appearance, which is 
relatively independent of the context. As such, our results further underline how 
widespread influences of facial trustworthiness may be in our everyday life. 
Keywords: Trustworthiness, Face Perception, Trait Inferences, “Who said what” 
paradigm, Spontaneity
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Introduc tion
It is widely assumed among psychologists that people spontaneously form 
trustworthiness impressions of newly encountered people from their facial 
appearance (Marzi, Righi, Ottonello, Cincotta, & Viggiano, 2012; Todorov, Said, Engell, 
& Oosterhof, 2008). These face-based impressions have been shown to influence 
important outcomes such as investment decisions in a trust game (Chang, Doll, van 
’t Wout, Frank, & Sanfey, 2010; Rezlescu, Duchaine, Olivola, & Chater, 2012; Schlicht, 
Shimojo, Camerer, Battaglia, & Nakayama, 2010; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; van ’t Wout & 
Sanfey, 2008) and sentencing decisions (Porter, ten Brinke, & Gustaw, 2010). If these 
impressions are truly formed spontaneously, the impact of facial appearance on our 
behavior would not only be profound but also frequent in our daily life.
 The assumption that face-based trustworthiness impressions are formed 
spontaneously originated mainly from four lines of evidence. First, it was shown 
that people are able to infer trustworthiness even from minimal exposure to faces 
(Willis & Todorov, 2006). Second, it was shown that people judge faces mostly on 
trustworthiness when asked to form impressions of displayed faces (Todorov et 
al., 2008). However, in both cases participants were explicitly instructed to form an 
impression. Therefore, it does not follow from these findings that trustworthiness 
inferences occurred spontaneously: that is, without an impression formation 
instruction.
 Third, it was shown that people are influenced by the facial trustworthiness 
of a player in a trust game (Chang et al., 2010; Rezlescu et al., 2012; Schlicht et 
al., 2010; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; van ’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). However, given that 
performance in a trust game depends on how well the trustworthiness of the other 
player is judged, asking a participant to play a trust game can be seen as an implicit 
instruction to judge trustworthiness. 
 Fourth, neurophysiological responses that may potentially reflect trustworthiness 
inferences have been shown to occur even in a task where the trustworthiness of 
displayed faces is irrelevant (Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; Mende-Siedlecki, Said, 
& Todorov, 2013). However, the relationship between neurophysiological responses 
and trustworthiness inferences is not straightforward (Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013; 
Said, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2010). For instance, amygdala responses have been found 
even when faces are varied on dimensions that have no known social meaning (Said 
et al., 2010; Sofer, Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Todorov, 2014). This makes it desirable to 
further investigate the spontaneity of trustworthiness inferences with different 
measures. In addition, it remains unclear whether facial trustworthiness was 
spontaneously encoded in memory. As such, it remains an open question whether 
stable impressions were formed spontaneously based on facial appearance. 
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 It is worth noting that there are also various studies, which showed that people 
tend to spontaneously infer personality traits (including trustworthiness) from 
observed behaviors (Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Mokowitz, 1996; Uleman, Newman, 
& Moskowitz, 1996). Some of these studies have also shown that behavior-based 
inferences tend to become associated with the face of the target person and thus 
become encoded in memory (Todorov & Uleman, 2002, 2004; Van Overwalle, Drenth, 
& Marsman, 1999). However, none of these studies has investigated the spontaneity 
of trustworthiness inferences from facial appearance.
 One may argue that the hypothesis that people spontaneously form 
trustworthiness impressions from facial appearance is nevertheless likely to be true 
for theoretical reasons. Specifically, given that detecting trustworthiness may help 
to cooperate with other individuals and given that detecting untrustworthiness 
may be vital to prevent exploitation and to promote survival, one may expect 
that natural selection pressures fostered the evolution of a spontaneous tendency 
towards face-based trustworthiness impressions. However, recent research showed 
that trustworthiness ratings based on facial appearance tend to be at chance level 
accuracy  (Rule, Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013; Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-
Siedlecki, 2015; but see Slepian & Ames, 2016). Thus, face-based trustworthiness 
inferences do not appear to contain valid information about the trustworthiness 
of a perceived person, which suggests that trustworthiness inferences do not 
necessarily aid survival and reproduction. Although this does not rule out that a 
spontaneous tendency towards face-based trustworthiness inferences could have 
evolved (Zebrowitz, Fellous, Mignault, & Adreoletti, 2003), it nevertheless qualifies 
the theoretical plausibility that such a tendency has evolved, and that it leads to 
stable trustworthiness impressions.
 Overall, it appears that the extent to which people spontaneously form 
trustworthiness impressions from facial appearance is still an open question. In 
particular, it remains unclear whether facial trustworthiness is spontaneously 
encoded in memory. Answering this question requires measuring trustworthiness 
encoding without mentioning trustworthiness to participants. We used the ‘Who 
said what’ paradigm for this purpose (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). This 
paradigm measures to what extent people rely on certain (facial or other) cues to 
remember the speaker of a statement. Thereby, it indirectly assesses whether a certain 
cue was encoded in memory. The ‘Who said what’ paradigm has been successfully 
applied to investigate the spontaneous encoding of person characteristics such as 
sex, race, attitude, attractiveness, color of clothing, skin tone and more (Klauer & 
Wegener, 1998; Maddox & Gray, 2002). Here, we apply it to indirectly measure to 
what extent people encode facial trustworthiness.
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 We tested the hypothesis that people spontaneously encode trustworthiness 
in four studies. We started investigating the hypothesis under conditions that 
may foster trustworthiness encoding and successively moved to conditions 
under which trustworthiness encoding would be considered more spontaneous. 
Specifically, Study 1 tested the hypothesis that people spontaneously encode facial 
trustworthiness in a context where trustworthiness was both context-relevant and 
made salient. Study 2 tested the same hypothesis in a trustworthiness relevant-
context but without making trustworthiness additionally salient. Study 3 tested the 
same hypothesis in a neutral context that is more representative of a neutral first 
encounter of a person. All of these studies used artificial faces that were strongly 
manipulated to look either trustworthy or untrustworthy. In Study 4 we investigated 
whether spontaneous facial trustworthiness encoding also occurs based on real faces 
that differ more subtly in terms of facial trustworthiness.1 Importantly, in all studies 
participants were instructed to read statements without giving the instruction to 
form an impression of the speakers of these statements. Complementing materials 
(e.g. stimuli, raw data, analysis scripts, and additional results)2 for all studies are 
available on the website of Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/a58zu/?view_
only=cc506061433648aca36ba59d8a2439c9).
S tudy 1
Participants
Seventy-five students (54 female) of the Radboud University participated in this study 
(M
age 
= 21.88, SD
age
 = 3.15). They received five euro or partial course credit as a reward. 
A power analysis was not feasible for our chosen data analysis technique because it 
would require guessing a relatively large number of parameters (see Data Analysis 
section). However, we noted that several comparable ‘Who said what’ studies found 
significant results with 40 or less participants (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). 
1 In order to improve the readability of the paper, we do not report the studies in their chronological order. 
The chronological order was: Study 2, Study 1, Study 3, and Study 4.  
2 We conducted three additional studies, which we do not report in this paper but which are reported in 
the online material. The reason for not reporting them in this paper is that we obtained insufficient model 
fit to interpret the results. We speculated that this happened because of problems with the employed 
statements in these studies, which differed from those employed in the studies reported in this paper. 
Importantly, the pattern of the results in all of the additional studies are in line with the results we report 
in this paper. Hence, the problem was not that the results were conflicting with the results in this paper 
but that their reliability could not be established given insufficient model fit.
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Procedure
The whole study was administered in English. Participants were asked to imagine 
that they are about to move to another city and that they have asked eight brokers 
to find a house for them in return for a certain fee. This was thought to create a 
trustworthiness-relevant context because (1) a lot is at stake, (2) the participant is 
fully dependent on the broker, and (3) brokers have a motive to tell positive lies 
about the house. Before the main task started, participants were asked for each 
broker how trustworthy the face of each broker looked (1=very untrustworthy, 
7=very trustworthy) with the face of the respective broker simultaneously displayed 
in the middle of the screen. This was thought to make facial (un)trustworthiness 
salient. 
 Next, the Who Said What paradigm was used to indirectly measure trustworthiness 
encoding. The paradigm consisted of a learning and a test phase (Klauer & Wegener, 
1998). In the learning phase, participants read statements made by four trustworthy 
looking and four untrustworthy looking speakers (i.e. the brokers). The individual 
features of the speakers were counterbalanced such that for any participant who 
saw the trustworthy version of a speaker, there was another participant who 
saw the untrustworthy version of the same speaker. Each speaker was randomly 
assigned to one of eight sets of statements, which each described a fictional house. 
Consequently, the assignment of statement sets to speakers was random across 
participants. The order of the statements within the set was fixed. In each learning 
trial, the face of the speaker was displayed in the middle of the screen. After a delay 
of 1500ms, a statement (taken from the assigned statement set of the displayed 
speaker) appeared under the face surrounded by a speech bubble that pointed 
towards the face. After 8000ms, the speaker and statement were replaced by a blank 
screen. The next trial started after an inter-trial interval of 500ms. The learning phase 
consisted of 48 trials. 
 In the test phase, the 48 statements from the learning phase were shown 
successively along with 48 distractor statements. Specifically, in each test trial 
a statement was shown in the middle of the screen and participants were asked 
whether the statement was made by one of the speakers in the learning phase 
(“Yes” or “No”). If “No” was answered, the next test trial was presented. If “Yes” was 
answered, participants were additionally asked which of the speakers had made the 
statement. Below this question, small pictures of the speakers were shown together 
with numbers that could be pressed to make the selection. The locations of the 
faces were randomized for each participant and the numbers were counterbalanced 
together with the individual features of the speakers.
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 After the ‘Who said what’ task, participants were asked for each broker to 
indicate their willingness to pick the house that the broker recommended on a 
seven-point scale (1=not at all, 7=very much) with the face of the respective broker 
simultaneously displayed in the middle of the screen. Next, participants were asked in 
the same fashion how trustworthy each speaker looks on a seven-point scale (1=very 
untrustworthy, 7=very trustworthy). These questions served as manipulation checks 
of our facial trustworthiness manipulations. For both questions, the order of the 
brokers was randomized. Finally, participants were asked demographical questions 
and to what extent they had difficulty with the English language in the study (“Not 
at all”, “Yes a little”, or “Yes very much”).
Stimuli
Pictures of trustworthy and untrustworthy looking faces were created using the 
FaceGen software development kit (Singular Inversions, Toronto, Canada). To 
manipulate trustworthiness, we used the FaceGen dimensions that were modeled by 
Oosterhof and Todorov (2008; Todorov, Dotsch, Porter, Oosterhof, & Falvello, 2013). 
Specifically, trustworthy and untrustworthy versions of eight male speakers were 
created through the following procedure. First, eight copies of the standard average 
face were morphed two standard deviations towards being male. Next, each face 
was morphed six standard deviations on a random dimension that was orthogonal 
to all known social dimensions to give each face neutral individual features (Said et 
al., 2010). To make the faces more realistic, each was also given an individual overlay 
texture that added details such as skin irregularities. In addition, we used Photoshop 
to give each face an individual haircut taken from pictures of real faces in the 
Radboud Face Database (Langner et al., 2010). Importantly, we created trustworthy 
and untrustworthy versions of each of the eight faces by morphing each version 
2.5 standard deviations towards being trustworthy/ untrustworthy (see Figure 1). 
In all manipulations above, skin brightness was kept constant to ensure that faces 
are perceived as Caucasian faces. Furthermore, 48 statements were created that 
described eight imaginary houses (which consisted of eight subsets of statements 
that described one imaginary house each) and 48 distractor statements that also 
described houses (without any subsets). All stimulus materials are available on Open 
Science Framework.
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FIGURE 1. Trustworthy (left column) and untrustworthy versions (right column) of two speakers 
(rows).
Data Analysis
We used Multinomial Processing Tree (MPT) modeling to analyze the data (Riefer & 
Batchelder, 1988) using the ‘MPTinR’ package (Singmann & Kellen, 2013) in R 3.1.0 (R 
Core Team, 2014). This analysis strategy has been validated for the ‘Who said what’ 
paradigm and has many advantages over traditional analysis strategies (Klauer & 
Wegener, 1998). The employed MPT model is identical to the model used by Klauer 
and Wegener (1998). For ease of explanation, it is helpful to think of this model as a 
tree of processing stages through which participants move during the task with the 
most important stages being item discrimination, person discrimination, and (in this 
case) (un)trustworthiness encoding (see Figure 2). 
 Specifically, a possible way to understand the MPT model is that upon perception 
of a statement in the test phase, participants first try to remember whether they 
have seen the statement in the learning phase (item discrimination). If they do 
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not remember the statement, they will respond “no” to the question whether the 
statement was shown in the learning phase and the trial is completed. If they 
do remember the statement, they respond “yes” and next try to remember the 
speaker of the statement (person discrimination). If they remember the speaker, 
they will give the correct response. If they do not remember the speaker, their 
responses depend on their memory of the (un)trustworthiness of the speaker’s face 
(trustworthiness or untrustworthiness encoding). If they remember whether the 
speaker was trustworthy or untrustworthy, they can at least restrict their guessing 
to half of the speakers (namely either the trustworthy or untrustworthy speakers), 
causing systematic guessing errors. MPT modeling estimates the probabilities of 
the outcomes of these stages (e.g. the probability of remembering the speaker of a 
statement).3
 The probabilities were estimated separately for statements made by trustworthy 
speakers, untrustworthy speakers, and distractor statements (see Klauer & Wegener, 
1998). This means that the model would in principle entail three parameters for item 
discrimination (D
T
, D
U
, and D
N
 where the subscripts T, U and N stand for trustworthy 
speakers, untrustworthy speakers, and new statements respectively). However, a 
model with all three parameters estimated freely can generally not be identified 
because it is not sufficiently constrained by the data. Therefore, in line with the 
MPT model of Klauer and Wegener (1998) we assumed in all analyses that item 
discrimination parameters were equal (D
T
 = D
U
 = D
N
). A test of this assumption is 
given in every analysis by assessing the fit of the model with the data. In addition, 
the model entailed two parameters for person discrimination (c
T
 and c
U
) and two 
parameters for (un)trustworthiness encoding (d
T
 and d
U
). In these cases, there were 
no additional parameters for new statements because person discrimination and 
trustworthiness encoding can only operate in trials in which old statements were 
displayed. 
 We first estimated all parameters together with their confidence intervals. Next, 
we tested whether the trustworthiness and untrustworthiness encoding parameters 
together contributed significantly to the model fit by comparing a model where the 
parameters were estimated freely to a model where the parameters were set to zero. 
In other words, we tested whether the model would match the data equally well 
if we assume that no encoding based on trustworthiness and untrustworthiness 
3 The MPT model does not necessarily assume sequential processing stages. Rather, the nodes in the 
assumed processing tree reflect states of the cognitive system and their dependencies upon each other. 
For example, the MPT model does not necessarily assume that people first try to recall the speaker of a 
statement and subsequently try to recall the trustworthiness of the speaker if they cannot recall the exact 
speaker. Instead, the MPT model assumes that trustworthiness will influence responses if the speaker is 
not recalled (thus, a dependency).
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took place. If the model fit was significantly better for the model with freely 
estimated (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters, we concluded that the 
parameters contributed significantly to the model fit and thus that trustworthiness 
or untrustworthiness encoding or both occurred. Only if the parameters jointly 
contributed significantly to the model fit, the individual trustworthiness and 
untrustworthiness encoding parameter were tested separately in the same fashion. 
Notice that probabilities cannot be negative, which means that our test can be 
significant in only one direction. This means that no a priori hypothesis about the 
direction of the effect needs to be formulated.
Item
Discrimination
(Un)Trustworthiness
Encoding
Person
Discrimination
1-D
1-c
1-d
d
c
D
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
FIGURE 2. The main part of the processing tree that is assumed in the employed Multinomial Processing 
Tree model. D represents the probability of remembering the statement (item discrimination), c 
represents the probability of remembering the speaker (person discrimination), and d represents the 
probability of remembering whether the speaker was trustworthy or untrustworthy (trustworthiness 
encoding). Success and failure probabilities add up to one, which means that one parameter is sufficient 
to estimate both. The full model has been described in detail by Klauer and Wegener (1998).
Results 
All participants indicated at the end of the study that they had no difficulty with the 
English language. Furthermore, manipulation checks showed that trustworthiness 
ratings were significantly and substantially higher for trustworthy (M=5.05, SD=0.73) 
compared to untrustworthy faces (M=2.77, SD=0.80), d=2.98, t(74)=19.01, p<.001. In 
addition, participants were significantly more willing to pick houses from trustworthy 
(M=4.64, SD=1.03) compared to untrustworthy looking brokers (M=3.43, SD=0.94), 
d=1.22, t(74)=6.27, p<.001. Overall, these results confirm that the trustworthiness 
manipulation was successful and strong.
 Next, responses in the ‘Who said what’ task were analyzed using MPT modeling as 
described above. The MPT model with freely estimated parameters had a satisfactory 
goodness of fit, G2=1.01, df=1, p=.315. All parameter estimates and their confidence 
intervals are given in Table 1. Importantly, the results showed a significant reduction 
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in goodness of fit when constraining the (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters 
to zero, ∆G2=64.97, df=2, p<.001. Likewise, the model fit reduced significantly when 
constraining only the trustworthiness encoding parameter, ∆G2=11.48, df=1, p<.001, 
and when constraining only the untrustworthiness encoding parameter, ∆G2=22.89, 
df=1, p<.001. Hence, the results showed significant evidence of both trustworthiness 
and untrustworthiness encoding. 
TABLE 1 - Parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for Study 1
Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
D
T
=D
U
=D
N
0.493 0.473 0.514
a 0.505 0.471 0.538
b 0.396 0.377 0.415
c
T
0.159 0.114 0.204
c
U
0.058 0.016 0.100
d
T
0.249 0.118 0.380
d
U
0.327 0.209 0.444
Note: The indices indicate whether the speaker of the statement was trustworthy looking (T), untrustworthy looking 
(U) or whether the statement was new (N).
Discussion
The results indicated that participants encoded facial (un)trustworthiness. These 
results were obtained even though participants received no impression formation 
instruction and although their explicit task was merely to read statements. In that 
sense, (un)trustworthiness encoding was relatively spontaneous. However, those 
results were obtained under conditions were trustworthiness was relevant to the 
context (i.e. buying a house from a broker) and made salient (participants rated the 
trustworthiness of each face prior to the task). In the following study we further 
investigated the spontaneity of (un)trustworthiness encoding by removing the 
salience manipulation. 
S tudy 2
Study 2 was equivalent to Study 1 with one main difference: rather than asking 
participants to rate the facial trustworthiness of each alleged broker prior to the “Who 
said what” task (and thus making trustworthiness salient), we asked participants to 
rate trustworthiness after the task. In other words, Study 2 used a context in which 
trustworthiness was relevant (buying a house from a broker) but did not additionally 
make trustworthiness salient (contrary to Study 1). Fifty-one students (35 female) 
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of the Radboud University participated in this study (M
age = 22.47, SDage = 3.59). They 
received five euro or partial course credit as a reward. 
Results
All participants indicated at the end of the study that they had no difficulty with the 
English language. Furthermore, manipulation checks showed that trustworthiness 
ratings were significantly and substantially higher for trustworthy (M=5.29, SD=0.73) 
compared to untrustworthy faces (M=2.96, SD=0.91), d=1.64, t(50)=11.70, p<.001. 
In addition, participants were significantly more willing to pick houses from 
trustworthy (M=4.87, SD=1.00) compared to untrustworthy looking brokers (M=3.31, 
SD=0.94), d=0.94, t(50)=6.71, p<.001. Overall, these results confirm again that the 
trustworthiness manipulation was successful, and strong. 
 Next, responses in the ‘Who said what’ task were analyzed using MPT modeling 
with freely estimated parameters. The MPT model had a satisfactory goodness of 
fit, G2=0.62, df=1, p=.429. All parameter estimates and their confidence intervals are 
given in Table 2. Importantly, the results showed a significant reduction in goodness 
of fit when constraining the (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters both to zero, 
∆G2=74.51, df=2, p<.001. Likewise, the model fit was reduced significantly when 
constraining only the trustworthiness encoding parameter to zero, ∆G2=11.19, 
df=1, p<.001, or when constraining only the untrustworthiness encoding parameter 
to zero, ∆G2=27.27, df=1, p<.001. Hence, the result showed significant evidence of 
trustworthiness and untrustworthiness encoding. 
TABLE 2 -  Parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for Study 2
Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
D
T
=D
U
=D
N
0.524 0.499 0.548
a 0.489 0.448 0.531
b 0.410 0.385 0.435
c
T
0.104 0.053 0.154
c
U
0.054 0.004 0.105
d
T
0.272 0.129 0.416
d
U
0.428 0.294 0.562
Note: The indices indicate whether the speaker of the statement was trustworthy looking (T), untrustworthy looking 
(U) or whether the statement was new (N)
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Discussion
The results showed evidence of spontaneous encoding of facial (un)trustworthiness 
cues in a context where trustworthiness is relevant (buying a house from a broker). 
In fact, the estimates of (un)trustworthiness encoding were relatively similar to those 
obtained in Study 1 (see Table 1 and 2). This suggests that the salience manipulation 
in Study 1 had little or no effect, which might reflect that the trustworthiness-relevant 
context made trustworthiness salient by itself. Alternatively, it is conceivable that 
people encoded information that is confounded with (un)trustworthiness cues (e.g. 
attractiveness or masculinity), and that this is why making trustworthiness salient 
had no strong effect. For these reasons, we next investigated whether spontaneous 
encoding of facial (un)trustworthiness also occurs in a more neutral context that 
resembles a situation where a person is encountered in everyday life. In addition, 
we investigated whether a salience manipulation increases (un)trustworthiness 
encoding in this context. 
S tudy 3
When people first encounter another person, they usually start by stating their name 
and perhaps some general information about themselves. Study 3 mimicked such 
conditions and investigated to what extent spontaneous trustworthiness encoding 
occurs. Furthermore, Study 3 had both a condition in which trustworthiness was 
made salient (salient condition) and a condition where trustworthiness was not 
made salient (spontaneous condition). This enabled us to investigate (1) whether 
people spontaneously encode (un)trustworthiness in a neutral context (spontaneous 
condition), and (2) whether our trustworthiness encoding parameters are influenced 
by trustworthiness salience (salience condition compared to spontaneous condition).
Method
151 Dutch students (100 female) of the Radboud University participated in this 
study (Mage = 21.62; SDage = 3.30). We created 48 statements that described neutral 
information about eight imaginary people (e.g. “My flat is next to a supermarket”). 
In addition, 46 distractor statements were created that also gave information 
about imaginary people. Each statement included general and relatively neutral 
information (e.g. name, age, city of residence, use of public transport, etc.; see 
material on Open Science Framework). 
 In addition, participants were assigned at random to one of two between-subjects 
conditions. In the salience condition (n = 77), participants were asked to judge 
the trustworthiness of each speaker’s face prior to the ‘Who said what’ task. In the 
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spontaneous condition (n = 74), participants were asked to judge the trustworthiness 
after the ‘Who said what’ task. The purpose of asking for trustworthiness judgments 
prior to the ‘Who said what’ task was to draw attention to the trustworthiness of the 
speakers and thereby to influence the (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters. No 
further questions were asked (aside from demographical questions). Everything else 
was identical to Studies 1 and 2.
Results
First, we re-checked participants’ trustworthiness ratings of the speakers collapsed 
over the salience and spontaneous condition. Overall, trustworthy faces (M=5.31, 
SD=0.72) were judged as substantially more trustworthy looking than untrustworthy 
faces (M=2.81, SD=0.89), d=2.11, t(150)=25.93, p<.001. The same result was obtained 
within only the salience condition, d=2.43, t(76)=21.35, p<.001, and within only the 
spontaneous condition, d=1.86, t(73)=15.97, p<.001. Hence, the trustworthiness 
manipulation of the speaker’s faces appeared to be successful and strong in all 
conditions.
 Next, we fitted an MPT model on the whole data from the “Who said what” task 
with separate multinomial processing trees for the two conditions. These trees were 
structurally equivalent and used the same parameters with the exception that there 
were separate (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters for the salience and the 
spontaneous condition. The model had a satisfactory goodness of fit, G2 =5.77, df=7, 
p=.567. All parameter estimates are given in Table 3. Did participants spontaneously 
encode facial (un)trustworthiness? To answer this question, we constrained the (un)
trustworthiness encoding parameters to zero in the spontaneous condition. This 
caused a significant reduction in the model fit, ∆G2 = 338.10, df=2, p <.001. Likewise, 
the model fit was significantly reduced when constraining only the trustworthiness 
encoding parameter to zero, ∆G2=50.03, df=1, p<.001, or when constraining only 
the untrustworthiness encoding parameter to zero, ∆G2=34.84, df=1, p<.001. Hence, 
we observed significant evidence of both trustworthiness and untrustworthiness 
encoding in the spontaneous condition.
 Did the salience manipulation increase (un)trustworthiness encoding? To answer 
this question, we constrained the (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters to be 
equal across conditions. This caused a significant reduction in the model fit, ∆G2 = 8.98, 
df=2, p=.011. The same was true if only trustworthiness encoding was constrained to 
be equal across conditions, ∆G2 = 4.36, df=1, p=.037, and if only untrustworthiness 
encoding was constrained to be equal across conditions, ∆G2 = 4.61, df=1, p=.032. 
These results indicate that both trustworthiness and untrustworthiness encoding 
were not equal in these conditions. More specifically, both trustworthiness and 
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(un)trustworthiness encoding parameter estimates were larger in the salience 
condition (d
T
=.477 and d
U
=.454) compared to the spontaneous condition (d
T
=.383 
and d
U
=.351). Hence, making trustworthiness salient increased trustworthiness and 
untrustworthiness encoding.
TABLE 3 - Parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for Study 3 with separate (un)
trustworthiness encoding parameters for the salience and the spontaneous condition.
Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
D
T
=D
U
=D
N
0.674 0.663 0.686
a 0.449 0.390 0.509
b 0.113 0.101 0.125
c
T 0.303 0.278 0.328
c
U 0.174 0.150 0.199
d
T 
(salience) 0.477 0.388 0.567
d
T 
(spontaneous) 0.383 0.285 0.482
d
U 
(salience) 0.454 0.350 0.558
d
U 
(spontaneous) 0.351 0.233 0.469
Note: The indices indicate whether the speaker of the statement was trustworthy looking (T), untrustworthy looking 
(U) or whether the statement was new (N).
Discussion
The results showed evidence for spontaneous encoding of facial (un)trustworthiness 
cues in a neutral context (i.e. a person introducing him or herself ). Moreover, (un)
trustworthiness encoding was stronger if (un)trustworthiness was made salient 
prior to the task compared to a condition where (un)trustworthiness was not 
made salient. This sensitivity of the (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters 
to a trustworthiness salience manipulation suggests that these parameters may 
reflect attention to facial trustworthiness to some degree rather than attention to 
social information that is confounded with trustworthiness (e.g. attractiveness or 
masculinity). Taken together, these results further support the conclusion that people 
spontaneously form trustworthiness impressions based on facial appearance. Study 
1-3 showed this using artificial faces with a relatively strong manipulation of facial 
(un)trustworthiness. A remaining question is whether spontaneous encoding of 
trustworthiness also occurs based on real faces that differ more subtly in terms of 
facial trustworthiness. This question was addressed in Study 4.
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S tudy 4
Study 4 was equivalent to the spontaneous condition in Study 3 with one difference: 
instead of using artificial faces, we used real faces. Specifically, we picked the 
four most trustworthy and four most untrustworthy looking male faces from the 
Radboud Face Database based on supplemented trustworthiness ratings (available 
on Open Science Framework) of these faces (Langner et al., 2010). It is important 
to note that the difference in trustworthiness between these groups is likely to be 
smaller compared to our artificial faces. Moreover, given that real faces were used, 
identities could not be counterbalanced in Study 4. The critical question we aimed 
to answer was whether (un)trustworthiness encoding is still reliably present with 
these faces. The study was conducted online (www.prolific.ac), which enabled us 
to obtain a relatively large and heterogeneous sample of participants. Specifically, 
150 Caucasians participated in the study. Two participants were excluded because 
they indicated that they had problems with understanding the English language or 
because they did not complete the whole study, leaving 148 participants (57 female; 
M
age
= 31.26; SD
age
=10.67).
Results
Manipulation checks showed that trustworthiness ratings were significantly and 
substantially higher for trustworthy (M=4.98, SD=0.87) compared to untrustworthy 
faces (M=3.63, SD=1.04), d=1.22, t(147)=14.71, p<.001. This suggests that the pre-
selection of trustworthy and untrustworthy faces was successful. Next, responses in 
the ‘Who said what’ task were analyzed using MPT modeling with freely estimated 
parameters. The MPT model had a satisfactory goodness of fit, G2=3.16, df=1, 
p=.076. All parameter estimates and their confidence intervals are given in Table 
4. Importantly, the results showed a significant reduction in goodness of fit when 
constraining the (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters both to zero, ∆G2=7.54, 
df=2, p<.023. When testing the trustworthiness and untrustworthiness encoding 
parameters separately, we found a significant reduction in the model fit when 
constraining the trustworthiness encoding parameter to zero, ∆G2=5.50, df=1, 
p<.019, but not when constraining the untrustworthiness encoding parameter 
to zero, ∆G2=0.0, df=1, p=1. Hence, the results showed significant evidence of 
trustworthiness but not untrustworthiness encoding. 
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TABLE 4 - Parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for Study 4
Parameter Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
D
T
=D
U
=D
N
0.526 0.513 0.539
a 0.505 0.471 0.539
b 0.237 0.224 0.250
c
T
0.296 0.267 0.325
c
U
0.464 0.435 0.494
d
T
0.124 0.019 0.230
d
U
0.000 -0.122 0.122
Note: The indices indicate whether the speaker of the statement was trustworthy looking (T), untrustworthy looking 
(U) or whether the statement was new (N).
Discussion
Study 4 investigated the spontaneity of (un)trustworthiness encoding in a 
neutral context that mimics conditions of a first encounter of a novel person. 
Importantly, Study 4 employed real faces that differed less strongly in terms of facial 
trustworthiness (difference in trustworthiness ratings: d=1.22) compared to the 
faces employed in Studies 1-3 (difference in trustworthiness ratings: d=2.98, d=1.64, 
and d=2.11 respectively). The results showed significant evidence of trustworthiness 
but no evidence of untrustworthiness encoding. 
 The former supports the conclusion that participants spontaneously encoded 
that a perceived face appears trustworthy. In contrast, the interpretation of 
untrustworthiness encoding parameter is less straightforward. What is remarkable 
is that the untrustworthiness encoding parameter was not merely estimated 
to be small but literally zero. One possible explanation for this finding is that 
participants did not encode facial untrustworthiness. However, an alternative 
explanation is that facial untrustworthiness facilitated person discrimination, and 
that the untrustworthiness encoding parameter may therefore under-estimate the 
true extend of untrustworthiness encoding. This is because (un)trustworthiness 
encoding is only estimated in trials where person discrimination failed (see 
Figure 2). Consequently, every trial in which detecting facial untrustworthiness 
caused accurate person discrimination is not taken into account in the estimation 
of the untrustworthiness encoding parameter. As a result, encoding of facial 
untrustworthiness could potentially have become indiscernible by a facilitative 
effect on person discrimination. This interpretation converges with the exploratory 
observation (see Table 4) that person discrimination was larger for untrustworthy 
faces (c
u
=.464) compared to trustworthy faces (c
T
=.296; see also Rule, Slepian, & 
Ambady, 2012). 
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 Taken together, the results support the assumption that people spontaneously 
encode facial trustworthiness. Moreover, although the results did not show evidence 
of facial untrustworthiness encoding, the general pattern of the results (i.e., when 
taking person discrimination into account) suggests that this could be due to 
limitations of the MPT paradigm.
General  D isc ussion
It is widely assumed among psychologists that people have a strong tendency to 
spontaneously form trustworthiness impressions from facial appearance. However, 
existing findings do not fully warrant this assumption, because most existing studies 
induced an impression formation goal either explicitly (Todorov et al., 2008; Willis 
& Todorov, 2006) or implicitly (Chang et al., 2010; Rezlescu et al., 2012; Schlicht et 
al., 2010; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; van ’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). Moreover, although 
some studies demonstrated spontaneous neurophysiological responses to facial 
trustworthiness (Engell et al., 2007; Marzi et al., 2012; Todorov, 2008; Winston 
et al., 2002), it remains unclear whether this reflects the formation of lasting 
trustworthiness impressions. Finally, the theoretical plausibility of a spontaneous 
tendency to infer trustworthiness from facial appearance has been questioned by 
recent findings. Specifically, it has been found that facial trustworthiness inferences 
tend to be at chance level accuracy (Rule, Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013; Todorov, 
Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015; but see Slepian & Ames, 2016) and thus do 
not seem to provide valid (and evolutionary beneficial) information to a perceiver. 
As such, whether or not people spontaneously form trustworthiness impressions 
based on facial appearance remained a relatively open question.
 To our knowledge, the present studies are the first that tested whether relatively 
stable trustworthiness impressions are formed spontaneously from facial appearance. 
The results of four studies taken together provided evidence for such a tendency. 
Specifically, the results showed that participant encoded facial (un)trustworthiness 
if (un)trustworthiness was relevant to the context and made salient (Study 1), if 
trustworthiness was relevant to the context without making it salient (Study 2), 
and if the context mimicked a neutral first encounter of another person (Study 
3; spontaneous condition). Furthermore, a saliency manipulation increased (un)
trustworthiness encoding in the latter context (Study 3; salience condition). These 
studies used experimentally controlled artificial faces (Studies 1-3). Finally, we also 
obtained partial evidence of (un)trustworthiness encoding with more naturalistic 
varying real faces (Study 4). Taken together, these results provide support for the 
assumption that people spontaneously form relatively stable trustworthiness 
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impression from facial appearance. As such, these results contribute to closing an 
important gap in the empirical social perception literature.
Societal Implications
Previous studies have shown that facial trustworthiness influences important 
behavioral outcomes in contexts that require making trustworthiness related 
decisions (Chang et al., 2010; Porter et al., 2010; Rezlescu et al., 2012; Schlicht et 
al., 2010; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015; 
van  ’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). Our results suggest that facial trustworthiness may also 
be encoded in relatively neutral contexts in which trustworthiness is not explicitly 
relevant. This further suggests that behavioral outcomes of facial trustworthiness on 
behavior may be relatively independent of the context in which a face is perceived. 
For example, even if a person is initially encountered in a neutral context (e.g. in 
a supermarket) and only later a decision needs to be made about the person (e.g. 
whether to invite the person for an interview based on a CV without a picture), 
facial trustworthiness may influence the decision. This further emphasizes that facial 
trustworthiness may have pervasive consequences in everyday life.
Methodological Implications
Our studies also demonstrate the broad applicability of the “Who said what” 
paradigm. Originally, the “Who said what” paradigm was conceived of as a method 
for detecting spontaneous categorization into discrete classes (e.g. male and female; 
Taylor et al., 1978). In contrast, trustworthiness and untrustworthiness do not 
necessarily constitute discrete classes but could in principle be seen as endpoints of 
the same social dimension (i.e. trustworthiness). For this reason, it was not entirely 
clear a priori whether the “Who said what” paradigm can be used to measure 
trustworthiness encoding. Our findings show that the “Who said what” paradigm is 
sensitive to (un)trustworthiness encoding. This converges with various other studies 
in which the “Who said what” paradigm was applied to various different cues (Klauer 
& Wegener, 1998). Taken together, this suggest that the “Who said what” paradigm 
may be conceived of as a method to measure (spontaneous) cue encoding in 
general, and may thus be more widely applicable than originally assumed. 
Limitations
Facial trustworthiness cues are intrinsically confounded with other facial cues such 
as attractiveness, age, and sex (Todorov et al., 2008). As such, it is conceivable that 
our results (partially) reflect encoding of other information than trustworthiness. 
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This is an inevitable limitation that is shared by previous studies (Chang et al., 
2010; Engell et al., 2007; Rezlescu et al., 2012; Schlicht et al., 2010; Stirrat & Perrett, 
2010; Todorov, 2008; van ’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008; Willis & Todorov, 2006; Winston et 
al., 2002). We attempted to minimize this limitation by creating artificial faces that 
are manipulated in terms of trustworthiness while keeping variations on other 
dimensions as constant as possible. In addition, the results showed that the obtained 
effect gets stronger if trustworthiness is made salient but only if it is not already 
salient due to a trustworthiness-relevant context. Although this does not fully rule 
out alternative explanations (e.g. encoding of age cues), the pattern of the results as 
a whole suggests that the obtained effects reflect encoding of facial trustworthiness 
to some degree. 
 Another limitation is that we relied exclusively on the “Who said what” paradigm. 
This paradigm has the strength that it does not explicitly induce an impression 
formation goal, and does not require mentioning (un)trustworthiness to participants. 
Furthermore, this paradigm has the strength that it measures whether social cues 
are not only detected but also encoded in memory. Nevertheless, a limitation is that 
this paradigm assumes that the underlying processes are uncorrelated (Klauer & 
Wegener, 1998). In particular, if there is a correlation between person discrimination 
and (un)trustworthiness encoding, the amount of (un)trustworthiness encoding is 
imperfectly estimated. This is because (un)trustworthiness encoding is estimated 
exclusively based on trials person discrimination failed (see Figure 2) and does not 
take the amount of (un)trustworthiness encoding into account that happened in 
trials where person discrimination succeeded. This is particularly important for the 
interpretation of the results of Study 4 where person discrimination was relatively 
high. It is conceivable that the reason we found evidence for trustworthiness 
encoding but no evidence for untrustworthiness encoding in Study 4 is that people 
tend to remember untrustworthy faces (i.e. successful person discrimination). To 
the extent that this is the case, the results of Study 4 under-estimate the amount 
of untrustworthiness encoding. Importantly, if anything this possibility strengthens 
the conclusion that people may spontaneously encode facial (un)trustworthiness.
Future Research
Future research may complement our work by investigating the spontaneous 
encoding of other facial cues (e.g. dominance). Furthermore, another possible 
direction is to investigate how facial cues interact with behavioural cues. Previous 
studies showed that people form initial trustworthiness impressions based on 
facial appearance in a trust game but gradually update this impression based on 
incoming behavioural information (Chang et al., 2010). An open question is how 
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facial appearance interacts with behavioural cues in contexts where trustworthiness 
is not salient. For example, it is conceivable that updating an initial face-based 
trustworthiness impression happens mainly if people have the goal to form an 
accurate trustworthiness impression but not when trustworthiness impressions are 
formed incidentally.
 Another open question is to what extent people spontaneously encode these 
trustworthiness cues if they observe dynamically moving faces. A main explanation 
for the tendency to infer trustworthiness from the structure a face is that people may 
confuse facial expressions (which may provide valid cues to trustworthiness) with 
facial structure (which may not provide any valid cues to trustworthiness; Todorov, 
2008). For example, some people may have a facial structure that makes it appear as if 
these people are smiling (a trustworthiness cue), while other people may have a facial 
structure that makes it appears as if these people are frowning (an untrustworthiness 
cue). However, social perceivers may be able to disentangle facial expressions and 
facial structure more effectively when observing dynamically moving faces. As a 
result, they may be less inclined to encode (alleged) trustworthiness cues in facial 
structure in this situation. Future research may investigate this by employing videos 
of moving faces while independently varying facial structure and dynamic facial 
expressions. 
Conclusions about trustworthiness inferences
It is widely assumed among psychologists that people spontaneously “judge a book 
by its cover”: they infer how trustworthy a perceived person is based on the person’s 
facial appearance. However, the existing findings in the literature did not fully 
warrant this assumption. Our results provide empirical support for the assumption 
that people spontaneously infer trustworthiness from facial appearance, and thus 
contribute to closing this important gap in the literature. Furthermore, our results 
suggest that facial (un)trustworthiness is not only spontaneously inferred but also 
encoded in memory. This further emphasizes the pervasive consequences facial 
trustworthiness may have in our daily life. 
Conclusions about the model proposed in Chapter 3
The studies reported in this chapter tested three predictions of our model. First, 
our model predicts that confusions should arise based on trustworthiness. In line 
with this prediction, we found significant (un)trustworthiness encoding parameters 
in various studies. These parameters reflect the extent to which people confused 
trustworthy with other trustworthy, and untrustworthy with other untrustworthy 
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looking speakers. Second, our model predicts that making trustworthiness 
salient increases memory confusions (see Simulations 2b and 2c). In line with this 
prediction we found that increasing trustworthiness salience significantly increased 
the trustworthiness encoding parameters in a neutral context (Study 3) but not 
substantially in a context where trustworthiness was already salient (Study 1 and 
2). Finally, our model predicts that the tendency to confuse other people based on 
encoded trustworthiness (social categorization) should be relatively independent 
of person memory (individuation). In line with this prediction, we found relatively 
independently varying parameters for trustworthiness (categorization) and 
individual memory (individuation). For example, whereas trustworthiness memory 
was relatively high and individual memory relatively low in Study 2 (with artificial 
faces), trustworthiness memory was relatively low and person memory relatively 
high in Study 4 (with real faces). Taken together, these results provide further support 
for the framework and formal model presented in Chapter 3.
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The present dissertation aimed to contribute to our understanding of person 
perception by (1) advancing the conceptual clarity of social categorization models, 
and (2) the integration social categorization models and connectionist models of 
person perception. Advancing conceptual clarity is an important goal to ensure 
that the theories we use to explain person perception are testable and the way 
they explain phenomena coherent. Moreover, advancing the integration of existing 
models is important to ensure that we can derive clear predictions from the 
theorizing in the literature more generally (without contradicting ourselves). 
 How did the present dissertation help to advance the conceptual clarity of 
social categorization models? In Chapter 2, we discussed the theory that “people 
categorize other people” (an idea from social categorization models), and argued 
that different researchers have used the term “categorization” with qualitatively 
different meanings. Specifically, we disentangled four different definitions with 
which this term has been employed in the person perception literature. First, the 
term “categorization” has been used to refer to the cognitive strategy to map external 
stimuli onto internal representations (the representing definition). Second, the term 
“categorization” has been used to refer to the strategy to map stimuli that vary on 
graded dimensions onto binary all-or-none representations (the dichotomization 
definition). Third, the term “categorization” has been used to refer to the strategy to 
summarize information about other people in terms of organizing representations 
(the organizing definition) rather than processing each separate feature of the 
person. Fourth, the term has been used to refer to the strategy to construe perceived 
people as interchangeable members of social groups (the grouping definition) rather 
than separate individuals.
 Importantly, under each definition, the theory that “people categorize other 
people” leads to qualitatively different predictions. For example, under the 
dichotomization definition, the theory that “people categorize other people” leads 
to the prediction that people perceive in an all-or-none fashion (e.g. a person is 
either a professor or not) rather than perceiving graded information (e.g. a person 
is a professor to a certain degree). In contrast, under the grouping definition, the 
theory that “people categorize other people” leads to the prediction that people 
confuse members of social group with each other (e.g. men with other men). 
Without disentangling such definitions it remains unclear what  the theory “people 
categorize other people” predicts, and therefore its relationship with empirical 
findings gets blurred. As a result, researchers can reach seemingly antagonistic 
theoretical conclusions (e.g. “people categorize rarely” vs “people categorize 
frequently”) based on the same empirical literature. Chapter 2 illustrated that such 
seemingly antagonistic conclusions may sometimes be reconciled by disentangling 
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confounded definitions of “categorization” (e.g. people may dichotomize rarely but 
group other people frequently). 
 In Chapter 3, we took steps towards the formalization of social categorization 
models. For this purpose, we adopted the grouping definition: “categorization” 
means to treat other people as group members rather than treating them as 
unique individuals (individuation). The notion that people “categorize” in the 
sense of grouping other people has been widely supported by empirical findings. 
We presented a formal interpretation of the grouping notion of “categorization” 
by interpreting grouping as a mapping of observed people onto nodes that are 
excited by any member of a social group (e.g. any men). Conversely, we interpreted 
individuation as a mapping of an observed person onto a node that is specifically 
excited by the observation of that particular person (e.g. Brad Pitt). Next, we 
showed that these formal interpretations are consistent with various documented 
phenomena in the person perception literature. In other words, it seems plausible 
based on these findings that people “categorize” in the sense proposed by our formal 
interpretation.
 How did the present dissertation contribute to the conceptual integration 
of social categorization and connectionist models? The core notion of social 
categorization models is that people can employ two cognitive strategies: they may 
either categorize or individuate the other person. The core notion of connectionist 
models is that people learn associations between internal representations (e.g. 
between African American and criminal). Subsequently, people are influenced by 
these associations by spreading activation among internal representations via 
associative links (e.g. African American spreads activation to criminal). 
 Without an overarching framework, it is ambiguous when which model is 
applicable, and therefore unclear how one can arrive at testable predictions from 
both theories taken together. For example, social categorization models have often 
been described as dual process models (they assume that person perception is 
driven by categorization and individuation; Brewer, 1988), whereas connectionist 
models have often been described as single process models (Ehret, Monroe, & 
Read, 2014; Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Consequently, it is unclear whether the finding 
of a cognitive dissociation in person memory is consistent with the theoretical 
person perception literature (e.g. this dissociation may reflect categorization 
and individuation) or inconsistent (e.g. does this dissociation fit to single process 
connectionist models?). Overall, an overarching framework is necessary that clarifies 
how these models relate to each other and how they relate to empirical findings.
 Chapter 3 aimed to provide such an overarching framework. The basic idea was that 
categorization and individuation can be distinguished in the input of connectionist 
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models. I gave the analogy of a coffee machine. The coffee machine may take two 
distinct types of inputs (e.g. two types of coffee capsules) but then apply the same 
process (i.e. pressing water through the capsule) to arrive at two dissociable outputs 
(e.g. two types of coffee). Analogously, we proposed that connectionist models 
may take two distinct types of inputs (group and exemplar representations), which 
are then processed in the same way (i.e. excitation from observation, spreading of 
activation via associations, and activation decay) to arrive at dissociable outputs (e.g. 
memory of individuals or groups). In this framework, “categorization” constitutes 
mapping an observed person onto a group representation while “individuation” 
constitutes mapping an observed person onto an exemplar representation.
 Furthermore, we presented a formal implementation of this framework. 
Specifically, we presented a connectionist model in which one can distinguish 
between nodes based on how generally they become excited by external stimuli: 
e.g. while some nodes become excited by any member of a social group (e.g. any 
men; a group node), other nodes become excited exclusively by specific individuals 
(e.g. Brad Pitt; an exemplar node). Activating the former type of nodes constitutes 
“categorization” while activating the latter constitutes “individuation” in this formal 
model. 
 This model shows a possible way how the core notions of social categorization 
models may be formally interpreted and synthesized with connectionist models. 
However, is this also a plausible way? Using computer simulations, we demonstrated 
that the model is consistent with documented phenomena in various person 
perception areas. First, we reproduced the social learning phenomenon that category 
activation becomes less effective in priming an exemplar the more exemplars are 
known (Phenomenon 1). Second, we reproduced the person memory phenomenon 
that people tend to confuse other people more frequently within groups than 
between groups (Phenomenon 2; part 1). By applying a Multinomial processing 
tree analysis to the same simulation, we also reproduced evidence of a cognitive 
dissociation in person memory (Phenomenon 2; part 2). Third, we reproduced the 
social judgement phenomenon that grouping stimuli based on how they vary on a 
graded dimension (e.g. long lines are labeled as A and short lines labeled as B), can 
polarize judgements on this dimension (e.g. the perceived difference between long 
and short lines becomes larger; Phenomenon 3). Fourth and finally, we reproduced 
the impression formation phenomenon that personality traits (e.g. extravert) tend 
to be relatively ineffective sources of person inferences compared to (some) other 
social groupings (e.g. politician; Phenomenon 4). Hence, the model seems to be 
relatively plausible in light of these existing findings. 
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 Ideally, a theoretical framework should not only be able to explain existing 
findings (post hoc) but it should also predict novel findings (a priori). In Chapter 
4, we therefore presented studies that test predictions of our framework that do 
not follow unequivocally from previous person perception models. Specifically, our 
framework predicts that memory confusions between people can occur based on 
any social representation that can be used to group people. Consistent with this 
prediction, we found evidence that people tend to confuse trustworthy looking 
faces more readily with other trustworthy looking faces than with untrustworthy 
looking faces (and vice versa). In addition, we find evidence for a dissociation 
between categorization and individuation if we apply a conventional process 
dissociation analysis to this data. These findings could not have been unequivocally 
predicted from past models, which assumed that memory confusions are caused by 
“categorization” (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978) and typically considered 
trustworthiness a non-categorical representation (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 
1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Tajfel, 1969).
 Our framework can help to clarify when which model is applicable and thus to 
derive predictions from both models taken together (e.g. is the cognitive dissociation 
in conflict with existing theorizing?). Consider again the coffee machine example. If 
one knows that two different coffee capsules will be provided to the coffee machine 
as inputs (analogous to group and exemplar representations), one can make the 
prediction that there will be qualitatively different coffees as outputs. Conversely, 
if one has the process model that the coffee machine presses water through the 
coffee capsule and pours it into a cup, one can make time course predictions such 
as when which sound will occur. Our framework works analogous to this example. 
For instance, because one can make a distinction between categorization and 
individuation in the connectionist input, we can predict (in line with empirical 
findings) that one should be able to find evidence of a cognitive dissociation (much 
like we can predict two coffees from two coffee capsules). Furthermore, because the 
same dynamic process is applied to each input, we can predict (in line with empirical 
findings) that one can find evidence of dynamic competition while participants are 
generating a response (much like a process model of a coffee machine can predict 
the sounds that occur while making the coffee).
 In the following, I will discuss how the present work advances our understanding of 
societal issues related to discrimination against social groups (societal implications), 
and lessons about the potential merits of theoretical research approaches (scientific 
implications). Finally, I will discuss limitations and future directions.
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S ocietal  Implic ations
An improved understanding of person perception may provide insights into the 
cognitive causes of explicit and implicit forms of discrimination against social 
groups. Past theories proposed that discriminations against social groups may be 
the result of our natural tendency to “categorize” other people. Yet, what does this 
mean exactly? Does discrimination against social groups arise because we map 
people onto internal representing (representing definition), or because we perceive 
in an all-or-none fashion (dichotomization definition), or because we organize 
information about other people (organization definition), or because we group other 
people (grouping definition)? This remained relatively ambiguous in the literature on 
the whole. At the same time, the question which of these constructs is the main 
cause of discrimination is important. For example, under the representing definition, 
“categorization” seems inevitable and may thus not be changeable through 
interventions. In contrast, under other definitions “categorization” is conditional and 
thus potentially changeable by interventions. 
 The work in the present dissertation may provide some new insights relevant 
to these open questions. To illustrate this, consider the phenomenon that people 
are more likely to confuse people from other races than people from their own 
race (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 
2010; Young, Bernstein, & Hugenberg, 2010). This phenomenon can have dramatic 
consequences in identifications of culprits through witnesses: a suspect from 
a different race than the witness will be more likely to be falsely identified as the 
culprit than a suspect from the same race as the witness (Hugenberg et al., 2010). It 
has been suggested that this happens because the witness may “categorize” people 
from other races rather than “individuating” them. However, as we demonstrated, 
this explanation remains ambiguous. What has the present dissertation contributed 
to our understanding of this matter? 
 In Chapter 3, we provided an explanation for memory confusions between 
perceived people implemented in computer simulations. Specifically, Simulations 
2a-2d suggested that confusions between other people do not occur because we 
represent people in general (“categorization” under the representing definition) but 
because we group people (“categorization” under the grouping definition). This was 
evident from the fact that confusions between people were eliminated completely 
when connectionist nodes that did not distinguish between group members were 
not excited by observed people (see Simulation 2c). Hence, it may not be mapping 
people onto representations in general (“categorization” under the representing 
definition) that is causing memory confusions but more specifically mapping people 
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onto group representations (“categorization” under the grouping definition). An 
important implication of this insight is that the latter can be avoided in theory. This is 
evident from the results of Simulation 2c where the simulated group representations 
were we simulated a situation in which situation does not occur and found that 
memory confusions disappeared. This conclusion could not have been drawn 
unequivocally without our conceptual contribution, because it was not unequivocal 
whether the view that categorization is inevitable or the view that categorization 
is conditional is applicable in this case. As such, our work provides conceptual 
support for the idea that discrimination may be reduced by interventions targeted 
at reducing social categorization.
 Furthermore, a novel implication of our model is that memory confusions 
between suspects may arise not only if the suspects are from the same race but also 
if they are similar in other abstract regards (e.g. personality). As a result, one may 
wonder: if all suspects are relatively untrustworthy looking people, how does that 
affect the probability that an innocent person will be falsely identified as the culprit 
(compared to suspects who vary more in terms of trustworthiness appearance)? 
Moreover, any kind of description of suspects on a group level (e.g. “these are the 
suspects” or “here are five men”) may make confusions of the true culprit with an 
innocent person more likely. Such implications did not unequivocally emerge under 
previous theorizing, because it was not clear what falls under “categorization”. 
 As another example, what has the present dissertation contributed to our 
understanding of stereotyping and resulting discrimination? In Chapter 3, we 
explored how “categorization” under the grouping definition can help to explain 
relevant phenomena. In particular, Simulation 4 suggested that stereotyping may 
not be the result of assigning people to groups in general (“categorization” under the 
grouping definition) but of assigning people to relatively small and homogeneous 
groups. For example, although both representing a person as a politician or as 
extravert can be seen as grouping (in the sense that there is a group of politician and 
there is a group of extraverts), people tend to be able to infer more stereotypic person 
properties (e.g. that a politician is old, extravert, and intelligent) than from the latter 
(an extravert is simply somebody who performs extravert behavior). The reason for 
this difference may be that politician refers to a relatively small and homogeneous 
group. In contrast, extravert may refer to a relatively large and heterogeneous group 
(e.g. including many age groups, many occupations, many nationalities, etc.) about 
whom clear predictions are hardly possible. Hence, grouping in general may not 
be the main source of stereotyping but more specifically small and homogeneous 
groupings. An implication of this insight is that teaching people about variabilities 
within groups may help to reduce stereotyping.
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 In general, our work helps to advance our understanding of person perception and 
various forms of discrimination against social groups by narrowing down relatively 
ambiguous theoretical explanations towards more specific and unequivocal 
explanations. This elucidates what the cognitive causes of discrimination, and 
sharpens what potential targets for interventions against discrimination might be. 
In addition, it leads to novel predictions and implications that can be investigated in 
future research. 
S cientific  implic ations
It is common wisdom in psychological science that statistical inferences from 
empirical data need to be made through formal analysis practices. Every step of 
the inferences process has been thought through, and agreed upon by experts (i.e. 
statisticians) such as what is formally interpreted as an effect (e.g. a regression slope), 
what is formally interpreted as noise (e.g. residuals), and how (e.g. calculating a p 
value or Bayes Factor) as well as when (e.g. p > .05 or BF > 3) it can be stated that 
there is a reliable effect. If a scientist would take an informal approach, that is, simply 
describe the pattern of the data in informal non-statistical terms (the dots in the 
scatter plot look like there is an upward trend), and draw a conclusion based on such 
an informal description (hence, the manipulation worked), it would probably not be 
accepted by other scientists. In other words, formal practices in empirical research are 
well established and treated as essential.
 Likewise, formal practices in theoretical research are well established and seen 
as essential in various scientific disciplines (e.g. physics, biology, economy). For 
example, various sciences employ formal language to express theories, computer 
simulations to derive predictions, and formal proofs to derive implications from 
theories. In contrast, the same formal practices of theoretical research are relatively 
rare in psychological science. The theorizing in the social categorization literature 
can be seen as an example of this general paucity of formal thinking in psychological 
theorizing (but see: Freeman & Ambady, 2011). 
 A general aim of the present dissertation is to show limitations of informal 
theorizing approaches, and to provide steps towards improvements. In particular, 
Chapter 2 illustrated that scientific progress can be obstructed by conceptual 
problems. Such problems are more likely to arise from informal theorizing 
approaches because these approaches allow equivocation of terms to go unnoticed. 
That is, verbal terms (e.g. “categorization”) can be used with different meanings 
in informal language (e.g. representing and grouping). As a result, spuriously 
antagonistic conclusions can arise (“categorization is inevitable” vs. “categorization 
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is conditional”). Likewise, we illustrated in Chapter 3 that because verbal terms can 
be used with different meanings in informal language (e.g. the term “process”), 
theoretical models that are in principle compatible (e.g. “people categorize and 
individuate” and “people learn and are influenced by associations”) can appear 
incompatible (e.g. by describing the former as a “dual process” and the latter as a 
“single process” model). Similar conceptual issues have been reported in other areas 
of social cognition research (De Houwer & Moors, 2015; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
These examples illustrate that there may be considerable merit in a formal approach 
to theorizing using mathematical language, computer simulations, formal proofs, 
and similar formal research tools. Much like a formal approach to data analysis has 
helped scientists to sharpen their inferences from empirical data, a formal approach 
to theorizing may help to sharpen theoretical ideas and ultimately deepen our 
understanding of the subject that we are studying. 
Limitations
While our computer simulations showed how our framework can explain various 
person perception phenomena, some caution is necessary not to take all formal 
properties of these simulations as a literal description of the human person 
perception mechanism. The computer simulations are almost certainly an over-
simplification (which this is a common limitation of computer simulations). For 
example, the model uses a Hebbian type of learning algorithm and it is well known 
that Hebbian learning is a very limited learning mechanism (McClelland, 2006). 
Likewise, the person perception mechanism is an abstraction that omits many details 
of real neural processes (e.g. a node may denote a whole population of neurons in 
the brain; Schröder & Thagard, 2013). 
 For such reasons, the computer simulations may be seen primarily as a proof of 
concept for the general framework (social categorization models as descriptions of 
connectionist inputs) rather than interpreting every detail of the simulations as a 
literal description of the human person perception mechanisms. Nevertheless, the 
computer simulations may also provide a useful starting point for more sophisticated 
models of person perception. For example, future models may adopt the general 
ideas of the framework while using a more sophisticated learning mechanism, 
larger networks, and representations that are more distributed (for an example how 
simplified models may provide a stepping stone to such more sophisticated models 
see: Schröder & Thagard, 2013)
 It is also worth noting that our integration of the core notions of social 
categorization models and connectionist models applies only under the definition 
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of “categorization” as grouping. As explained in Chapter 2, this definition is not 
shared by all researchers in the person perception literature. This limitation is 
inevitable given that qualitatively different notions have been confounded under 
the term “categorization”. Consequently, not all of the theorizing in the social 
categorization literature may fit into our proposed model. For example, Fiske and 
Neuberg proposed that perceivers tend to organize information about other people 
(“categorization” under the organization definition), which is an idea that is not 
included in our model. Future research may complement our work by focusing on 
such remaining questions. 
 Finally, although our framework demonstrates how core notions of social 
categorization and connectionist models can be integrated, it does not yet address 
more detailed aspects of specific social categorization and connectionist models. 
For example, Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model did not only make a 
distinction between a categorization and individuation processing strategy but 
also proposed inter-mediate strategies in which the perceiver searchers for sub-
categories of the initial categorization. Likewise, many existing connectionist models 
adopt a different learning mechanism than our model or used slightly different rules 
to govern how the model spreads activation (e.g. Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Smith & 
DeCoster, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004). Our general framework remains 
silent about such more specific ideas. Nevertheless, it may provide a starting point 
for future research that aims to integrate such detailed mechanism into a general 
person perception model.
Future direc tions
The present work may be followed up by both empirical and theoretical research. 
A possible direction for empirical research would be to investigate the interplay 
between social categorization and individuation. In traditional models, social 
categorization and individuation have been seen as alternate cognitive strategies: 
a perceiver employs either social categorization or (switch to) individuation (Brewer, 
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).1 In contrast, in our model social categorization and 
individuation constitute the activation of different types of representations (group 
1 This description is somewhat simplified. For example, in the Continuum Model, people always initially 
assign another person to a social category. However, if perceivers are motivated to look for further 
information and they find that the social category does not organize the information of the person 
well, they will reject the category, and resort to other processing strategies. The last alternative in this 
processing stream is that all possible social categories are rejected and the person is treated purely 
based on individual characteristics. Importantly, in this model the perceiver either keeps the initial social 
category (pure social categorization) or rejects it and uses other information such as the individual 
properties of the person (pure individuation).
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and exemplar representations) that are independent of each other. This means that 
in our model social categorization and individuation are not intrinsically opposed 
cognitive strategies (people either categorize or switch to individuation) but two 
strategies that can be employed both at the same time (see Chapter 3; Simulation 2b).2
 This has important implications. It has been suggested in the past that social 
categorization leads to relatively inaccurate perceptions (e.g. stereotyped impression 
that do not do justice to an individual) while individuation leads to relatively accurate 
person perception outputs (e.g. an impression that is based on the behavior of the 
individual; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Our 
model provides a novel perspective: rather than de-motivating social categorization, 
an alternative approach to reduce biases in person perception may be to facilitate 
the use of both social categorization and individuation at the same time. This idea 
could not have emerged under previous models, which assumed that categorization 
and individuation are alternate strategies. Moreover, this idea converges with 
evidence that many stereotypes tend to be accurate, and often improve accuracy 
on average over several perceived people (Jussim, Cain, Crawford, Harber, & Cohen, 
2009; Jussim, 1991). At the same time, this idea is consistent with traditional views 
that stereotyping (namely, if it is employed without simultaneous individuation) can 
lead to biased perceptions of specific individuals who do not fit to those stereotypes 
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Future empirical research may investigate this 
by comparing accuracy in conditions where people are motivated (1) to categorize, 
(2) to individuate, or (3) to both categorize and individuate.
 A possible direction for theoretical research would be to further investigate the 
functions that social categorization may fulfill during person perception. A widespread 
idea in the person perception literature is that social categorization is a cognitive 
strategy that helps to reduce the complexity of the person perception process 
(Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2001). As yet, there is no formal analysis of how exactly social categorization may 
ease the person perception processes, which provides food for theoretical research in 
the future. For example, one could use computer simulations with our connectionist 
model (Chapter 3) to compare a situation in which a perceived person is encoded 
2 A critical reader may notice that the MPT model in Chapter 3 (Simulation 2a-2d) assumes a dependency: 
social categorization influences responses only if individuation does not occur. However, this dependency 
does not reflect that people do not rely on categorization if they individuate. Instead, it reflects that if 
people individuate (e.g. they remember that the statement x was made by Brad) then social categorization 
does not have any effect on the response (e.g. although they may remember that statement x was made 
by a man, this information is superfluous for selecting a speaker if one remembers the exact speaker). This 
does not mean that social categorization did not occur simultaneously with individuation but rather that 
social categorization does not influence responses in this particular paradigm if it occurs simultaneously 
with individuation. As such, the theoretical proposals above are consistent with the MPT model discussed 
in Chapter 3 (Simulation 2a-2d). 
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in terms of social category nodes (by providing a positive external input exclusively 
to those nodes) to a situation in which a perceived person is encoded in terms of 
exemplar nodes (by providing a positive external input exclusively to those nodes). 
A possible research question would be whether the computer simulation finishes 
with fewer iterations in the former situation compared to the latter. If it does, this 
would be consistent with the idea that social categorization reduces the complexity 
of the person perception process relative to individuation. The next step would be to 
extrapolate the formal properties of the cognitive process that cause this reduction 
in processing time. Such discoveries may then lead to novel insights and predictions 
that could be tested in empirical research. 
 Furthermore, such discoveries may also inspire practical applications in the 
engineering of artificial systems that have a capacity for social cognition, such as socially 
interactive robots or game avatars. A common problem in artificial intelligence is that 
the human-level capacity for making sense of our physical and social world appears 
intractable: i.e., existing computational theories of this capacity require astronomical 
amounts of processing time for inputs of real-world complexity (van Rooij, 2003). In 
contrast, humans can make snap judgments and form impressions of other people 
in split seconds. If social categorization is a strategy by which social perceivers 
make the person perception process tractable, cognitive engineers may be able to 
use this as an inspiration to solve tractability issues in artificial cognitive systems.
Conclusion
In many cases, researchers seek to advance our understanding of person perception 
by reporting empirical findings that provide novel insights. Complementing empirical 
approaches, the present dissertation aimed to advance our understanding of person 
perception through conceptual contributions. A theory elucidates person perception 
only to the extent that the theory is unequivocal. Moreover, the person perception 
literature on the whole elucidates person perception only to the extent that existing 
theories are compatible and integrated. The present dissertation focused on this 
conceptual aspect of person perception research by advancing the conceptual 
clarity of social categorization models and the integration of social categorization 
and connectionist models. I hope that this work deepens our understanding of 
person perception in general (e.g. how person perception may work on the whole), 
provides novel insights on current societal issues (e.g. the potential cognitive causes 
of discrimination against social groups), helps to improve the scientific quality of 
existing theorizing (e.g. what we can predict from existing models taken together), 
and provides novel directions for future research (e.g. the interplay between 
categorization and individuation, and the tractability of person perception).  
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How does person perception work? For example, how do we form impressions 
of other people in our everyday life (e.g. that another person is shy, arrogant, or 
likeable)? This topic is not only of theoretical interest but also societally relevant. 
People often discriminate against social groups because they make snap judgments 
of other people based on superficial cues such as race, sex, or religion. Various 
models of person perception have accumulated in the scientific literature, which 
have provided important insights into these topics. Two models are discussed in the 
present dissertation. First, social categorization models propose that discrimination 
against social groups may be the result of people’s natural tendency to “categorize” 
(e.g. as a man) other people rather than “individuating” (i.e. treating the person as a 
unique individual) them. Second, connectionist models propose that discrimination 
may be caused by learned associations (e.g. between African American and criminal), 
which may (implicitly) influence our judgements and behavior towards other people.
The first goal of the present thesis was to advance the conceptual clarity of existing 
models. The degree to which these models advance our understanding of person 
perception is limited by the degree to which these models are ambiguous. In 
particular, if it is not clear what we mean by “categorization” then the theory that 
discrimination against social groups is caused by “categorization” provides only 
limited insights. Therefore, the first aim of the present dissertation was to further 
advance the conceptual clarity of social categorization models by disentangling 
different meanings of the term “categorization”. 
 In Chapter 2, we showed that the term “categorization” has been used 
with qualitatively different meanings by different researchers. First, the term 
“categorization” has been used to refer to cognitive strategy to map external 
stimuli onto internal representations (the representing definition). Second, the term 
“categorization” has been used to refer to the strategy to map stimuli that vary on 
graded dimensions onto binary all-or-none representations (the dichotomization 
definition). Third, the term “categorization” has been used to refer to the strategy to 
summarize information about other people in terms of organizing representations 
(the organizing definition). Fourth, the term has been used to refer to the strategy 
to construe perceived people as interchangeable members of social groups rather 
than separate individuals (the grouping definition).
 Importantly, under each definition, the theory that “people categorize other 
people” leads to qualitatively different predictions. For example, under the 
dichotomization definition, the theory that “people categorize other people” leads to 
the prediction that people perceive in an all-or-none fashion (e.g. a person is either 
a professor or not) rather than perceiving graded information (e.g. a person is a 
professor to a certain degree). In contrast, under the grouping definition, the theory 
14507_Klapper_BW.indd   145 17-07-17   13:09
E n g l i s h  S u m m a r y
146 
that “people categorize other people” leads to the prediction that people confuse 
members of the same social group with each other (e.g. men with other men). 
Consequently, the relationship between the theory that “people categorize other 
people” and empirical findings gets blurred without disentangling these definitions. 
As a result, researchers can reach seemingly antagonistic theoretical conclusions 
(e.g. “people categorize rarely” vs “people categorize frequently”) based on the 
same empirical literature. Chapter 2 illustrated that such seemingly antagonistic 
conclusions can in some cases be reconciled by disentangling confounded 
definitions of “categorization” (e.g. people may dichotomize rarely but group other 
people frequently). 
 In Chapter 3, we further sharpened social categorization models by providing 
steps towards the formalization of their core notions. For this purpose, we adopted 
the grouping definition in which “categorization” means to treat other people as 
group members rather than treating them as unique individuals (individuation). 
The notion that people “categorize” in the sense of grouping other people has been 
widely supported by empirical findings. We presented a formal implementation 
of this idea in which we interpreted grouping as activating a representation that is 
generally excited by any member of a social group (e.g. any men) and individuation 
as activation of a representation that is specifically excited by the observation of that 
particular person (e.g. Brad Pitt). Next, we showed that this formal interpretation is 
consistent with various documented phenomena in the person perception literature. 
In other words, it seems plausible in light of these findings that people “categorize” in 
this particular sense.
 The second aim of the present dissertation was to contribute to the integration 
of social categorization and connectionist models. The core notion of social 
categorization models is that people can employ two processes: they may either 
“categorize” (leading to discrimination against social groups) or “individuate” another 
person. The core notion of connectionist models is that people learn associations 
between internal representations (e.g. between African American and criminal). 
Subsequently, people are influenced by these associations because activation is 
spread via associative links (e.g. African American spreads activation to criminal). 
Connectionist models have often been seen as single process models because they 
assume that every stimulus is treated in the same way.
 Without an overarching framework, it is ambiguous when which model is 
applicable, and therefore unequivocal what these models taken together teach 
us about person perception theories. For example, is the finding of a cognitive 
dissociation in person memory consistent with the theoretical person perception 
literature (e.g. this dissociation may reflect categorization and individuation) or 
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inconsistent with this literature (e.g. does this dissociation fit to single process 
connectionist models?). That is, are there two processes underlying person 
perception or one? Overall, an overarching framework is necessary that clarifies how 
these models relate to each other and how they relate to empirical findings.
 Chapter 3 aimed to provide such an overarching framework. The basic idea 
was that categorization and individuation can be distinguished in the input of 
connectionist models. To illustrate the general idea: a coffee machine may take two 
kinds of inputs (e.g. two types of coffee capsules) but then apply the same process 
(i.e. pressing water through the capsule) to arrive at two dissociable outputs (e.g. 
two types of coffee), Analogously, we proposed that connectionist models may 
take two kinds of inputs (group and exemplar representations), which are then 
processed in the same way (i.e. co-variance based associative learning, excitation 
from observation, spreading of activation via associations, and activation decay) to 
arrive at dissociable outputs (e.g. memory of a group member or individual). In this 
framework, “categorization” constitutes mapping an observed person onto a group 
representation while “individuation” constitutes mapping an observed person onto 
an exemplar representation. 
 Furthermore, we presented a formal implementation of this framework. 
Specifically, we presented a connectionist model in which one can distinguish 
between representations based on how generally they are excited by external stimuli. 
More specifically, while some representations become excited by any member 
of a social group (e.g. any men; a group representation), other representations 
become excited exclusively by specific individuals (e.g. Brad Pitt; an exemplar 
representation). Activating the former type of (group) representation constitutes 
“categorization” while activating the latter type of (exemplar) representation 
constitutes “individuation” in this formal model. 
 This model shows a possible way how the core notions of social categorization 
models may be formally interpreted and integrated with connectionist models. 
However, is this also a plausible way? Using computer simulations, we demonstrated 
that the model is consistent with documented phenomena in various person 
perception areas. First, we reproduced the social learning phenomenon that 
category activation becomes less effective in priming an exemplar of the category 
the more exemplars are known (Phenomenon 1). Second, we reproduced the person 
memory phenomenon that people tend to confuse other people more frequently 
within groups than between groups during recollection (Phenomenon 2; part 1). 
By applying a Multinomial processing tree analysis to the same simulation, we also 
reproduced evidence of a cognitive dissociation in person memory (Phenomenon 
2; part 2). Third, we reproduced the social judgement phenomenon that grouping 
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stimuli into distinct categories can polarize judgements. Fourth and finally, we 
reproduced the impression formation phenomenon that personality traits (e.g. 
extravert) tend to be relatively ineffective sources of person inferences compared 
to (some) other social groupings (e.g. politician; Phenomenon 4). Hence, the model 
seems to be plausible in light of these existing findings. 
 Ideally, a theoretical framework should not only be able to explain existing 
findings (post hoc) but it should also predict novel findings (a priori). In Chapter 
4, we therefore presented studies that tested novel predictions of our framework. 
Specifically, our framework predicts that memory confusions between people 
can occur based on any social representation that can be used to group people. 
Consistent with this prediction, we found evidence that people tend to confuse 
trustworthy looking faces more readily with other trustworthy looking faces than 
with untrustworthy looking faces (and vice versa) – especially if (un)trustworthiness 
was made salient prior to the task. In addition, we found evidence for a cognitive 
dissociation when applying a process dissociation analysis to this data. These 
findings could not have been predicted unequivocally from past models, which 
typically considered “trustworthiness” a non-categorical representation.
 How does this advance our theoretical understanding of person perception? Our 
framework can help to clarify when which model is applicable (e.g. is the cognitive 
dissociation in conflict with single process connectionist models?). Consider again 
the coffee machine example. If one knows that two different coffee capsules will be 
provided to the coffee machine as inputs, one can make the prediction that there 
will be qualitatively different coffees as outputs. Conversely, if one has the process 
model that the coffee machine presses water through the coffee capsule and pours 
it into a cup, one can make time course predictions such as when which noise will 
occur while making coffee. Our framework works analogous to this example. For 
instance, there are at least two types of connectionist inputs (group and exemplar 
representations), we can predict (in line with empirical findings) that one should 
be able to find evidence of a cognitive dissociation (much like we can predict two 
coffees from two coffee capsules). Furthermore, because the same dynamic process 
is applied to each input, we can predict (in line with empirical findings) behavioral 
dynamics while a response is generated (much like a process model of a coffee 
machine can predict the sounds that occurs while making the coffee).
 What can we learn from this work about the potential causes of discrimination 
against social groups? In general, this work clarifies what exactly those potential 
causes may be. For example, in Chapter 3 we showed that theoretically any kind of 
grouping (“categorization” under the grouping definition) may lead to confusions 
between people (think of witness identifications of potential culprits, for instance). 
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This theoretical point was empirically supported in Chapter 4. This leads to the 
important implications that such confusions may happen not only based on race 
(as shown by past findings) but more generally based on any kind of grouping other 
people (e.g. that they are all untrustworthy looking). As another example, our work 
in Chapter 3 showed that stereotyped impressions may not arise necessarily from 
any kind of grouping of other people (e.g. not so much from grouping people as 
extravert), but most strongly from assigning people to small and more homogeneous 
groups (e.g. politician). 
 Future research may complement our work by focusing on more detailed aspects 
of existing models. For example, our framework addresses how the core notions of 
social categorization models (i.e. that perceivers can categorize or individuate) can 
be integrated with the core notions of connectionist models (e.g. associative learning, 
spreading of activation via associations, etc.). However, our framework ignores more 
detailed aspects of existing models (e.g. how categorization and individuation may 
interact, or how exactly associations are learned). Nevertheless, our framework may 
serve as a starting point for (theoretical or empirical) research on such more detailed 
aspects. Overall, I hope that the work presented in this dissertation deepens our 
understanding of person perception, and thereby the conceptual basis to address 
relevant societal problems.
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Hoe werkt persoonswaarneming? Hoe vormen we indrukken van andere mensen 
in ons alledaagse leven (bijvoorbeeld dat een persoon verlegen, arrogant of aardig 
is)? Dit onderwerp is niet alleen theoretisch interessant maar ook maatschappelijk 
relevant. Mensen discrimineren vaak andere mensen gebaseerd op snelle oordelen 
op basis van oppervlakkige kenmerken zoals ras, geslacht en etniciteit. Er zijn 
tegenwoordig meerdere modellen in de persoonswaarnemingsliteratuur die 
belangrijke inzichten bieden in deze onderwerpen. Twee modellen worden in dit 
proefschrift behandeld. Volgens sociale categorisatie modellen is discriminatie 
vaak het gevolg van onze natuurlijke neiging om andere mensen te “categoriseren” 
(bijvoorbeeld als man) in plaats van te “individueren” (de persoon as een uniek 
individu behandelen). Volgens connectionistische modellen is discriminatie van 
sociale groepen vaak het gevolg van aangeleerde associaties (bijvoorbeeld een 
associatie tussen Afro-Amerikaan en crimineel) welke onze oordelen en ons gedrag 
naar andere mensen dan (impliciet) beïnvloeden. 
 Dit proefschrift heeft als doel bestaande modellen (1) duidelijker te maken en (2) 
te integreren. De mate waarin deze modellen ons begrip van persoonswaarneming 
verbeteren wordt beperkt door de mate waarin deze modellen duidelijk geformuleerd 
zijn. Als niet duidelijk is wat we met “categorisatie” bedoelen dan geeft de theorie 
dat discriminatie het gevolg is van “categorisatie” ook maar beperkt inzicht. Daarom 
was het eerste doel van dit proefschrift om de conceptuele helderheid van sociale 
categorisatie modellen verder te verbeteren door verschillende betekenissen van de 
term “categorisatie” uit elkaar te trekken.
 In hoofdstuk 2 lieten we zien dat de term “categorisatie” met kwalitatief 
verschillende betekenissen werd gebruikt door verschillende onderzoekers. Ten 
eerste werd de term “categorisatie” gebruikt voor de cognitieve strategie om externe 
stimuli toe te wijzen aan interne representaties (de representatie definitie). Ten 
tweede werd de term “categorisatie” gebruikt voor de cognitieve strategie om externe 
stimuli toe te wijzen aan binaire alles-of-niets representaties (de dichotomization 
definitie). Ten derde werd de term “categorisatie” gebruikt voor de cognitieve 
strategie om informatie over een andere persoon samen te vatten doormiddel van 
een organiserende representatie (de organisatie definitie). Ten vierde werd de term 
“categorisatie” gebruikt voor de cognitieve strategie om mensen als groepsleden te 
beschouwen in plaats van individuen (de groeperen definitie).
 Onder elke definitie leidt de theorie “mensen categoriseren andere mensen” 
tot andere voorspellingen. Bijvoorbeeld: onder de dichotomization definitie leidt 
de theorie “mensen categoriseren andere mensen” tot de voorspelling dat mensen 
op een alles-of-niets manier waarnemen (bijvoorbeeld dat iemand of professor is 
of niet) in plaats van continu (bijvoorbeeld de mate waarin iemand professor is). 
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Onder de groeperen definitie daarentegen leidt de theorie “mensen categoriseren 
andere mensen” tot de voorspelling dat mensen andere mensen binnen een sociale 
groep met elkaar verwarren (bijvoorbeeld mannen met andere mannen). Het 
gevolg is dat de relatie tussen de theorie “mensen categoriseren andere mensen” en 
empirische bevindingen onduidelijk wordt wanneer de verschillende definities niet 
onderscheiden worden. Hierdoor kan het gebeuren dat verschillende onderzoekers 
schijnbaar tegenovergestelde conclusies trekken (bijvoorbeeld “mensen 
categoriseren bijna nooit” vs “mensen categoriseren vaak”) op basis van dezelfde 
empirische literatuur. Hoofdstuk 2 liet zien dat zulke schijnbaar tegenovergestelde 
conclusies soms weer in overeenstemming bracht kunnen worden door de 
onderliggende definities uit elkaar te trekken (bijvoorbeeld: mensen nemen bijna 
nooit op een alles-of-niets manier waar maar beschouwen andere mensen vaak als 
groepsleden). 
 In hoofdstuk 3 zetten we eerste stappen richting een formalisatie van sociale 
categorisatie modellen. Hiervoor gebruikten we de groeperen definitie waarin 
“categorisatie” betekent dat een andere persoon als een groepslid wordt beschouwd 
in plaats van een individu. Het idee dat mensen “categoriseren” in de zin van 
groeperen werd door veel empirisch onderzoek bevestigd. We stelden een formele 
implementatie voor door groeperen te interpreteren als het activeren van een 
representatie die algemeen door elk afzonderlijk lid van een sociale groep geprikkeld 
wordt (bijvoorbeeld elke man) en individuatie als het activeren van een representatie 
die alleen maar door een specifieke persoon geprikkeld wordt (bijvoorbeeld Brad 
Pitt). Vervolgens lieten we zien dat deze formele interpretatie consistent is met 
meerdere aangetoonde fenomenen in de persoonswaarnemingsliteratuur. Met 
andere woorden, op basis van bestaande bevindingen lijkt het plausibel dat mensen 
in deze zin “categoriseren”.
 Het tweede doel van dit proefschrift was om bij te dragen aan de integratie van 
sociale categorisatie modellen en connectionistische modellen. Het kernidee van 
sociale categorisatie modellen is dat mensen twee processen kunnen gebruiken: 
ze kunnen of een andere persoon “categoriseren” (met discriminatie als gevolg) 
of “individueren”. Het kernidee van connectionistische modellen is dat mensen 
associaties leren tussen interne representaties (bijvoorbeeld tussen de representaties 
Afro-Amerikaan en crimineel). Vervolgens verspreid activatie via deze associaties 
(bijvoorbeeld van Afro-Amerikaan naar crimineel) wat de waarneming van andere 
personen beïnvloed. Connectionistische modellen worden vaak als single-proces 
modellen gezien omdat ze veronderstellen dat elke stimulus op dezelfde manier 
behandeld wordt. 
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 Zonder een overkoepelende theorie blijft echter onduidelijk wanneer welk 
model van toepassing is en daarom ook wat deze modellen tezamen ons over 
persoonswaarneming leren. Bijvoorbeeld: is de bevinding dat er een cognitieve 
dissociatie is in de persoonswaarneming consistent met de theoretische 
persoonswaarnemingsliteratuur (de dissociatie zou komen doordat mensen 
zowel categoriseren als individueren) of inconsistent met deze literatuur (hoe 
past deze dissociatie bij single-proces connectionistische modellen?). Zijn er twee 
onderliggende processen of is er maar één proces? Een overkoepelende theorie is 
nodig die duidelijk maakt hoe sociale categorisatie en connectionistische modellen 
bij elkaar passen.
 In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we een overkoepelende theorie voorgesteld. Het 
basisidee was dat categorisatie en individuatie kunnen worden onderscheiden in 
de input van connectionistische modellen. Dit kan men zich als volgt voorstellen: 
een koffiemachine kan twee soorten inputs nemen (twee soorten koffie capsules) 
en past dan hetzelfde proces toe (water door de capsule drukken) om twee 
outputs te genereren (twee soorten koffie). Op dezelfde manier stellen wij voor 
dat connectionistische modellen twee soorten inputs kunnen nemen (groep-
representaties en exemplar-representaties), daarop hetzelfde proces toepassen 
(associatief leren op basis van co-variaties, activatie op basis van observatie, 
verspreiden van activatie via associaties en activatieverval) en daardoor verschillende 
outputs genereert (bijvoorbeeld een herinnering aan een groepslid of een individu). 
In deze theorie is “categorisatie” het toewijzen van een persoon aan een groeps-
representatie en “individuatie” het toewijzen van een persoon aan een exemplar-
representatie. 
 Verder stelden we een formele implementatie van deze theorie voor. We stelden 
namelijk een connectionistisch model voor waarin men tussen representaties kan 
onderscheiden in termen van hoe algemeen ze door stimuli geprikkeld worden: 
terwijl sommige representaties door elk afzonderlijk lid van een groep geprikkeld 
worden (bijvoorbeeld elke man; groep-representatie) worden andere representaties 
alleen maar door één specifieke persoon geprikkeld (bijvoorbeeld Brad Pitt; 
exemplar representatie). Het activeren van het eerste soort (groep-)representatie 
wordt daarbij als “categorisatie” gezien terwijl het activeren van het tweede soort 
(exemplar-)representatie als “individuatie” wordt gezien.
 Dit model laat een mogelijke manier zien waarop de kernideeën van sociale 
categorisatie en connectionistische modellen verenigd kunnen worden. Maar is 
dit ook een plausibele manier? Doormiddel van computersimulaties hebben we 
laten zien dat het model consistent is met aangetoonde fenomenen in meerdere 
gebieden van de persoonswaarneming. Ten eerste kon het model het fenomeen 
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reproduceren dat het activeren van een categorie in mindere mate informatie 
over leden van de categorie activeert hoe meer leden bekend zijn (Fenomeen 1). 
Ten tweede kon het model het fenomeen reproduceren we mensen vaker binnen 
groepen dan tussen groepen verwarren in ons geheugen (Fenomeen 2; deel 1). 
Door een “Multinomial Processing Tree” analyse op dezelfde simulatie toe te passen 
konden we ook het cognitieve dissociatie fenomeen reproduceren (Fenomeen 2; 
deel 2). Ten derde kon het model het fenomeen reproduceren dat het groeperen van 
stimuli op een manier die gecorreleerd is met variatie op een dimensie (bijvoorbeeld 
het noemen van korte lijnen als A en lange lijnen als B) de waarneming op deze 
dimensie polariseert (bijvoorbeeld dat het verschil tussen waargenomen lengte van 
lijnen groter wordt tussen de groepen; Fenomeen 3). Ten vierde kon het model het 
fenomeen reproduceren dat persoonlijkheidstrekken (bijvoorbeeld extravert) een 
minder effectieve basis voor persoonsinferenties zijn in vergelijking tot (sommige) 
andere groeperingen (bijvoorbeeld politicus; Fenomeen 4). Het model lijkt dus 
relatief plausibel op basis van deze bevindingen. 
 Idealiter moet een theorie niet alleen bestaande bevindingen verklaren 
(post hoc) maar ook nieuwe bevindingen voorspellen (a priori). In hoofdstuk 4 
hebben we daarom studies besproken die nieuwe voorspellingen op basis van 
onze overkoepelende theorie hebben getoetst. Onze theorie voorspelt namelijk 
dat verwisselingen tussen mensen in ons geheugen op basis van elke sociale 
representatie kan gebeuren die gebruikt kan worden om mensen te groeperen. In 
overeenstemming met deze voorspelling lieten onze bevindingen zien dat mensen 
betrouwbare gezichten vaker met elkaar verwisselen dan met onbetrouwbare 
gezichten (en omgekeerd) – met name als betrouwbaarheid meer saillant werd 
gemaakt. Bovendien vonden we bewijs voor een dissociatie tussen categorisatie 
en individuatie door de conventionele proces dissociatie analyse op de data van 
deze studies toe te passen. Deze bevindingen konden niet eenduidig vanuit eerdere 
modellen worden voorspeld omdat “betrouwbaarheid” daar vaak niet als een 
categorie werd gezien.
 Hoe verbetert dit ons begrip van persoonswaarneming? Onze overkoepelende 
theorie maakt duidelijk wanner welk model van toepassing is (bijvoorbeeld vormt 
het cognitieve dissociatie fenomeen bewijs tegen connectionistische single-proces 
modellen?). Denk nog een keer aan het voorbeeld van de koffiemachine. Als we weten 
dat twee verschillende soorten koffie capsules als input voor deze machine worden 
gebruikt dan kunnen we voorspellen dat de machine ten minste twee verschillende 
soorten koffie als output teruggeeft. Als we bovendien weten dat de koffiemachine 
altijd water door de koffie capsule drukt dan kunnen we voorspellingen over de 
afloop maken zoals wanneer welk geluid te horen zal zijn tijdens het maken van 
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de koffie. Onze theorie werkt net zoals dit voorbeeld. Omdat er twee soorten 
connectionistische inputs zijn (groep- en exemplar-representaties) kunnen we 
voorspellen (in overeenstemming met empirische bevindingen) dat bewijs voor 
een cognitieve dissociatie kan worden gevonden (net zoals we twee soorten koffie 
vanuit de twee input koffie capsules kunnen voorspellen). Omdat beide soorten 
inputs doormiddel van een dynamische connectionistisch proces worden bewerkt 
kunnen we verder voorspellen (in overeenstemming met empirische bevindingen) 
dat we bewijs voor dit soort dynamisch processen zouden kunnen we vinden terwijl 
proefpersonen een response genereren (net zoals een proces model van de koffie 
machine ons helpt te voorspellen wanneer we welk geluid zouden moeten horen). 
 Wat kunnen we hieruit leren over de mogelijke oorzaken van discriminatie van 
sociale groepen? Het is duidelijker geworden wat precies de onderliggende oorzaken 
van verschillende soorten van discriminatie zijn. Zo lieten we in hoofdstuk 3 zien dat 
verwisselingen tussen personen (denk bijvoorbeeld aan identificaties van de dader 
van een misdrijf door getuigen door getuigen) kunnen plaatsvinden op basis van 
elke manier van groeperen van andere personen (“categorisatie” onder de groeperen 
definitie). Deze theoretische voorspelling werd ondersteund door de bevindingen 
in hoofdstuk 4. Dit leidt tot de implicatie dat dit soort geheugen verwisselingen 
waarschijnlijk niet alleen maar voor mensen van andere etniciteiten gebeuren maar 
meer algemeen door elke soort van groeperen van andere mensen (bijvoorbeeld 
dat ze allemaal onbetrouwbaar lijken). Een tweede voorbeeld is dat stereotyperen 
niet perse door groeperen in het algemeen komt maar vooral door het toewijzen 
van mensen aan kleine en homogene groepen (bijvoorbeeld politicus) in plaats van 
grote en heterogene groepen (bijvoorbeeld extravert). 
 Toekomstig onderzoek zou dit werk kunnen aanvullen door op meer 
gedetailleerde aspecten van bestaande modellen te focussen. Onze overkoepelende 
theorie laat bijvoorbeeld zien hoe de kernideeën van sociale categorisatie 
modellen (dat mensen andere mensen kunnen categoriseren of individueren) en 
connectionistische modellen (dat we associaties leren en door deze associaties 
beïnvloed worden) verenigd kunnen worden. Tegelijkertijd negeert deze theorie 
specifiekere aspecten (bijvoorbeeld hoe categorisatie en individuatie interacteren 
of hoe precies associaties worden geleerd). Niettemin kan onze theorie als een 
start punt worden gezien voor (theoretisch of empirisch) onderzoek wat zich op 
dit soort gedetailleerde aspecten richt. Over het algemeen hoop ik dat het werk 
in dit proefschrift ons begrip van persoonswaarneming verdiept en daarmee de 
conceptuele basis legt om bestaande maatschappelijke problemen op te lossen.
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My PhD project felt like a real adventure. Many times I had to leave my comfort zone 
and this could have gone two ways: it could either have been a source of personal 
growth or it could have been a traumatic experience. When I look back at my PhD 
project now I can definitely say two things. First, my PhD project has not been easy 
and far outside of my initial comfort zone. It was an experience that could very well 
have left scars on me. Second, my PhD project has also definitely been an amazing 
experience and an invaluable source of personal growth. This almost seems to be 
a contradiction but the simple factor that makes this combination possible is this: 
support from great people. Some people supported me directly in my project while 
others supported me indirectly during or after work. In any case, without those 
people, things could have turned out very differently and I feel incredibly grateful 
for their help.
Ron Dotsch
Ron, when I started my PhD project under your supervision you literally turned my 
world on its head. Most of my supervisors tried to pull me down to earth when I came 
up with overly ambitious plans. But not you. You took my plans and made them four 
times more ambitious. I was baffled, excited, scared, and I loved it. Together, we took 
on the seemingly impossible and turned it into reality. You taught me how to walk 
in unexplored directions, how to learn things I never knew I could learn, and how to 
keep walking in the face of drawbacks. I feel incredibly proud of the things we have 
achieved and so lucky that you have been my supervisor. I realize that I was one of 
your first PhD students so maybe I should give you some feedback. Here it is: just 
keep doing what you have been doing, it was amazing. Thank you for everything!
Daniël Wigboldus
Daniël, you have been involved in my academic career literally since the very 
beginning. When I arrived in the Netherlands, I was not sure whether leaving my 
home country and starting a study in a foreign language was a wise choice. However, 
after only a few of your lectures it was clear to me that coming to the Netherlands 
was one of the best decisions I had ever made. Thanks to you, I got deeper into 
psychology than I ever hoped and it was more fun than I ever imagined. It turned out 
that the language and cultural barrier was nothing while finding the right people 
was everything. A very important lesson that had a huge impact on how I approach 
both my academic and private life today. And this was only the beginning. Later, 
you became my supervisor during my undergraduate and graduate studies. There 
are so many things I learned from you and many of them go far beyond the mere 
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craft of doing research. I think most of all, I have learned from your openness, your 
unconditional respect for other people, and your never-ending emphasis on the 
power of team-work. Thank you!
Iris van Rooij
Iris, what you have done for me during my PhD project is so remarkable that I find 
it hard to put it into words. Although I have always strongly identified with being 
a researcher, I could not get rid of the feeling that I was not doing exactly what I 
wanted to do. And then I met you and you opened the door into the world of 
theoretical research for me. It was like breaking though the water surface. It was 
mind-blowing and wonderful. It was nothing less than discovering my true identity 
as a scientist: a theorist. Working with you was a very special experience for me. It 
felt deeply personal and it enabled me to overcome barriers I did not even know 
existed. Thanks to you, my PhD research feels closer to my heart than any other 
research I have done before. Thanks to you, I discovered things about myself that I 
may never have discovered otherwise. And during all this time you have been there 
with seemingly inexhaustibly intellectual and emotional support. I am so grateful for 
everything you have done and feel extremely happy that our paths crossed. Thank 
you so much! 
Rob Holland
Rob, you have not been directly involved in my PhD project but without you it may 
never have come into existence. You have been my supervisor in all Bachelor years, 
you taught me “how to walk”, and shared your enthusiasm for doing research with 
me. As a natural sceptic, I hardly ever made choices without doubts but thanks to 
you becoming a researcher turned out to be one of the easiest choices in my life. 
Without you, there is a high chance that I would not be where I am now and I will 
never forget this. Thank you Rob, you will always be my cherished first year (and 
second year, and third year) bachelor supervisor!
Lorijn Zaadnoordijk
I used to think that a PhD project is all about staying focused but I learned that a PhD 
project is also about getting distracted once in a while. I learned that having a chat 
over a coffee can lead to new perspectives, that dancing Tango can lead to plans to 
visit scientific conferences in Los Angeles, that Babybots are undeniably awesome, 
that R2D2 is in the new Star Trek movies (thank you so much for that insight), and that 
sometimes a developmental psychologist can have more in common with a social 
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psychologist than a social psychologist with another social psychologist. Lorijn, thank 
you for sharing thoughts and emotions, for lots of great dancing, and most of all for 
messing up my orderly life from time to time. You are a very pleasant annoyance.
Lin Jansen
Lin, we have been colleagues for… how long? Very long in any case. It is quite hard 
for me to get used to the thought of doing research without you working next door. 
When I read terms like “peer review” my brain explains it to me as “people like Lin 
review a paper”. And maybe that is not only because we have been colleagues for so 
long but also because the challenges we have faced have been so similar – and also 
many of our passions! I definitely miss having you working on the same floor. Thank 
you for everything and I hope to see you around for a long time!
 
Lukas Wolf
This may sound a bit cheesy but one thing I definitely missed during my time as PhD 
student was watching the sunset over a beer with my pal after a long university day. 
Living in different countries has made this rather difficult but although we did not 
spend much time together in the last years, we definitely made it count. Together, 
we explored mountains, caves, waterfalls, and glaciers, we watched sunsets, saw 
northern lights, made fire, listened to the same soundtracks over and over again and 
then complained that we cannot keep listening to them during a hike, we somewhat 
destroyed a car, we got lost in the most impossible situations, we froze, starved, faced 
death, and celebrated being alive. What could be a better balance to the troubles of 
working life? These memories will accompany me for the rest of my life, thank you so 
much for that! May many more be added in the future!
Gesa Kappen
Life can be funny sometimes. In my case, it took a couple of valuables and with it 
my future perspectives and for a while my optimism and energy. But in return it 
gave me a wonderful friend. Gesa, you once said to me that I have a very positive 
way of looking at life. But there is a huge confound in this assessment: you. Having 
you as a friend makes it virtually impossible to think negatively. You spread so much 
happiness in the world that I sometimes wonder whether the world can possibly give 
you a fair amount back – but I do my best to provide my part. I can hardly imagine 
where life would have gotten me without you. In fact, I do not want to imagine it. I 
hope you forgive me for stealing your words but I simply cannot express it better: 
ILTSOOY.
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I also want to give special thanks to…
•	 Eliot Smith for hosting me at Indiana University and his support with getting 
started with my theoretical research project.
•	 Kurt Hugenberg and Ad van Knippenberg for their support with Chapter 2
•	 All people from the Person Perception group, the Behaviour Regulation group, 
and the Computational Cognitive Science group.
•	 Sterre, Xijia, and Mariko for being my friends in academia since many years.
•	 Matthias Klein for being a great friend for more than 15 years.
•	 Maaike van der Heiden for an uncountable number of great dance nights and 
many other unforgettable memories that helped me to take some very needed 
mental breaks.
•	 Sara Baldan for a truly amazing and inspiring time on the Camino Portuguese at 
the moment when I needed it the most.
•	 Last but not least, thanks to my family for all kinds of support, be it encouragement, 
advice or simply listening.
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André Klapper was born in Cologne in 1986. He completed a Bachelor in Psychology 
and a Research Master in Behavioral Science at the Radboud University Nijmegen. 
During his master project, he combined behavioral and neuroimaging methods to 
investigate the mechanisms that underlie automatic imitation of observed behavior, 
which he partially conducted in a 3-month internship at the Bangor University in 
Wales. Next, he worked as a PhD student of Ron Dotsch and Daniël Wigboldus in the 
field of social perception. He became particularly interested in the quest to advance 
cognitive theories. For this purpose, he joined forces with Iris van Rooij (head of the 
Computational Cognitive Science group of the Donders Institute) who later became 
a co-promotor on his PhD project. The resulting PhD research provided steps to 
sharpen and synthesize existing theories of social perception using a broad set of 
scientific approaches including conceptual analysis, computational modeling, and 
empirical approaches. Currently, André is a postdoctoral researcher at the Donders 
Center for Cognitive Neuroimaging where he is working with Alan Sanfey in the field 
of decision neuroscience.
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